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THE INTEGRATION OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL COORDINATION AND 
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT IN RESPONSE TO IMMEDIATE CRISES 
 
THAILAND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT  
Tavida Kamolvej 
 
 
Recent occurrences of natural disasters and severe manmade hazards have increased 
awareness of the need for effective mitigation and response to extreme events. States of emergency 
require multiple agencies to perform multiple tasks simultaneously to return the situation to normal. 
This study proposes an inter-organizational model supported by the efficient use of information and 
communication technologies to assist multiple agencies in coordinating their actions more 
effectively during states of emergency.  The model will assist participating agencies to develop the 
capacity to adapt to emergency conditions as well as the ability to replace other functions that fail in 
order to maintain the continuity of basic operations for the community until the state of emergency 
is cleared.  
Three recent cases of emergency operations in Thailand are examined to assess whether 
coordination among response agencies can be improved by using appropriately designed interagency 
operations. The complex environment of emergency response operations offers an extraordinary 
opportunity to investigate methods that may be used to understand and identify factors that build 
strength or lead to weakness in practice. The interdependence of sequential failures from sudden 
impacts such as the collapse of electrical transmission lines or a communication system provides a 
practical challenge for assessing the use of information and communication technologies in 
managing emergencies. Insights gained from this project may assist public agencies to work together 
more effectively. 
 iv 
This research is conducted as an exploratory study with a nested case design. It employs both 
qualitative and quantitative methods of observation, interviews, social network analysis, document 
review and structured surveys to identify complementary characteristics rather than advocating a 
single style of research. Units of analysis are the emergency response organizations at national, 
provincial and local levels while units of observation are emergency response personnel in each 
organization. In addition, units of observation are stratified into top, middle, and operational levels 
of management in order to obtain information that may vary by levels of authority. Information 
obtained from multiple sources is analyzed to understand better the existing emergency response 
operations and how to improve the system effectively and efficiently. 
An alternative approach based on lessons learned from this study is to build systematic and 
adaptive collaboration among agencies, national, provincial and local levels, in emergency 
management of Thailand. The primary actors, Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation 
(DDPM), Bangkok Metropolitan Authority (BMA), Civil Emergency Relief Department (CERD), 
and District Offices (DO) can play effective roles in emergency response network under different 
scales of emergency. Insufficient information support and communication channels increase the 
difficulties of activating the action plan in wider response in states of emergency. Information 
technology and communication systems allow multiple agencies to share their knowledge and 
information they need in making informed decisions. Communication is a significant means to 
enable participating agencies to coordinate their operations simultaneously. These functions of 
information technology and communication help connect the entire emergency operation into a well-
organized direction. 
 
 v 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
The importance of public safety has gained recognition from governments of all countries around 
the world. Public safety includes how well communities cope with extreme phenomena, such as 
natural disasters and threats of manmade hazards, as well as how effectively emergency response 
agencies respond to such crises. The uncertainty and unexpected consequences of these extreme 
events create severe conditions such as large scale destruction of buildings, dramatic change in 
geography, destruction of communication and electrical infrastructure, exacerbated by a lack of 
understanding of risks to which communities are exposed. Natural disasters may create heavy 
damage across wide areas that require public agencies to work together nationally and locally to 
manage states of emergency. Such crises require a clear understanding of risks and skillfully 
coordinated operations to return the situation to normal. Under urgent constraints of time and 
threat to life, information and communication facilities are critical to enable multiple agencies to 
coordinate their actions simultaneously and make timely informed decisions. In states of 
emergency, all participating response agencies need to work together and communicate with 
each other. This study examines how emergency management policies are implemented in 
Thailand at national and local levels separately and cooperatively, and what information and 
communication processes are essential to emergency management. 
 
 1 
1.1 RESEARCH PROBLEM: THE SEARCH FOR COLLABORATIVE 
EMERGENCY RESPONSE 
Recent occurrences of natural disasters and severe manmade hazards have increased awareness 
of the need for effective mitigation and response to such extreme events. Such events cause 
devastation and unpredictable impacts, spreading widely across communities, resulting in sudden 
damage to infrastructure, transportation, communication, property, and losses of life, health, and 
livelihood. States of emergency require multiple agencies to perform multiple tasks 
simultaneously to return the situation to normal. Unorganized and inexperienced response can 
delay disaster assistance and recovery processes. In addition, lack of understanding of risks to 
which communities are exposed leads to an unprepared state of emergency services to cope with 
sudden threats and changed conditions. Increasing manpower alone will not be effective in 
facilitating emergency response operations, if those personnel have insufficient skills and 
knowledge.  
Intergovernmental management raises the question of what roles and authorities should 
be assigned to participating agencies individually and cooperatively. Radin, et al, (1996) argue 
that multi-organizational arrangements are solutions for inter-organizational problems that 
cannot be achieved by a single organization working alone. States of emergency need to take into 
account the adaptive capacity of single unit and effective coordination of multilevel 
governmental agencies. The tsunami disaster in six provinces in southern Thailand is a good 
example of how the national government works with the provincial and local authorities across 
provincial jurisdictions, while the flood risk and massive accidents in Bangkok reflect how the 
provincial government manages through its district units and other agencies to respond to states 
of emergency locally.  
 2 
Thai governmental agencies, even though they have absorbed the new public 
management concept of decentralization, have been managed under a traditional bureaucracy for 
a long period of time. Kettl (2002) and Salamon (2002) argue that new governance moves its 
focus to networks rather than hierarchy in organizational forms. Under states of emergency, 
public managers have the obligation and responsibility for making decisions regarding life and 
death. Their training may have focused on command and control as a traditional means of 
disaster management. Public executives may believe that strictly top-down decision making and 
a single operational unit will result in more efficient disaster management. Yet, the tsunami 
disaster demonstrates that large scale of states of emergency require interagency coordination to 
manage an effective response while the flooding crisis and massive accidents in metropolitan 
Bangkok show the need for collaboration among their agencies as well as across sectors.  
With low awareness of tsunami risk and lack of understanding in such states of 
emergency especially with a large scale of devastation as of 6 provinces along a coastal area, 
Thai national and provincial governments have many difficulties in working together to provide 
assistance to damaged communities. Lack of experience in crisis management leads agencies to 
misinterpret severe risk and creates an unorganized and inadequate response. This study assesses 
the flood crisis management and massive accident emergency plan of Bangkok as well as 
response to the tsunami in southern Thailand, expecting to learn of emergency management from 
Bangkok that emergency personnel has longer and more frequent experience. It seeks to identify 
the patterns of self organization and adaptation in complex systems in emergency operation. 
These two approaches explain and clarify the adaptive capacity of organizations to benefit 
participating agencies and affected communities. Lessons and experiences shared among 
agencies foster organizational flexibility to adapt to changes and deal with complexity.  
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Preliminary assessment shows that Bangkok Metropolitan Authority (BMA) and its 
emergency response agencies need to review their crisis operations and emergency policy, 
especially regarding how to get all the participating agencies to work together under the 
constraints of time, resources, experience, and technical equipments. Members of relatively new 
established emergency mitigation department, Civil Emergency Relief Department (CERD), may 
obtain their long experience from being fire fighters, yet confronting different emergency needs 
with adaptive capacity and learning from the experience of others. Since an increased awareness 
and recognition of the need for emergency preparedness has emerged, this study examines the 
alternatives for reducing the costs involved in improving public safety and the need to relocate 
budget priorities to achieve this goal. BMA also focuses on developing strategies for the CERD 
to assist the communities in building cooperation and preparing for emergency situations. This is 
especially important for the Civil Defense Volunteer Units (CDVU), operating together with the 
District Offices (DO) as front line emergency personnel, which are also trained and supported by 
Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation (DDPM) who is the primary emergency 
response personnel and operates nation wide. Good relationships and frequent communication 
are bases of trust and sharing information they need in conducting an effective emergency 
response operations.   
A dramatic change in geography and unstable structures make disaster areas more 
difficult for agencies to access efficiently and coordinate actions with other participating 
agencies simultaneously without effective communication facilities. The unexpected failure of 
communication and electrical systems worsens the situation since the agencies could not 
communicate and update the information. The information and communication facilities are 
crucial to managing states of emergency especially across a large scale of devastation. A typical 
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communication and information system can fail due to the lack of power or the black-out of 
electricity. This research also examines the role of information technology in order to pursue the 
alternative solution for communication under system failure. Emergency response agencies need 
sufficient information in order to make more informed decisions, and such information sharing 
and decision making need to be supported by an efficient communication system.    
1.2 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT IN THAILAND 
1.2.1 Emergency Management in Tsunami Response 
On 26 December 2004, the first tsunami wave generated by the 7:58 a.m. magnitude 9.1 
earthquake off the west coast of Sumatra, Indonesia struck Thailand at approximately 9:30 am, 
local time. Most heavily damaged were the tourist areas and communities on Phuket and PhiPhi 
Islands, Krabi province, and the west coast of PhangNga province. The local population had 
almost no knowledge of tsunamis or the potential risk of a tsunami following a powerful 
earthquake. In Thailand, this lack of local knowledge was attributed in part to the fact that the 
area had been designated as “low risk” for earthquake and tsunami hazards.  
This study investigates and assesses two areas of devastation with two objectives. First, it 
examines the two provinces that were the most damaged from the effects from December 26, 
2004 tsunami, Phuket and PhangNga. Second, it compares the two provinces in terms of the 
significant differences in their local environments. Phuket is a tourist area with a particular 
geographic structure that makes the area relatively less affected from tsunami. The Phuket 
coastline has a deep beachfront area, which reduces a tsunami’s energy and its ability to create 
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high destructive waves.  However, the beach hotels on Phuket Island were filled with tourists for 
the Christmas holiday, many from Europe with little experience with tsunami hazard.  
In contrast, PhangNga has a shallow beachfront area, a geological structure that exposes 
the area to the highest level of risk in a tsunami.  PhangNga additionally occupies a geographical 
location with one main road to access the area that makes effective rescue difficult. PhangNga 
has two different communities, the hotel and resort community and the local communities. The 
differences between the settings inside PhangNga make the province more complicated to both 
mitigate and recover from disaster. Hotels and resorts occupy well-structured locations, enabling 
response agencies to access those areas more easily than in the crowded local communities. 
Locals, however, are more familiar with the area, which helps them to escape to a more secure 
location than tourists and transients around the hotel and resort areas.  
1.2.2 Emergency Management in Flood Crisis in Bangkok Metropolitan  
Bangkok Metropolitan Authority (BMA) is a special governing system for a capital city. BMA 
has its own administration operating locally through the district units and financed by its own 
budget. There will definitely be questions regarding exercise of the hierarchy and political 
control when examining cross sectional cooperation of the personnel from different agencies. 
Understanding of the structure and authority of BMA and its relation to the national government 
will give a better assessment of the status and the probability of approaching the system with 
network analysis. Like or unlike other developing countries, Bangkok Metropolitan Authority 
may have an effective pattern of emergency operation and management that the other studies can 
apply or build upon. 
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For the past eight years, Bangkok has seemingly mitigated the severity of flood risks 
because of both the implementation of a comprehensive drainage system and fortunate nature. As 
the statistical data (BMA report from 1998 to 2004) show, the accumulation of water from rain, 
seawater, and north stream has not increased for the past eight years. The uncertainty is that these 
three causes of excess water have never occurred in Bangkok at the same time. BMA needs to 
operate its flood management plan along with other generic plan for water usage.  
The Department of Water Drainage under BMA is likely to have the opposite goal from 
the Department of Irrigation under the Ministry of Agriculture in preserving a specific amount of 
water. The Flood Control Center is used as the center of prediction and coordination and as the 
information and communication center of command operations. The 50 district office (DO) units 
are the operational team responsible for implementing the water release plan as well as working 
together with the traffic police trying to ease the traffic congestion regarding the excess amount 
of water on the main road. Most of the time, Bangkok is prioritized by the national government 
to clear its flood prone area to the boundaries of the natural water shed in vicinity areas. This 
research explores whether coordination is needed for these affected jurisdictions. In that sense, 
the coordination pattern may exist and function as routine operations.  
BMA has a relatively new emergency relief unit, Civil Emergency Relief Department 
which was transferred from the Fire Department at the end of 2003. This may be one reason that 
this organization did not respond as expected to the emergency situations included in this study. 
In the past, under a state of emergency or massive accident, BMA operated its emergency unit 
under the command and control of Fire Department and National Police Department along with 
rescue units from private foundations and paramedic teams. As a result, BMA did not have its 
own specialists and experienced personnel to perform emergency operations.  
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1.2.3 Emergency Management in Massive Accident in Districts of Bangkok 
In the fire case, the building collapse unfortunately resulted in the deaths of rescue personnel 
from both the National Police Department and the voluntary rescue team of BMA. The need for 
public safety raised the awareness of the communities regarding how BMA manages its own 
emergency policy. In this case, the state of emergency created a demand for an intensive 
operation that caused all personnel to respond. Unfortunately, the lack of experienced 
coordination and low awareness of the structure of the building after a long period of burning 
caused the building to collapse with five rescue personnel buried under the debris. 
In the underground train accident, there were no deaths but a lot of injuries. The accident 
portrayed a chaotic atmosphere and unorganized rescue and emergency operations. The 
underground train is a relatively new operation which reveals that the entire system as well as the 
accident plan is not yet stable. Once again BMA had to rely on private rescue units as the center 
of emergency management with supports from voluntary rescue team and paramedics to 
evacuate and give the primary treatment to the injured.  
Both incidents raise questions for the Bangkok governor and the management team 
regarding the current capacity of BMA and CERD for emergency management and their 
experience and skill in activating emergency operations effectively. As a result of these 
incidents, from January to March 2005, BMA restructured and retrained CERD to be a single 
reliable emergency unit that would assume responsibility for the entire emergency operation. 
This unit would implement the emergency plan and coordinate with other participating agencies. 
The training programs developed for this department not only address their specific operations 
but also relations with their co-agencies. In addition, CERD is expected to reach out to the 
communities so that the first emergency response can be primarily done by households.  
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1.3 RECENT RESPONSE TO EMERGENCIES 
1.3.1 Tsunami Response 
1.3.1.1 Nation-Wide Early Warning System 
 
The National Disaster Warning Center was established on May 30th, 2005, functioning as a focal 
point to integrate and analyze all information coming from international information providers, 
domestic governmental agencies and general public networks in order to decide whether or not a 
warning message will be disseminated. The warning would be directed to emergency response 
personnel, governmental agencies and the general public to start an evacuation process and 
prepare for emergency response operations. The warning message is automatically disseminated 
through different channels of communication to different targets. The national television pool, 
national radio stations network, and amateur radio network are used purposely to reach the 
general public. Cell phone text messages, email and facsimile are sent to relevant governmental 
organizations and personnel at national and provincial areas. Police, Military and Department of 
Disaster Prevention and Mitigation emergency personnel receive the same warning message 
through their trunk-radio and assigned-frequency radio networks. Another instant warning 
message is disseminated by siren towers. As of April 2006, 57 out of 77 siren towers have been 
installed in southern Thailand in tsunami affected areas.       
Along a coastline within tsunami inundation coverage, siren towers have been installed 
with the broadcast of warning messages in five different languages to warn people who are out 
on the beach and the locals who are not reachable by any other means of communication. The 
siren towers are automatically activated from the national center in Bangkok with a relay time of 
2 minutes. The assigned emergency personnel from different public agencies will respond to a 
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warning message sent from the national center and will proceed with their tasks as planned and 
drilled. Emergency personnel will update situations periodically to NDWC and wait until a 
termination of state of emergency is released from the center to allow people to return 
accordingly.  
Problems and difficulties fall under a classic argument of bureaucracy regarding how 
governmental organizations and public agencies cope with change. First, NDWC as a national 
organization needs not only legislation to support its existence and authorities requiring other 
agencies to cooperate, but also competent staff in emergency management to perform all 
procedures effectively. The recruitment of new personnel is time consuming, and skillful human 
resources in the field are rare. Secondly, NDWC is trying to enlarge and enrich its 
responsibilities by taking not only tsunami but all natural hazards into account. It creates a large 
amount of concern and hesitation from governmental agencies who originally are taking 
responsibility for issuing warnings such as the Departments of Meteorology, Mineral Resources, 
Royal Irrigation and Hydrographic of the Royal Navy. Last but very important, provincial 
governors have to clearly understand and willingly accept the role of the national center as a 
decision maker who has full authority to issue a warning message that requires provincial and 
local authorities to react accordingly. The nation-wide warning system and management require 
the integration of intergovernmental coordination, information sharing and communication 
networks for a warning message to be effectively disseminated in order to save lives and 
property.  
1.3.1.2 Nation Wide Emergency Response 
The Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation (DDPM) has relocated more personnel 
and resources to the southern regional centers and provinces. All resources and facilities have 
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been prepared and assessed to be ready for emergency response. Evacuation map, risk 
assessment, building codes, and evacuation procedures have been developed. DDPM is working 
to adapt their action plan to a generic action plan for other provincial emergency agencies and 
responsible governmental organizations such as the Department of Mineral Resources who also 
has responsibility for the geographical assessment of risk areas.  
It is clear that technical infrastructure and resources can be placed in position and made 
available. However, organizational authority and inter-organizational structure require clear 
direction and procedures to follow. Legislation needs to support the authority and guide how 
interagency coordination should be conducted effectively. More importantly, DDPM also needs 
the cooperation of other emergency agencies and communities in evacuation management in 
order to carry out an action plan appropriately. Coordinating emergency operations also requires 
a skillful and well-trained workforce. Tsunami drills that are conducted periodically to test the 
warning system and the evacuation procedures can help them to understand how to work 
together in implementing evacuation operations. However, all emergency personnel, police, 
military, coastguard, provincial officers and medical units, need to learn to work together in 
emergency response operations and disaster mitigation. Failure or malfunction of one unit should 
be effectively compensated by the other neighboring units’ operations, so that the entire 
emergency response system has the capacity to continue to deliver assistance to those in need.     
The DDPM Academy joined by international disaster reduction agencies and emergency 
experts, provides training courses to emergency response personnel around the country in areas 
exposed to multi-hazards. The problems and difficulties of the tsunami response triggered an 
awareness and recognition of the basic requirement for emergency operations, well-trained 
emergency personnel. However, training courses provided by the DDPM academy need to 
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consider the nature of natural disaster in the nation as well. Flood problems, drought crises and 
fire have a higher potential for occurrence than earthquake and tsunami. DDPM emergency 
personnel and action plans need to adapt to such facts. Technology and training programs from 
experts can not be used at their highest potential if local emergency personnel can not apply them 
to their operations and the situations they confront. Those training programs need to be 
developed, so that the skills trained are applicable to multiple hazards. Further, co-training 
programs among different geographical units and among different agencies need to be developed 
accordingly.  
1.3.2 Flood Crisis and Massive Accidents in Bangkok Metropolis 
1.3.2.1 The Establishment of Central Emergency Agency  
 In April 2005, Bangkok Metropolitan Authority (BMA) established its central emergency 
agency, Civil Emergency Relief Department (CERD), to be responsible for multi-hazards 
emergency operations in a large scale especially fire in Bangkok metropolis. CERD is 
functioning as coordinator of emergency field personnel when the scale of emergency is 
considered too large for district emergency units. CERD was transformed from a Fire Fighter 
Unit under National Police Department. There are not enough personnel, equipment, and fire 
stations to support multi-hazards operations. From an organizational competency perspective, 
CERD confronts with the same problems as NDWC in recruiting new personnel and in providing 
those training courses as well as reaching out for expert consultation. In addition, CERD is still 
adjusting to its position as the central emergency agency working with other agencies of BMA, 
and to the new status of its personnel as civil servants rather than police officers. Norms and 
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cultures of organizations still play significant roles and affect how personnel work and view their 
respective lines of authority.   
BMA approved a budget to purchase fire trucks and build more fire stations in the outer 
city area of Bangkok metropolis. Action plans of emergency management are designed and 
translated to all emergency personnel. The Civil Emergency Relief Department has recruited 
more personnel and built facilities and mapped the city construction and traffic in emergency 
response. CERD also provide many training programs to emergency personnel in other hazards 
than fire. Those training programs are also conducted with the participation of district officers, 
volunteers, communities and private sector companies.    
1.3.2.2 New Assignments to District Offices in Bangkok Metropolis 
BMA tasked the district offices to increase the number of members in district Civil Defense 
Volunteer Units (CDVU) to be able to create a stronger network of frontline emergency 
personnel to expand its emergency response coverage. CDVU volunteers also work closely with 
district enforcement officers in coordinating night-surveillance to protect communities from 
crimes and day-surveillance to inspect any malfunction of public construction or equipment that 
can cause an emergency or accident. BMA expects the district offices to reach out to 
communities more effectively by initiating a coordination activity between the two units as 
mentioned. Problems arise because the CDVU is composed of volunteers who have less 
incentive to participate in preparedness activities unless district offices can encourage them to 
accept responsibility for the safety of the communities. At the same time, district officers lack 
the motivation to do more work.        
In addition to emergency management preparedness, BMA assigned every district office 
the task of implementing an action plan for an effective a one-stop-service mobile operation to 
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access district areas in emergency maintenance, such as street pipe damage, road destruction and 
drainage problems. This unit, which is called Bangkok Emergency Service Team (BEST), 
structurally includes different divisions under the district office which are Civil Engineering, 
Enforcement, and Drainage. This unit is expected to deliver services effectively and efficiently to 
create a satisfactory relationship between communities and district offices. The problem is how 
to draw the lines of responsibility among BEST, CDVU, and district office emergency personnel.      
1.4 SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH 
Both national and local levels of emergency operations are expected to have cooperation from 
each other. The approach of intergovernmental management requires mutual understanding and 
partnership practice among all the agencies as well as communities. Effective coordination is 
limited by spatial distance and simultaneous operations. The use of information technology and 
computation produces virtual access to the geographical area and facilitates continuous 
communication among the agencies. This study explores existing emergency management plans 
and operations that are currently in practice. As the Thai government is working at national, 
provincial and local levels to accomplish the same goal of public safety by preparing effective 
crisis and emergency management policies, officials need to understand their capability and 
limitations. This understanding will assist them in developing alternatives for improving their 
emergency structure and operations to manage states of emergency more effectively. In addition, 
the mutual understanding of operations through multiple levels of jurisdiction will help to 
coordinate the emergency response appropriately.  
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To explore these issues, this study addresses the following research questions:  
1. To what extent do the key agencies responsible for disaster operations collaborate in 
large scale emergencies?  
2. To what extent are authority and responsibility for emergency management assigned 
to specific public agencies? 
3. To what extent does an intergovernmental coordination process operate in emergency 
management in practice?   
4. To what extent does the use of information technology facilitate inter-organizational 
coordination and communication in emergency management? 
5. In what ways are intergovernmental coordination and information management 
integrated in Thai emergency management?  
6. What are the significant factors that move existing emergency response systems 
toward auto adaptation, and how?  
1.5 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
Many researchers have addressed the problem of getting participating agencies to work together 
(Bardach 1998). Intergovernmental management is one approach that has received attention from 
scholars and government officials. Careful preparation for crises in communities is important to 
their capacity to manage risk. Increasing the awareness and understanding of the risks they 
confront can help both communities and the public agencies to work faster and more efficiently. 
This research examines disaster and emergency management practice in Thailand and explores 
the role of scalable inter-organizational emergency management through multiple agencies. It 
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emphasizes the study of the possible integration of intergovernmental management, uses of 
information technology, and the activation of smart communities to increase efficiency and 
effectiveness in reducing risk. These three concepts support the process of self organization that 
helps multiple participating parties to understand the limits of their knowledge. Recognizing 
their limits will help them to support collaborative decision making and understand the demands 
placed on other units in their operations. Coping with states of emergency and extreme events 
requires competent response agencies, coordinated operations, and efficient information and 
communication management. This study contributes to understanding the processes of self 
organization and the initiation of learning environment for emergency personnel. In turn, self 
organization assists agencies to translate the emergency management policy into practice 
effectively. 
1.6  ANTICIPATED FINDINGS 
A strong foundation of command and control is evident in the national, provincial and local 
governmental emergency management units since all levels of management have been operating 
under a hierarchical bureaucratic structure for a long time. Even though the new constitution 
(1999) states its recognition of the power of local authorities and emphasizes decentralization, 
command and control patterns still exist in public agencies’ operations. Recent events indicate 
the potential for change. The complexity of the environment such as crowded population and 
structures, and advances in information and communication technology convince Thai 
government officials at both levels to accept the lack of their effectiveness in emergency 
management and the significance of getting agencies to work together in performing multiple 
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tasks in complex environments with the help of information and communication technology to 
expand processes of coordination.  
A complex environment and bureaucratic culture are not the only difficulties in managing 
the multi-agencies operation in emergency situations. Being in a designated low-risk geographic 
zone, the people of Thailand were unaware and unprepared for large scale devastation and 
powerful destruction of disaster. The misinterpretation of the devastation and severity of the 
tsunami disaster are also expected to be one of the obstacles of any emergency mitigation plan. 
Not only do the national authorities and local agencies need to understand the risks to which they 
are exposed, but the communities also have to learn to be well prepared to confront the threats 
and cooperate with the agencies to activate the emergency plan effectively.  This study expects to 
find that the less knowledge and understanding the communities have, the less effective response 
and recovery operations are. This study will provide the assessment and analysis of the existing 
emergency management and operations and offer recommendations for improving the structure 
of operations and plans as well as involving the public and communities in emergency 
management. 
States of emergency can create unorganized mobilization of multiple agencies. 
Emergency response units are trained to cope with such procedures. Under conditions of 
uncertainty and unpredictable effects, the devastation and damage may require cooperative skills 
in operations, as well as adaptive capacity from all participating parties nationally and locally. 
The flood threat in Bangkok is a good case to identify a network of operational agencies to 
illustrate how Bangkok Metropolitan Authority has been enabling its agencies to work together, 
using all resources and facilities they have at hand. The experience of such crisis management 
should be a valuable asset for Bangkok government to apply to other threats and prepare its 
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central and district emergency personnel to cope with multi-hazards effectively. It is also 
expected that the result will support the integration of the local, provincial and national 
emergency response agencies of emergency organizational structure, authority, operation, and 
cooperative emergency management action plans. 
An alternative approach learned from the lessons of this study is to build systematic and 
adaptive collaboration among agencies, national, provincial and local levels, in emergency 
management of Thailand. The primary actors, Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation 
(DDPM), Bangkok Metropolitan Authority (BMA), Civil Emergency Relief Department 
(CERD), and District Offices (DO) can play effective roles in the emergency response network 
under different scales of emergency. This research assesses all levels of emergency agencies and 
operations under the analytical frameworks of 1) assessment of the intergovernmental network, 
communities’ involvement and the use of information technology, 2) knowledge sharing and 
information exchange assessment within and between the three cases, 3) integration of the 
intergovernmental network and information technology in implementing the emergency 
management policy, and 4) a proposed strategic plan and structure of collaboration among 
District Offices and CERD under BMA and DDPM under the Ministry of Interior.  
Information exchange and communications are important in managing emergency 
operations. This study expects to find evidence that insufficient information support, 
communication channels, and equipment increase the difficulties of activating the action plan for 
wider response in states of emergency. Information technology and communication systems 
allow multiple agencies to share their knowledge and the information they need in making 
informed decisions. Communication is a significant means to enable participating agencies to 
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coordinate their operations simultaneously. These functions of information technology and 
communication help to organize the entire emergency operation.  
1.7  ORGANIZATION OF CHAPTERS 
This dissertation is organized in seven chapters. The first chapter, states the problem of lack of 
systematically organized and adaptive emergency response in Thailand. This problem led to an 
exploration of states of emergency management at three levels of jurisdictional operations; 1) 
national-provincial-local scale in the tsunami response and 2) Bangkok Metropolitan area 
response to flood crisis and 3) the district level response to massive accidents within Bangkok 
Metropolitan area. There is a need for the Thai national government to understand the emergency 
response system in a larger scale and to learn how to improve such system.  
The second chapter reviews the literature related to emergency response in Thailand. 
This study proposes a conceptual model of the integration of intergovernmental networks in 
response to immediate crises built upon concepts of complex adaptive systems, interagency 
management, social networks, and information and communication management. Studies in the 
interdisciplinary area of emergency management approach this problem using a range of 
conceptual frameworks.  
Chapter three presents the multiple approaches used in research methodology. Each 
methodology has its weaknesses which, in turn, become strengths of the others. This study 
explores the three cases of emergency responses in Thailand, by employing participant 
observation, content analysis, interviews and surveys. Each methodology complements the 
others in the analyses and interpretations.  
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Findings from the analyses are presented in Chapter 4 characterizing the December 26, 
2004 tsunami response and in Chapter 5, characterizing the emergency response to the flood 
crisis and a massive accident in Bangkok Metropolis. The two cases of emergency response in 
Bangkok are under the same Emergency Act, directed by the Bangkok Metropolitan Authority 
and managed by the District Offices and Volunteer Units. This approach organizes the two cases 
in one chapter under the management of the Bangkok Metropolitan Authority. Both cases share 
the same emergency structure and support of central agencies and the Civil Emergency Relief 
Department, in case of overloaded operations. The significant roles and critical functions of the 
Flood Control Center and Vicinity’s involvement in flood crisis management will be discussed 
as well.   
Chapter 6 illustrates how emergency response in each of the three cases is managed 
through a scalable intergovernmental network. The interpretation of the performance of the three 
emergency response systems is later identified in terms of non-adaptive and emergent adaptive 
systems. How to improve the performance of the entire emergency response system to a state of 
auto-adaptive emergency response is considered.  
Chapter 7 of this study integrates all findings and analyses to suggest four concepts of 
effective emergency response that include; 1) a scalable intergovernmental network, 2) 
information and communication management, 3) resilient community network and 4) self 
learning in adaptive capacities. These four concepts, based on the concept of an auto-adaptive 
system with socio-technical components, are analyzed and integrated into the practices of 
disaster warning management and emergency response operations. These two steps are 
considered very important to help save lives and properties.           
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1.8 SUMMARY 
This study expects to translate the concepts of emergency operations and management into 
practice at different scales of implementation throughout the country. It also emphasizes the 
effective coordination of multiple levels of agencies as well as the adoption of information 
technology to help reduce the obstacle of large scale complex tasks. Three cases are explored and 
analyzed throughout the study to reflect how Thailand emergency personnel at different levels of 
jurisdiction manage its emergency response operations in states of emergency of different scales 
of severity. Those cases are December 26, 2004 tsunami, flood crisis in Bangkok Metropolis, and 
massive accidents in districts of metropolitan Bangkok.  The findings are expected to help 
district emergency personnel to reach out to the community for their effective participation, if an 
unexpected event occurs. In addition, this study explores the feasibility of integrating 
information technology into intergovernmental emergency management to generate back-up 
utilities in case of system failure and to enhance the performance of participating agencies for an 
effective emergency response. 
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2.0  A CONCEPTUAL MODEL FOR EFFECTIVE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 
Many researchers have addressed both structural and nonstructural solutions in seeking to 
mitigate disaster. Nonstructural mechanisms offer an alternative approach of organizational 
management and policy implementation to address the effectiveness and efficiency of emergency 
management. Policy scientists have argued that disaster preparedness can lessen the vulnerability 
of human communities to unforeseen natural events (Rosenthal, Boin, and Comfort 2001). States 
of emergency can be managed effectively, if communities foster readiness through 
organizational adaptive capacities of households and response agencies. Emergency management 
policy and practice can be constructed and conducted with a clear understanding of the crucial 
elements of participating agencies in the operations. This study employs the concepts of self 
organization, complex adaptive systems, intergovernmental management, and information and 
communication management to explore the capability of organizations and agencies in managing 
states of emergency.   
 In order to address the research questions posed earlier (P.14), this chapter will review 
the relevant literature in reference to organizational adaptive capacities, the power of information 
and communication technology, and the use of interagency management under states of 
emergency. The three central theoretical concepts will be used to examine the state of emergency 
management practice in Thailand in two dimensions. The complex adaptive systems and self 
organization models help explain the individual and organizational adaptive capacities and 
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functions in dealing with emergency and crises, while the intergovernmental coordination and 
social network concepts address the significance of getting agencies to work together effectively. 
In addition, research on information and communication technologies explore how networks 
empower the adaptive capacity and operational performance of interagency operations. This 
study proposes a conceptual model of how a country could manage its states of emergency 
effectively. The integration of intergovernmental coordination and information and 
communication management is critical to achieving effective and efficient emergency 
management. In order to integrate the two concepts to appropriately increase the performance of 
emergency management practice, it is essential to understand how participating agencies manage 
their specific operations as well as cooperative ones. This study will discuss each of the 
theoretical concepts in application to actual emergency management and practice, and proposes a 
conceptual model as an alternative approach respectively. 
2.1 COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS (CAS) AND SELF ORGANIZATION 
This research examines the problem of crisis management in an environment of complexity, 
placing the crisis into mega city and urbanized settings. The problem involves a wide range of 
activities under many levels of solutions that include the processes of response, mitigation, and 
recovery. Axelrod and Cohen (1999) state that complexity means the system consists of parts 
interacting in ways that heavily influence the probabilities of later events. They suggest a 
concept of harnessing complexity, which means living with, and taking advantage of, 
complexity, rather than trying to ignore or eliminate it.  
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Axelrod and Cohen attempt to explore how the dynamism of a Complex Adaptive 
System can be used for productive ends in order to help managers and policy makers harness 
complexity in rapidly changing and hard-to-predict environments. They explore three key 
processes in a complex adaptive system: variation, interaction, and selection, whether to 
encourage variation in a rapidly changing circumstance, how to assess the impact of 
manipulating interactions in an organization, and how to select and support the most viable 
individuals, teams, systems or strategies that emerge. They argue that most complex adaptive 
systems have distinctive interaction patterns and these patterns are neither random nor 
completely structured. Interaction patterns help determine what will be successful for the agents 
and the system, and this in turn helps to shape the dynamics of the interaction patterns 
themselves. 
Based on these hallmarks of a complex adaptive system, Axelrod and Cohen offer a 
framework, a way of thinking through a complex setting that takes advantage of complexity, 
harnessing it to generate new questions and new possibilities for action and designing 
organizations and strategies in complex settings. They also pay special attention to the role of 
information in complex adaptive systems and thus make heavy use of examples derived from the 
Information Revolution. The Information Revolution not only promotes faster and wider 
adaptation, but also promotes a new mode of thinking about social systems. It engenders 
complex adaptive systems that capture the fundamental relationships of information to 
complexity and adaptation to secure the benefits of enormous change. 
The study applies the model of complex adaptive system (CAS) to analyze the state of 
preparedness in communities. CAS assumes an infrastructure for communication and decision 
support among participants in the system along with the flexibility to adapt to the changing 
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conditions. Kaufman’s proposition (1993, P.212) suggests that the most creative action occurs at 
the edge of chaos where the system is operating with “sufficient structure to hold and exchange 
information and sufficient flexibility to adapt to changing conditions.” Comfort (1999) agrees 
with Kauffman on the importance of information infrastructure and organizational flexibility as 
the main factors in enhancing the capability of the organizations to deal with uncertainty such as 
natural disaster and unexpected consequences. However, once the balance of the structure and 
the flexibility is set, it is crucial to anticipate the resistance to the transition. 
In her discussion of shared risk, Comfort applies a model to explain different 
combinations of crucial components in emergency operation. These components include the two 
dimensions of technical infrastructure and organizational flexibility but also cultural openness. 
Technical infrastructure refers to the existence of a sufficient level of information and 
communication exchange regarding risks and operations to enable communities and their 
emergency response agencies to function effectively. Organizational flexibility is the extent to 
which emergency personnel are able to reduce complexity in the environment through functional 
differentiation of tasks among participating organizations and reintegration of sets of related 
tasks under the basic function of disaster response.  Comfort points out that cultural openness; 
willingness to accept changes, improve performance, correct mistakes, learn new methods of 
work, and solve conflicts, is a crucial component in developing an adaptive organization. This 
study takes into account the significance of the culture as one of principal factors in challenging 
the effectiveness and efficiency of a concept of centralization with command and control in 
emergency response and management. Cultural openness needs to be rooted in local operations 
as a high value and new norm of the agencies implementing emergency procedures and 
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delivering public services. Common understanding toward the primary goal will help guide the 
agencies to operate and coordinate in a clear and effective direction.   
Comfort uses a three-dimensional model to capture the interaction among technical 
structure, organizational flexibility, and cultural openness that leads to successful transition for 
inter-organizational disaster response systems. Comfort introduces four types of response 
systems; non-adaptive, emergent adaptive, operative adaptive and auto-adaptive systems, which 
represent the dominant patterns found in actual cases. These four types of response systems 
provide a useful illustration of the process of transition, and the characteristics that both facilitate 
and hinder the emergence of self-organizing processes. This model will be used to analyze the 
performance of emergency response systems in actual cases of emergency operations in 
Thailand. Non-adaptive and emergent adaptive systems are those characterized by low technical 
structure which illustrates the lack of preparation and awareness of disaster risk in Thailand.  
While non-adaptive systems explain the low organizational flexibility and low cultural 
openness that characterized the response to December 26, 2004 tsunami, medium organization 
flexibility and emerging openness to new cultural meanings of seismic risk demonstrate 
increased investment for flood crisis management in Bangkok, especially the awareness of flash 
flood and dam collapse.  This study seeks indicators of the other two types, operative adaptive 
systems and self organizing systems, to explore the potential for change in the emergency 
management system in Thailand. This study also takes into account the concept of collaboration 
between the core emergency agencies in a large scale disaster across jurisdictions and the 
balance of cooperation and competence needed for sustainable disaster management.  
A three-dimensional model is used to identify states of emergency response systems and 
how to make a transition to self-organization. “Self organization is the spontaneous reallocation 
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of energy and action to achieve a collective goal in changing environment (Kauffman, 1993, P. 
223).” The complex adaptive system (CAS) model recognizes that social systems engage in 
continuous learning and self organization in reciprocal interactions with the environment in 
which they are embedded (Comfort, 2000). Change in any one level may be perceived as a threat 
to the security and privileges at other levels. Specifically, in a developing country, the 
characteristics of the bureaucratic system and the learning environment of the organizations are 
likely to create resistance and obstruction to transition and change. The recent perception of 
smart communities as learning organizations is likely to increase the awareness of emergency 
and risk preparedness for the communities as well as participating agencies to confront 
uncertainty effectively. As such, the basic community institutions and functions demonstrate 
instances of self organization to cope with the crisis. This study examines the concept of self 
organization as a means of developing a learning environment and a new culture of work. All 
agencies have to clearly understand their own operations and prepare themselves well for a state 
of emergency. Under conditions of uncertainty, all agencies need to adapt to cope with negative 
events.  
2.2 INTERGOVERNMENTAL NETWORK AND INTERAGENCY MANAGEMENT 
 
Radin et al., 1996, states that multi-organizational arrangements are solutions for independent 
problems that cannot be achieved by a single organization. Managing states of emergency 
requires multiple participants across jurisdictions and organizational sectors. Many tasks in 
emergency management such as evacuation, medical care, transporting victims, and recovery 
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operations need effective coordination across sectors public, private and non profit. States of 
emergency cannot be managed without cooperative inter-agency operations. With this 
environment, organizational transition represents a significant increase in complexity from 
behavioral change in an individual. It involves engaging multiple organizations simultaneously 
in many types of actions to address a complex problem (Simon 1981, Comfort, 1991). Bardach 
(1998) is concerned with the potential of public agencies to work together as a way of adding 
public value, and explores interagency collaboration within and across sectors. He measures the 
level of integration achieved in a variety of partnerships and in particular, concentrates on 
building interagency collaborative capacity. This study explores how emergency response 
operations are conducted in different environments to identify coordination among different 
agencies. The tsunami disaster in southern Thailand and massive accidents in Bangkok show the 
lack of effectiveness and coordination in managing states of emergency.  
Thai government has implemented its policies under perceptions of command and 
control, and centralization to ensure quality control and the accuracy of rules compilation. Lack 
of experience in understanding a disaster like tsunami and coordinating emergency response 
resulted in ineffectiveness and inefficiency in delivering put another perspective into Thai 
governance to answer why emergency response is difficult or fails. Kettl and Salamon (2002) 
argue that command and control government in the past must be transformed into decentralized 
governance because earlier governmental solutions fail to resolve the problems that face 
governments now. Pfeffer (1992) also asserts that the exercise of control, influence and authority 
relying on the existence of recognized hierarchies is now rarer. Such changes have undermined 
hierarchies and made collaboration and co-operation more useful management tools than the old 
methods of command and control. 
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 In less hierarchical organizations, the most effective managers are those who take the 
time to win others round to their way of thinking--campaigning rather than coercing. This also 
tends to produce wiser decisions. Pfeffer suggests that there are three ways of getting things 
done: 1. through hierarchical authority, which is badly out of fashion, 2. through developing a 
strongly shared vision or organizational culture, which is very time and resource consuming, 3. 
through use of power and influence.  He focuses attention on this third strategy, stating that it 
emphasizes method rather than the structure. This study seeks to balance command and control, 
which is believed to achieve accuracy in policy implementation, with interagency networks of 
operations, which are believed to be more effective and efficient in managing emergency 
response of multiple agencies performing many tasks.  
Provan and Milward, 2001, comment that the delivery of public service at multiple levels 
requires the integration and coordination of a variety of organizations into service delivery while 
Meyers et al., 2001, assert that the devolution appears to have moved the boundaries of program 
authority and responsibility both downward and outward. Getting agencies to work together 
needs not only self reaction readiness. Personnel can be well trained and learn about their 
partners’ operations but they also need to bring knowledge and skills to practice. This study 
approaches the network of intergovernmental management by asserting the idea of knowledge 
sharing into the emergency networks both internally and externally regarding geographical 
limitations. The lack of knowledge and experience regarding the characteristics of the disaster 
increases the difficulty of adaptive capacity of organization to react individually and 
cooperatively.  
Self organization and complex adaptive systems will help build a strong foundation to 
develop the organizational adaptive capacity. This capacity will enhance the trust among each 
 29 
other to work together (Bardach, 1998), but all participating agencies still need to learn how to 
work together effectively and efficiently. He proposes that interagency collaboration is defined 
as activities by agencies intended to increase, or add, public value by having the agencies 
working together rather than separately. Many institutional features of our policy making system 
suggest that unexploited opportunities to create value in this way are abundant. The process of 
trying to exploit such opportunities involves leveraging personnel and financial resources for 
collaborative purposes, designing and managing an effective operating system, reaching and 
maintaining consensus on basic goals and on tradeoffs among relevant sub-goals, creating an 
effective culture or ethos of interpersonal working relationships, and securing the implicit or 
explicit consent of elected officials. It is a complex developmental process that unfolds over a 
long time period and requires the government to shift its administration from hierarchy to 
networks.    
2.3 THE SOCIAL NETWORK PERSPECTIVE AND ANALYSIS 
The social network perspective is a comprehensive analytical strategy and conceptual approach 
for how resources, goods and information flow through particular configuration of social ties. 
Social networks cut across discrete communities and other entities, even though in certain cases 
they may also congeal into bounded groups and clusters. Transactions unfolding within social 
networks are not always symmetrical and the patterning of invisible relations among actions such 
as structural holes or gaps in a network usually means disparities in access to both information 
and control benefits. The social network approach provides a framework for studying the 
structure of interaction among emergency response agencies and the communities. These 
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interactions reflect how emergency agencies engage in response operations during states of 
emergency that illustrates a pattern of intergovernmental coordination. In emergency 
management, coordinating operations requires an understanding of how the network of response 
actions is conducted and what communication processes are used, especially in large scale 
operations that require multiple agencies to perform many tasks simultaneously under urgent 
time constraints and threats to life.       
Public policy makers, planners, and managers are increasingly relying on what might be 
called large-group interaction methods to involve large numbers of people in planning and 
implementing major change efforts. These methods are structured processes for engaging large 
numbers of people to: (1) enhance the amount of relevant information brought to bear on a 
problem; (2) build commitment to problem definitions and solutions; (3) fuse planning and 
implementation; and (4) shorten the amount of time needed to conceive and execute major 
policies, programs, services, or projects. Proponents of such methods claim that they provide sets 
of concepts, procedures, and tools that can help public and nonprofit organizations and 
communities deal effectively with change. 
This study borrows the network perspective from the structuralism school using a variety 
of network analytic concepts and techniques to address substantive issues that have preoccupied 
most sociologists. The field of network studies describes the comprehensive structure of 
relationships in a social system. Through manipulating matrices, analysts can find patterns of 
connectivity and cleavage among members within social systems. This perspective also reflects 
changes in network structures over time and ways in which system members are directly and 
indirectly connected. It enables analysts to trace lateral and vertical flows of information, 
identify sources and targets, and detect structural constraints operating on flows of resources. 
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This study inquires into how different emergency personnel operate and interact which helps to 
identify critical roles and coordination patterns in order to seek an appropriate alternative for 
improving in coordination within and among jurisdictions.  This study acknowledges that 
network studies are not always methodologically feasible or analytically appropriate, and uses 
multiple methodologies, for collecting data and defining boundaries regarding the demographic 
characteristics of, network members.   The study employs a range of statistical and mathematical 
techniques to tease out the underlying structural properties of the emergency response system.     
Carley and Hill (2001) argue that organizations are composed of intelligent adaptive 
agents constrained and enabled by their positions in networks that link agents and knowledge. 
Here, information can include beliefs, values, goals, graphs, pictures, words, numbers, 
information on the task, on what others know and with whom they interact, on one’s own and 
other’s demographic characteristics,. Most models of network evolution overlook the fact that 
the social network does not exist independent from the knowledge network. Although the social 
network and knowledge network co-evolve, they can stabilize at different times, which can have 
a great effect on an organization’s behavior. When the organization is viewed as a meta-network, 
it is easier to see how a change in one of the sub-networks can cause changes in the other sub-
networks. It pays a lot of attention to critical nodes that link other sub-networks together. This 
study examines the roles of governmental, nongovernmental and communities’ sub-networks in 
the national emergency response system. Each sub-network performs its functions in order to 
adapt and survive from states of disaster while it also mobilizes resources and personnel to help 
the entire emergency operations system. Information and resources that flow in sub-networks 
also affect the performance of the meta-network since managing a large scale emergency 
response needs effective coordination and linkage between active sub-networks in particular 
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areas and the specific functions they perform to integrate their operations through a common 
framework for the entire network of response operations. 
Watts (1999) also supports the emerging recognition of social networks in his book, 
Small Worlds.  Watts notes that the recent development of organizations includes 1) emergence 
and evolution of cooperative behaviors in large organizations, 2) processing of information in 
spatially extended and irregularly connected networks such as the human brain, 3) design of 
power and communications networks, and 4) emergence of global computational capability from 
locally connected systems. This study focuses on the area of integrating intergovernmental 
coordination, information and communication into emergency response network as later 
discussed in a proposed conceptual model.  
Provan and Milward (2001) state that although cooperative, inter-organizational networks 
have become a common mechanism for delivery of public services, evaluating their effectiveness 
is extremely complex and has generally been neglected. To help resolve this problem, they 
discuss the evaluation of networks of community-based, mostly publicly funded health, human 
service, and public welfare organizations. Consistent with pressures to perform effectively from 
a broad range of key stakeholders, they argue that networks must be evaluated at three levels of 
analysis: community, network, and organization or participant levels. While the three levels are 
related, each has its own set of effectiveness criteria that must be considered. They suggest that 
effectiveness at one level of network analysis may or may not match effectiveness criteria at 
another level, and discuss the extent to which integration across levels may be possible.  
Social networks also serve as the means to integrate local citizens’ groups into an 
organizational framework to work together with the government agencies to reduce risk and 
manage emergencies. Putnam (1993) argues that networks of civic engagement facilitate 
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coordination and communication, and amplify information about the trustworthiness of other 
individuals. Local communities have knowledge of their area and people. This familiarity of 
location and resources becomes crucial when the authorities and participating agencies are 
unable to access this potential. This study examines the process of enlisting community 
representatives to work together with the public agencies from the very first step of emergency 
management. It allows local representatives to share their specific knowledge of the area as well 
as understand the developing response process. This exchange of knowledge facilitates the 
implementation of the emergency operations. 
2.4 THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND COMMUNICATION 
MANAGEMENT 
Self organization, complex adaptive systems, and intergovernmental coordination need an 
effective information management and communication system not only to build a common pool 
of information and knowledge to share between agencies but also to ease the situation of 
working across jurisdictions of many different government agencies and organizations. 
Sufficient information and knowledge exchanged among agencies also help emergency 
personnel to make more informed decisions and increase the efficiency of their actions under 
time constraints. Dunn (2003) points out that for emergency managers, problem sensing and 
structuring are key. The lack of precise information leads to ill or, at best, moderate structuring 
of the problems. The limitations of decision making for organizations operating under 
uncertainty have spurred researchers to explore means of reformulating the concept of problem 
solving capacity (Comfort, 1991). This study also examines the use of information technology 
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mechanisms to enhance the power of communication and means of facilitating information flow 
through social networks to help policy makers share knowledge and communicate more 
effectively in states of emergency.  
For organizations to function well, Graber (2003) suggests that they must have structures 
that are appropriate to organizational goals. “Structures refer to the patterns of information flow 
inherent in formal organization charts and reflected in work manuals.” These official structures 
provide a restricted, standardized communication environment that enhances the stability and 
predictability of organizational behavior (J. March and H. Simon notes the importance of 
structures). Structure explains how information networks are constructed, and why they are 
formed. Graber also discusses network analysis, the significance of network positions, and the 
roles of networks in information management.  She notes that the chief goal of networking is “to 
establish communication links with significant others to share information about mutually 
relevant situations” while that of network analysis is “to explain the communication roles played 
by organization members and the consequences for the performance of the organization.’  
In public organization, the options for designing organizational structures are to use: 
geographical divisions, functional divisions, line and staff functions or client types. Graber 
addresses the impact of the previous steps on public managers’ ability to use information 
effectively to make sound decisions. She discusses the four phases of decision making - problem 
analysis, option exploration, selection of models for decision (rational-choice, incremental-
bargaining, aggregative, and garbage can model), and monitoring feedback. Graber also 
discusses common errors in decision making at the individual, group and organizational level, 
and suggests strategies that can be used to avoid errors such as enhancing the supply of 
information, fostering policy coherence and coping with crisis. With regard to the designing of 
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structures for decision making, she argues that structures can be either top-level (formalistic, 
competitive and collegial models) or can be formed from external advisors who are authorities in 
the field. 
Cahan and Cresswell emphasize that technology, information, and professional and 
organizational relationships played critically important roles in government, business, and 
community responses to the event. Effective use of a variety of information technologies helped 
government agencies to cope with, and respond to, the multiple crises and ongoing recovery 
demands resulting from the crises. Meanwhile, the severity of the crisis was exacerbated by 
damage to critical communications and infrastructure as well as the absence, outdated nature, 
loss, or inaccessibility of needed information resources. Bardach (1998) states that in his study of 
a geographically based network of human services agencies that collaborated to match clients 
with appropriate services, the communications processes among the participants were embedded 
in interpersonal relationships and also in an infrastructure of various connection mechanisms. 
The information system infrastructure needs to be in place to facilitate reporting for 
emergency situations and give the workforce full information in order for them to make 
decisions. Communication channels as well as back up systems are required to keep all agencies 
connected and updated in order to support one another in unexpected events. The content of the 
information needs to be aggregated into a common knowledgebase for all parties involved in 
order to support accurate and timely decisions, especially during a state of emergency. Fountain 
(2001) argues that the use of information technology, such as in internet communication and 
networks of computing operations, allows networked organizations to extend control and 
coordination more easily across organizations. Information technology does not by itself create 
social capital or cooperation, but may enhance trust in the network through ease in 
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communications. A government that forces network formation but eschews collaboration may 
increase, rather than decrease, the cost of collaboration. As Holland (1995) states, agents within 
the organizations represent collections of rules and rule syntaxes that use information as stimuli 
for response and adaptation, lever points for building the complex adaptive system. Making a 
transition to an adaptive socio-technical system requires the abilities to search and exchange 
information through communication channel that facilitates intra and inter organizational 
learning.  
Peha (2005) investigates the effectiveness of communication in emergency response and 
states that emergency responders depend on reliable ad ubiquitous wireless communications. 
Failures in these communication systems can cost lives. He argues that a policy that required 
each public safety organization to independently make decisions about its communications 
system without a coherent plan and extensive coordination will produce an infrastructure that is 
more expensive than necessary. It is obvious that without effective coordination mechanisms, 
any communications infrastructure designed by many thousands of independent decision makers 
is prone to producing a tangle of systems that do not interoperate. With coordination, all of the 
inefficiency can be eliminated. Many public safety agencies would share multiple 
communications channels as well as costly infrastructure. Unless requiring emergency personnel 
to carry more than one type of equipment in case it fails, or having all representatives of all 
involved emergency agencies operate with their communication channels together in a central 
command center, communication equipment should be interoperable.  
The impact of natural hazards upon human communities can be more effectively reduced 
through informed decisions regarding the location and construction of built environments, 
informed actions taken by the public exposed to risk, and timely communication and exchange of 
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information among organizations and jurisdictions that have designated responsibilities for the 
protection of life and property (Comfort, 2000). In this sense, institutional design and a 
responsible learning environment provide crucial support. Private sector and citizen communities 
also need to know the status of risk for the area in which they have their business functions or 
their families. The information they share will also help organizations to decide how to provide 
assistance, if their actions change under unexpected situations. 
2.5 CONCEPTUAL MODEL: THE INTEGRATION OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
COORDINATION, INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND COMMUNICATION 
SYSTEMS 
All four concepts of this study are crucial in creating and sustaining effective emergency 
management. This study proposes the integration of intergovernmental coordination and 
information technology with a strong foundation of organizational adaptive capacity in dealing 
with crises and complex changes. This integration will need the official collaboration of both 
national and local response units. Emergency situations are dynamic and the sequential effects 
are uncertain. The devastation can expand to a larger scale of the area which affects more of the 
population. Sometimes a state of emergency is declared across jurisdictions. It is clear that many 
directly authorized emergency response departments are out in the field. It is sometimes difficult 
to define where the authority and responsibility lie in the multi-agency work. In order to 
effectively coordinate multiple emergency agencies performing multiple tasks in multiple areas 
under time constraint and threats to lives, emergency response operations require efficient 
communication channels and equipment to keep all emergency personnel connected and updated. 
Information sharing and exchange are critical not only during the field operations but also in 
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learning and training programs. Mutual understanding and clear direction of how emergency 
response and disaster management are conducted help multiple agencies to coordinate and 
compensate each other in case failure occurs among them effectively. 
An intergovernmental network approach seeks to find an appropriate level of authority 
through the management of interagency emergency operations not only to prepare them to work 
together, but also to balance command-control and decentralization. Ironically, the idea of 
decentralization and empowerment of local authorities is the underlying value of giving the local 
governments the authority to control their emergency operations. Bangkok government will at 
best be able to control its resources and operations. A long history of bureaucratic culture makes 
the system vulnerable to change especially switching between rowing and steering. Government 
agencies have been trying to implement concepts of decentralization, street-level participation 
and citizen empowerment instead of command and control of centralization. Public agencies may 
still organize their work and responsibility using command and control techniques, especially 
under heavy pressure and urgent time constraints. Emergency operations are at their best 
strategic implementation, if the collaboration can be well structured. Since, emergency 
management is uncertain, strengthening response operations by having them support one another 
effectively is in the best interest of the affected population and rescue agencies.    
 Comfort’s model of four types of adaptation in emergency response systems 
identifies a set of components needed for developing emergency response systems. The four 
types ranged from non-adaptive or emergent adaptive systems to an auto-adaptive system or self 
organization. This study uses Comfort’s model to analyze the existing emergency model in 
Thailand. This study applies three crucial indicators, which are technical structure, organizational 
flexibility, and cultural openness, to identify the type of emergency management at each level. 
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At the national level, emergency response agencies confronted the devastation of the tsunami 
with a low level of technical structure, organizational flexibility, and cultural openness which 
this study defines as a non-adaptive system. Bangkok Metropolitan Authority’s emergency 
response agencies conduct their emergency operations with higher levels of performance on the 
three components to illustrate an emergent adaptive system. This study examines the factors 
needed to improve the existing emergency management systems of national provincial and local 
levels from states of non-adaptive and emergent-adaptive to auto-adaptive. Such adaptive 
capacity and systems will be analyzed from two perspectives First, the study reviews the 
performance of an individual emergency agency and examines what factors affected its 
performance and its effectiveness in the emergency response system. Secondly, this study 
focuses on coordination among the emergency agencies, exploring a cooperative emergency 
response. Since managing states of emergency require multiple agencies to perform multiple 
tasks, the understanding of emergency management needs to take into account the interagency 
management accordingly. This study approaches an auto-adaptive emergency response system 
with a concept of intergovernmental management to collaborate emergency systems of both 
national and local levels for an entire country.  
Effective intergovernmental networks and interagency coordination cannot function 
without the strong link created by effective information technology and communication system. 
Decision-making, under pressure of time constraints and threats to life, needs sufficient 
information to support participating agencies to make more accurate decisions. The knowledge, 
data, and information need to be integrated into a systematic database to share among all 
participating agencies and the public when necessary. The best information cannot serve 
organizations at the highest capacity without a good communication system and management. A 
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communications system is crucial in facilitating the information flow among participating 
agencies and the public to keep all operations connected. Under a wide spread of devastation and 
disaster impacts, geographical distance and destruction make access to communications difficult, 
hindering cooperative emergency operations. Multiple tasks performed by multiple agencies also 
increase the complexity involved in following up each unit and monitoring the entire operation. 
In extreme cases, the electrical system fails when the entire power grid or electrical utilities 
black-out. For example, the recent tsunami disaster caused the loss of the entire electrical system 
in PhangNga area which created great difficulty for emergency operations. All participating 
agencies, in wide area operation, cannot physically see one another due to the distance and chaos 
of the situation. Communication channels need to be well structured and be designed with the 
knowledge that many communication stations can be destroyed and damaged, despite the fact 
that electricity is crucial for a communication system to work. This study explores alternative 
back-up methods for information and communication systems in extreme events. All agencies on 
duty confront such unexpected difficulties. States of emergency need effective interagency 
operations and such operations require sufficient information technology and efficient 
communications systems.             
In addition to effective intergovernmental coordination and efficient information and 
communication management, this study also reviews community networks. Local residents are 
frontline emergency response personnel, if they are well-trained because they are closer to the 
incident and have more experience in the area. Their informed response to states of emergency 
can mitigate damage and reduce levels of severity, buying time for emergency personnel with 
more advanced equipment to arrive and operate. Community representatives and volunteers are 
also trusted by local residents. Evacuation and emergency regulations can be directed effectively 
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by the assistance of these groups. In addition, the knowledge of members of communities will 
later help communicating feedback of search and rescue to the command center to avoid 
redundancy and repetition of emergency response that waste manpower and resources. 
Community networks also help connect small areas together without spending more resources to 
manage more complicated geographical operations. In employing effective networks, 
communities learn about potential risks they may confront as well as emergency procedures, 
creating resilient communities. In the chaos of extreme events, people tend to have less 
systematic decision making processes. Informed decisions require basic understanding and 
adaptive capacity to adapt to different situations and unexpected consequences. Information that 
emergency personnel shared through their database management and communication systems 
should be made available to general public to educate them regarding their exposure to disaster 
risk. Simulated operations exercises serve as an effective tool to enable emergency response 
personnel and communities to learn about emergency operations and to build trust with one 
another.     
The integration of all networks of interagency coordination, information and 
communication create resilient communities that develop a constructive learning environment 
and adaptive capacity to enable all participants to maintain the levels of competency needed to 
deal with an extreme event. Training programs and education tools can be developed internally 
within a single agency as well as cooperatively among multiple agencies. Disaster is dynamic 
and less predictable. Emergency response personnel and communities exposed to risks need to 
adapt and be willing to learn new alternatives in addition to applying their previous knowledge. 
Adaptive capacity means continual updating and improving. 
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2.6 SUMMARY 
Public safety is concerned with how emergency response is managed and how emergency 
personnel operate. Effective emergency response can help save lives and property. Disaster and 
emergency are complex and less predictable by their nature. Emergency response and 
management need to be flexible and have a high level of adaptive capacity to be able to manage 
the situation to return to normal. This study builds its conceptual model how emergency response 
and management should be operated on the notions of four significant concepts of Complex 
Adaptive System (CAS), Intergovernmental Coordination, Social Network, and Information 
sharing and Communication Managements. Previous studies have shown that emergency 
response systems increase their capacity to make informed decisions and cope with disaster 
situations more effectively when they have access to efficient communication channels.      
In practice, emergency operations are implemented among different communities in 
which local residents necessarily become frontline emergency personnel. This study emphasizes 
the need for community participation in emergency management. The local knowledge of 
community residents helps to construct an appropriate emergency response for each area. In wide 
area operations, community networks can also help facilitate resources and connect the entire 
response system together. In order to encourage communities to work together and with public 
emergency personnel, values of self organization and adaptive capacity need to be strengthened. 
This study proposes that a model of auto-adaptation can improve the delivery of emergency 
services and reduce disaster risk.     
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3.0  RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGIES 
This research is an exploratory investigation of emergency management performance in which 
the operating contexts and the participating agencies differ. This exploratory research examines 
the complex system of emergency management in response to different types of threat and 
analyzes the effectiveness of operations in three cases in three different settings in order to 
illustrate the emergency management policy in Thailand. These cases include the December 26, 
2004 tsunami in the southern Thailand, a flooding crisis in metropolitan Bangkok and massive 
accidents at the district levels in Bangkok. The cases are selected to represent emergency 
response operated by different primary agencies at national, provincial and local levels which, in 
turn, illustrate the emergency management of the country. 
This chapter presents the following sections: 1) research design; 2) research questions 
exploring emergency responses in Thailand; 3) selection of cases; 4) units of analysis and 
observation;  5) qualitative and quantitative research methodologies , and discussion of threats to 
validity and reliability, 6) data collection procedures, including  participant observation,  semi-
structured interviews and structured survey of emergency personnel , 7) analytical steps that 
guided the integration of multiple sources of data, and  8) anticipated findings.  
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3.1 RESEARCH DESIGN: EXPLORATORY NESTED CASE STUDY 
This study conducted an exploratory case study for three cases of emergency response in 
Thailand which are 1) tsunami response of the national emergency agency, 2) Bangkok flood 
crisis response of the provincial agency and 3) massive accidents response of the district agency 
in Bangkok. An exploratory case study examines a set of actors bounded in time and place and 
the contextual material describing the setting of the case. It requires gathering extensive 
materials from multiple sources of information to provide an in-depth picture of the case 
(Creswell, 1998). Lincoln and Guba (1985) add that case studies structure the problem, the 
context, the issues, and the lessons learned. Creswell (1998) emphasized the use of within-case 
and cross-case analysis to identify the lessons learned. 
This study seeks not only these two dimensions of analysis, but also the relationship 
among cases. This study tries to identify the appropriate solution for each case as well as the 
relationship among the three cases and collaboration among the three core actors in each case. In 
small scale emergencies like a massive accident in Bangkok Metropolitan Area, district or local 
level of agencies are likely to be able to manage emergency by coordinating with neighboring 
units to respond to the situation. However, in a medium scale emergency like flood crisis in 
Bangkok, which frequently affects more than one district or province across Bangkok’s 
metropolitan area, emergency response requires coordination between district and provincial 
agencies as well as collaboration among provinces. In a large scale emergency like the tsunami 
response in six southern provinces of Thailand, national, provincial and local emergency 
agencies need to work together effectively to be able to deliver help to those in need. It is clear 
that emergency response in six provinces requires multiple levels of emergency agencies across 
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many jurisdictions to perform a large number of tasks in different areas simultaneously. There is 
a need to explore and understand the relationship among these agencies’ operations.            
This tie between the three core actors leads to the concept of a “nested-set case study.” 
Nested design exploits cross-unit variation and analysis to elucidate the features of an individual 
unit rather than examining an individual unit to explain a more general phenomenon (Coppedge 
2002, Lieberman 2002). Each case in the nested design seeks to identify the positive and 
negative factors that influence the emergency plan of each core agency and to study the 
relationships among the agencies interacting in emergency operations. For example, emergency 
response to a flood crisis in the Bangkok Metropolitan Area and massive accident in a district of 
Bangkok reflect a nested case of how provincial administration, district officials, and volunteer 
emergency personnel react and perform their functions in response to extreme events at small 
and medium scales. Flood and massive accident operations share similarities and differences in 
emergency structure and agencies that need to be studied as an interacting system. The tsunami 
response reflects the interagency operations of the country at national, provincial and district 
levels in which a large scale disaster requires the coordination of all jurisdictional levels. 
Understanding the roles of single units and the interactions among them in emergency response 
operations will also inform the functions of scalable management of the entire emergency system 
for incidents at different degrees of severity. 
As discussed in the conceptual model presented in Chapter Two, nested analysis also 
allows the investigation and comparison of the information and communication networks of the 
two settings within three cases. The first setting is the national emergency response network in 
tsunami event while the second setting buried within two events, flood crisis and massive 
accident managed by BMA emergency response. The strengths and weaknesses of each system 
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affect the performance of the others while the relationships among the two sets of emergency 
operations reveal the structure of coordination and information shared among them. 
Understanding these interactions leads to improvement of existing information and 
communication networks and the innovation of emergency information sharing and 
communication managements of interagency operations.    
3.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In social science research, research questions should be relevant to real world problems and 
contribute to the framework of the existing literature in the field (King, et al, 1994). This study 
explores social phenomena that have occurred in reality and seeks to understand the mechanisms 
of operation and context of problems that affect human lives, and to verify this explanation. It 
addresses the functions of intergovernmental coordination, information network and 
communication management in increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of emergency 
response and management.  
Command and control may be useful in the first stage of an emergency to direct 
operations and track specific tasks among multiple agencies, especially in a country that has 
relatively little experience in managing states of emergency. Conducting emergency operations 
for a large area across jurisdictions and among different agencies requires effective coordination 
among the participating agencies. This study examines the intra-agency and interagency 
networks to explain how participating agencies can work together more effectively and to 
balance centralized command and control with networking operations in emergency 
management.  
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The study will address the following research questions.  
1. To what extent do the key agencies responsible for disaster operations collaborate in 
large scale emergencies?  
2. To what extent are authority and responsibility for emergency management assigned 
to specific public agencies? 
3. To what extent does intergovernmental coordination operate in emergency 
management in practice?   
4. To what extent does the use of information technology facilitate inter-organizational 
coordination and communication in emergency management? 
5. In what ways are intergovernmental coordination and information management 
integrated in Thai emergency management?  
6. What significant factors would move existing emergency response systems in 
Thailand toward auto adaptation, and how?  
3.3 SELECTION OF CASES 
This study examines the emergency management system in Thailand and explores alternatives to 
improve emergency operations and crisis management. It addresses the operational management 
of district and provincial authorities as well as national. Thailand is selected because of its 
geographical exposure to hazards and its specific bureaucratic culture as a developing country. 
Located in reputedly a low-risk zone, Thailand is nonetheless vulnerable to unexpected powerful 
disaster attacks. The December 26, 2004 tsunami reflected the unprepared state of emergency 
management as well as the lack of experience, knowledge and awareness of the requirements for 
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immediate response. Conducting rescue and mitigation operations from the national government 
throughout the south across six provinces challenged the ability and skill of the entire emergency 
management system.  
 Bangkok is a mega-city that illustrates multiple centers of every public and private 
activity. This research focuses in two cases of flooding and massive accidents in a metropolitan 
setting to consider the complexity of the environment as an additional factor in planning for 
emergency operations. Bangkok is a complex system in daily operations, let alone when the 
complexity is increased by the complicated circumstances such as flooding or massive accidents. 
Bangkok Metropolitan Authority has its own structure to manage its emergency operations. 
Bangkok has been addressing the flood threat for years and has reduced the flood release period 
from days to five or three hours, but not yet entirely. The first case examines Bangkok 
government’s experience in dealing with flood crisis with the alternative approach of a non-
structural solution by incorporating intergovernmental network management and information 
technology into the structure of coordination to enhance the performance of the agencies.  
 Flood Control Center of Bangkok Metropolitan Authority plays a central information 
provider and coordination agency in managing flood response although filed operation belongs 
to Civil Emergency Relief Department and District Offices. The second case examines the 
performance of the Bangkok emergency response units and their operation under the massive 
accidents. Existing policy assigns District Offices and Civil Emergency Relief Department total 
responsibility for all emergency incidents which includes flooding. District agencies which 
include district officers and local volunteer unit are frontline emergency personnel while Civil 
Emergency Relief Department personnel function as coordinating center in both cases. Flood 
crisis and massive accident responses share the same interagency coordination-action-plan when 
 49 
decisions should be made to share authority when scale of emergency is expanded. Nonetheless, 
flood crisis response reflects more frequent of coordination because of wider nature of flood 
prone area and illustrate a clearer picture of information sharing between central agencies, Flood 
Control Center and Civil Emergency Relief Department, and district emergency personnel.      
 The long term experience of flooding management of Bangkok government 
together with the changing experience of the national emergency response agencies should 
inform the response unit through their shared knowledge and organizational learning process 
more appropriately. The purpose of examining the experience of these three cases is to identify 
the potential for collaboration between the three major emergency response agencies, national, 
provincial and district. Well structured collaboration should provide an effective back-up 
operation for emergency management in the nation.      
3.4 UNIT OF ANALYSIS AND CASE STUDIES 
The unit of analysis for these three case studies is organization. Yin (2003) suggests that the 
selection of the unit of analysis is related to the way in which the initial research questions have 
been defined. The unit of analysis specifies the level being addressed by the study questions. 
This study examines the performance of emergency response organizations at three different 
levels of operation. Three different cases are analyzed and assessed. Since this research explores 
the network of intergovernmental interactions, the analysis will identify in the three sets of 
participating organizations. In each case, the study focuses on the organizations with primary 
responsibility for emergency response, the Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation 
(DDPM) under the Ministry of Interior, and Civil Emergency Relief Department (CERD) and 
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District Offices (DO) under Bangkok Metropolitan Authority’s (BMA) management. This 
analysis investigates and assesses emergency management practice in these core agencies.  
The units of observation are emergency personnel engaged in emergency operations. 
Included in observations are three groups of participating personnel in emergency management; 
1) top management, as decision makers, such as ministers, directors general, provincial 
governors, deputy permanent secretaries and department directors, 2) middle management, as 
linking pins, such as district deputy, supervisors and chief of operations, and 3) operational level 
as frontline personnel performing emergency response in actions. The field observations were 
aggregated at three levels of performance; individual, organizational, and system wide. This 
study examines the actions, interactions, behavior, and response of emergency personnel to 
explain the effectiveness of their operations which, in turn, reflects how organizational 
operations and coordination are managed. The inter-organizational management also helps to 
understand the entire system of emergency management in the nation.  
This research explores three cases of emergency management, tsunami disaster, flood 
crisis and massive accident to explain these cases: 
1) How does DDPM implement the emergency management plan? How does DDPM 
work locally and nationally? 
2) How does the BMA manage among its own agency, District Office (DO) and interact 
with other agencies and the community in flood crisis management? What are the 
patterns of coordination or command and control? 
3) How would the model of flood crisis management implemented by the BMA apply to 
the practice of emergency management under the newly established response 
department, CERD? 
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4) To what extent did the DDPM, BMA/CERD, and BMA/District Offices work 
together, and how do they define their separation of responsibilities? 
 
These three cases illustrate the work of core and participating agencies in emergency 
operations nationally, provincially, and locally. This study explores and examines the operation 
of each individual core agency to identify its adaptive capacity in states of emergency and further 
studies the interaction between all agencies to identify the existence of intergovernmental 
network in emergency operations and to explain how effective the coordination is functioning. 
The purpose of exploring theses applications is to understand the intergovernmental management 
as well as the use of information and communication technology in managing states of 
emergency.  
The cases, outlined below, begin with the most severe case that involved disaster 
operations at national provincial and local levels, the tsunami of December 26, 2004. The second 
case addresses the flood crisis in metropolitan Bangkok, and the third case focuses on disaster 
operations in massive accidents at the district level in Bangkok. Noticeably, the two emergency 
operations in Bangkok share the same primary emergency actors.  
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Table3.1 Outline of Case Studies, Actors and Analytical Frameworks 
  
CASE 1 
DECEMBER 26, 2004 
TSUNAMI RESPONSE 
   (NATIONAL LEVEL) 
 
CASE 2 
FLOOD CRISIS RESPONSE 
(PROVINCIAL LEVEL) 
 
CASE 3 
MASSIVE ACCIDENT 
RESPONSE 
(DISTRICT LEVEL) 
 
PRIMARY 
ACTORS 
 
 
1. DEPARTMENT OF   
DISASTER PREVENTION 
AND MITIGATION 
2. PROVINCIAL 
GOVERNMENTS OF 
PHUKTE, PHANGNGA 
AND KRABI 
3. CIVIL DEFENSE 
VOLUNTEER UNIT 
 
 
1. BANGKOK 
METROPOLITAN 
AUTHORITY 
2. FLOOD CONTROL CENTER 
3. DISTRICT OFFICES (DO) 
4. CIVIL DEFENSE 
VOLUNTEER UNIT 
5. CIVIL EMERGENCY 
RELIEF DEPARTMENT 
(CERD) 
 
1. BANGKOK 
METROPOLITAN 
AUTHORITY 
2. DISTRICT OFFICES 
(DO) 
3. CIVIL DEFENSE 
VOLUNTEER UNIT 
4. CIVIL EMERGENCY 
RELIEF DEPARTMENT 
(CERD) 
 
OTHER ACTORS 
 
1. LOCAL COMMUNITIES 
2. OTHER GOVERNMENTAL   
ORGANIZATIONS 
3. OTHER NON-
GOVERNMENTAL 
ORGANIZATIONS 
4. NATIONAL POLICE 
DEPARTMENT 
 
1.LOCAL COMMUNITIES 
2.VICINITY’S 
ADMINISTRATION AND 
AUTHORITIES 
3. NATIONAL POLICE 
DEPARTMENT 
4. MINISTRY OF 
METEOROLOGY 
 
1. PARAMEDIC AND 
MEDICAL CARE 
UNITS 
2. PRIVATE RESCUE 
UNITS 
3. NATIONAL POLICE 
DEPARTMENT 
 
ANALYTICAL 
FRAMEWORKS 
 
1. LEGAL STRUCTURE AND 
AUTHORITY OF DDPM 
2. EMERGENCY 
MANAGEMENT PLAN OF 
DDPM 
3. CONTEXT OF 
OPERATIONS IN 
ASSESSMENT OF 
TSUNAMI EVENT 
4. INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER 
AGENCIES AND 
ORGANIZATIONS 
5. APPLICATIONS OF 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
MANAGEMENT 
6. USE OF INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY AND 
COMMUNICATION 
MANAGEMENT 
 
 
1. BMA FLOODING 
MANAGEMENT 
STRUCTURE 
2. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE 
FLOODING CONTROL 
CENTER AND ITS 
AUTHORITY THROUGH 
COMMAND AND 
CONTROL 
3. COORDINATION AMONG 
THE PARTICIPATING 
AGENCIES, DO AND CERD 
4. ASSESSMENT OF LOCAL 
COMMUNITIES 
INVOLVEMENT AND CIVIL 
DEFENSE VOLUNTEER 
UNIT 
5. HIERARCHICAL 
AUTHORITY AND THE 
INTER-AGENCIES 
IMPLEMENTATION 
6. USE OF INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY AND 
COMMUNICATION 
MANAGEMENT 
 
1. STRUCTURE AND   
AUTHORITY OF CERD 
AND DO 
2. RESPONSIBILITY AND 
COORDINATION OF 
CERD AND DO UNDER 
AN EMERGENCY 
3. TRAINING PROGRAM 
AND ASSESSMENT OF 
CERD AND DO 
4. EXPECTATION OF 
CERD AND THE 
EXPANSION OF 
RESPONSIBILITY 
5. LOCAL 
COMMUNITIES AND 
CIVIL DEFENSE 
VOLUNTEER UNIT 
PARTICIPATION 
6. USE OF 
INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY AND 
COMMUNICATION 
MANAGEMENT 
In all cases, this research will take into account the role of a new established organization, the national 
disaster warning center (NDWC), Thailand.  
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3.5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY: MIXED METHODS 
Social science research can be quantitative or qualitative in style (King, et. al, 1994). Research is 
designed to make inferences either in a descriptive or explanatory way on the basis of empirical 
information about the world. Descriptive inference is the process of understanding an intellectual 
construct on the basis of a set of observations while explanatory or causal inference seeks to 
identify causal effects from the data observed. Exploratory and descriptive case studies represent 
appropriate methods to analyze social phenomena. 
In deploying case study research, Yin (2003) suggested that unlike a solely qualitative 
approach, case studies can be based on a mix of qualitative and quantitative evidence. King, 
Keohane, and Verba (1994) and Brady and Collier (2004) agree that both quantitative and 
qualitative analysis can be used successfully to achieve similar social scientific ends. Used 
appropriately, these two approaches complement one another in explaining and interpreting the 
findings of the study. This research is conducted as an exploratory study with the nested case 
design and employs both qualitative and quantitative methods of observations, interviews, social 
network analysis, documentations and structural surveys to identify complementary 
characteristics rather than advocating a single style of research.  
3.5.1 Mixed Methods 
3.5.1.1 Qualitative Approach: Observation and Interview 
1) Participant observation 
I conducted on-site observation in the affected communities and at the emergency 
operation centers in southern provinces, January 2005, as well as metropolitan Bangkok, July 
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2005, to examine emergency operations and to witness the situation at the peak of the crisis. In 
participant observation, information from non-structured conversations and documentation were 
collected and obtained. The purpose is to compare direct observations with other sources of 
information. Multiple sources could increase the reliability and validity of data and information 
which the researcher collects for analyses.  
2) Interviews  
I conducted interviews to get in-depth information of emergency operations and 
emergency management culture from every level of participating agencies, national, provincial 
and district. Semi-structured questions in the interview were designed and constructed from 
preliminary analysis of documentation and participant observation during the first phase of the 
field research. Detailed information obtained from interviews also supplemented the findings and 
results derived from other methodologies.  
3.5.1.2 Qualitative and Quantitative Approach: Social Network Analysis 
I did a content analysis, from a local newspaper (ThaiRath dated December 27, 2004 to January 
17, 2005) for a tsunami response, and from the emergency operations reports for the emergency 
responses in Bangkok area, to extract the information needed for the analysis of social network. 
Social network analysis allows measurement of structures and systems quantitatively that would 
be difficult to describe without relational concepts, and provides understanding of structural 
properties. Such understanding was gained during a step of content analysis as well as additional 
information from the observation and interviews. UCINET software which was used to report a 
measurement of the networks also allowed us to map the relationships of actors in the network 
into a diagram. This function of UCINET helps visualize how actors interact clearly.   
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As Wasserman and Faust suggest that the methods of social network analysis provide 
explicit formal statements and measures of social structural properties that might otherwise be 
defined only in metaphorical terms, this study presented webs of relationships, closely knit 
networks of relations, social role, centrality, group cliques and so on are given mathematical 
definitions by social network analysis. Explicit mathematical statements were also used to 
compare the characteristics of the networks in this study.  
3.5.1.3 Quantitative Approach: Structural Questionnaires 
In addition to observation and interviews, this study collected data in a survey of emergency 
personnel regarding their assessment of work conditions under crises or emergency, inter-agency 
cooperation, and participation in crisis operations. The survey was intended to serve two 
purposes; to crosscheck with the reports obtained from observation and interview of similarities 
and differences, and to identify critical factors for improving emergency operations and building 
a strong emergency response network.   
A stratified representative sample was used to collect data from emergency personnel at 
national, provincial and local levels of emergency operations and cover three groups of 
management levels which are top, middle and operational. How to distribute and conduct the 
survey and a description of the sampling design are presented in data collection.  
3.5.2 Threats to Validity and Reliability 
This study reviewed the criteria for internal validity, external validity, and reliability of the 
findings and analyses to determine whether there were inconsistencies that affected the 
generalization of findings across time and space.  
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A threat to internal validity was rose to question the effect of intergovernmental 
coordination, information sharing and communication management, and socio-technical 
components in emergency management. The exploration and assessment of this study were built 
upon the studies and practices of disaster and emergency management in complexity. Participant 
observation and interviews allowed this study to document and obtain information from the 
informants directly how they viewed the effects of factors proposed by the study on emergency 
responses to avoid such threat.  
Threats to external validity arose differently since this study covered every emergency 
agency and organization with in the nation, Thailand. Instead of questioning whether research 
findings could be generalized with other actors or jurisdictions, the question was asked if the 
findings could be used by other developing countries and other types of emergency such as 
terrorism. This study emphasized the significance of culture and emergency structure as factors 
affecting to emergency response. Further study needs to take into consideration the similarities 
and differences in cases’ characteristics if findings are analyzed in different settings. The other 
perception of external validity was the extent to which this study was drawn on the theoretical 
framework of “Shared Risk”, Comfort 1999. Her socio-technical components were also used to 
apply and examine other emergency responses in other countries across the world. This study, 
although quantifying socio-technical components, shared the same theoretical fundamental as in 
Comfort’s model. This study validated this concept of strong relationship between socio-
technical components and emergency response in the next chapters.    
Construct validity was taken into account of the study emphasizing empirical studies and 
practices of sources and theoretical frameworks upon which the operationalization of inferences 
is built. This study carefully modified socio-technical components from previous studies and 
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practices to fit with specific characteristics of the Thai environments using preliminary field 
research and analyses of experts. The proposed conceptual model of critical roles of 
intergovernmental coordination, information sharing and communication management were 
evidenced by the event of ineffective tsunami response. A preliminary analysis of Bangkok 
emergency response from non-structured interview also reflected an agreement of the acceptance 
of critical roles of those factors in emergency responses.    
Reliability has to do with the quality of measurement. In its everyday sense, reliability is 
the consistency or repeatability of the measure. This study paid attention to two types of 
reliabilities; 1) Inter-rater or inter-observer reliability, and 2) Internal consistency reliability. For 
the inter-rater reliability, this study was able to ask specific questions twice in a different way to 
determine the accuracy of the responses being provided. For the internal consistency reliability, 
this study performed a pre-analysis data screening before running factor analysis and 
multivariate analysis to make sure that all assumptions and restrictions are met. Tests of missing 
values, outliers, normality and linearity were performed. In addition, two different persons were 
performing manual verifications. However, reliability test can be performed mathematically by 
computing Cronbach’s alpha value or calculating the estimation of a ratio between variances of 
true score and measured score. The closer to “1” the ratio is, the higher reliability the 
measurement has. Each of the reliability estimators gives a different value for reliability. In 
general, the test-retest and inter-rater reliability estimates will be lower in value than the parallel-
forms and internal consistency estimates because they involve measuring at different times or 
with different raters.   
We often think of reliability and validity as separate ideas but, in fact, they are related to 
each other. In many cases, the study is consistently and systematically measuring the wrong 
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value for all respondents, or the study seldom hits the target but gets the right answer on the 
average. Statistical validity and reliability are a strong part of this research due to the coverage of 
cases and large sample size. Cases used in this study cover emergency response of national, 
provincial and district levels managed by every emergency personnel and organization in the 
nation. Sample size is large of total number of 424 informants (N=424) which include 
emergency personnel around the country, 75 provinces and a capital city, Bangkok province.          
Multiple methods used in this study also complement each other. Generalization of 
quantitative analyses of statistical findings is also well explained in detail and depth of 
understanding by the qualitative analyses of interviews and documents review. Social network 
analysis as a qualitative-quantitative tool also allows this study to explain emergency response 
network in statistic interpretation and narrative assessment. Nested design helps relate the cases 
this research study to identify factors affected to both individual and networking emergency 
responses.   
3.6 DATA COLLECTION 
Data for case studies came from many sources of evidence. Sources of evidence commonly used 
in doing case studies include documentation, archival records, interviews, direct observations, 
participant observation, and physical artifacts. No single source has a complete advantage over 
all others. The various sources are highly complementary (Yin, 2003). This study used multiple 
sources of data collection in order to benefit from such complementary interaction. Preliminary 
work for this study consisted of interviews and participant observation to gather informed details 
of emergency cases in order to establish a baseline illustration of existing states of the 
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emergencies and emergency management practice. Documentation, archive records and physical 
artifacts were collected and analyzed. These analytical reports were used as the basis for 
developing a semi-structured interview protocol and structured survey questionnaires for data 
collection. 
3.6.1 Review of Documentary Evidence and Archival Data 
The archival data and secondary information were collected from the regulation books, laws, 
annual reports, and the statistical data on both paper-based and computer-based from Bangkok 
Metropolitan Authority and its key agencies, Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, 
National Disaster Warning Center, Military, national and provincial governments and other 
governmental agencies. All official documents were authorized for the academic purpose of the 
study. This study also refered to previous master thesis on civil society policy of Bangkok 
Metropolitan Administration and the graduate study project of information technology and 
intergovernmental coordination in flood crisis in Bangkok, Kamolvej (1997, 2002).  
 
3.6.2 Field Trips (Participant Observation and Interviews) 
3.6.2.1 Observation and Documentation 
3.6.2.1.1 Phase 1: January-February 2005 
I went back to Thailand during the second and third weeks after tsunami disaster to 
conduct exploratory field study of how tsunami responses were conducted at local 
communities, shelters and emergency command centers in Phuket, PhangNga provinces 
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and headquarter in Bangkok. This first phase of field trip was to obtain first hand 
information from empirical study in the real situation. The observation and non-
structured questions were also conducted with Bangkok Metropolitan Authority and its 
key agencies to obtain information of Bangkok emergency response and management. 
 
3.6.2.1.2 Phase 2: March and May 2005 
I went back to Thailand to update information of tsunami recovery and rehabilitation in 
the southern area, a development plan for the Department of Disaster Prevention and 
Mitigation and the newly established National Disaster Warning Center responsible for 
disseminating warning message to general public. During this period, the information of a 
newly established emergency organization of Bangkok Metropolitan, Civil Emergency 
Relief Department was also obtained.    
3.6.2.1.3 Phase 3: July-August, 2005 
During this period, the data and information from documents, media news release, 
organizational reports and statistical data collected by governmental agencies on the 
December 26, 2004 tsunami disaster management are reexamined and updated to valid 
the findings and results of previous data collection and analyses. Official documents from 
national government and Bangkok Metropolitan Authorities were also collected and 
authorized to be used. The development and progress of CERD was also obtained to 
update the study’s database. Operations, drills and training programs of DDPM, CERD, 
District Offices and Civil Defense Volunteer Units were observed and documented by the 
researcher.      
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3.6.2.2 Semi-structured interviews  
I returned to Bangkok, Thailand during the flooding season from July to August 2005 to collect 
data and information. Open-ended questions and semi structured interviews were employed in 
extended data collection as well as for cross-validating the content analysis. Semi-structured 
interviews were constructed from preliminary analysis of observation from previous phases of 
filed trip and were conducted using representative stratified sample of two levels of decision 
makers (top and middle management) and the response units (operational staff) at national, 
provincial and local levels for all three cases. The interview data identify the relationships within 
each organization to explain how they manage their operations as well as between all 
participating agencies to examine their coordination patterns if one exists. This information helps 
to confirm or contradict findings from content analysis of preliminary field data collection as 
well as update the process of disaster preparation and prevention. The updated information and 
more explanation of unclear answer during this period of interviews were obtained in December 
2005, the last filed trip. A description of the interviewee is presented in table 3.2.  
3.6.3 Conducting Surveys 
A survey with structured questions was conducted using a representative stratified sample of the 
top and middle managements as well as the operational personnel of the emergency action plan 
at national, provincial and local levels. The survey was designed to produce the quantitative data 
that was integrated and analyzed using network and statistical analysis (top management as 
decision makers, middle management as linking pins, and operational level as personal in 
actions). The data from the survey characterized the collective attitudes of personnel in their 
network of operation and how they viewed their coordinative and adaptive capacity under 
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emergency management operation. Findings from this survey, in turn, provided an understanding 
of current states of collaboration both within and among agencies as well as reporting 
suggestions for improvement. Identifications of informants were obtained only for liability. 
Conversation and observation during surveys distribution were obtained and analyzed only for 
the purpose of understanding the findings of the study. Confidentiality of informants is kept and 
the results of the surveys and analysis will be reported to the agencies accordingly.  
I conducted the survey after the interviews with top and middle managers of the core 
agencies, the Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, headquarters and Bangkok 
Metropolitan Board of Administration. I asked for willingness and cooperation from the deputy 
generals and chiefs of divisions of DDPM and deputy permanent secretary and district deputies 
of Bangkok to allow the survey to be distributed to emergency response personnel as well as 
emergency defense volunteer units. I distributed questionnaires to DDPM headquarters, DDPM 
regional centers, provincial DDPM in Phuket, PhangNga and Krabi provinces, CERD, District 
Offices and CDVU in target districts allowing three weeks period to be completed and collected.  
3.6.3.1 Sample Design (Presented in Table 3.2) 
1. National level:  
  1.1 Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation 
   1.1.1 Headquarters 
   1.1.2 Regional Center (RDPM)  
    1.1.2.1 Central Center 1: Pathumtani 
    1.1.2.2 Southern Center 11: Songkla 
    1.1.2.3 Southern Center 12: Surat Thani 
  1.2 Military   
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2. Provincial level:  
  2.1 Phuket, PhangNga and Krabi provinces 
   2.1.1 Provincial Government 
   2.1.2 Provincial Disaster Prevention and Mitigation  
  2.2 Bangkok province (Metropolis) 
 2.2.1 Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA) 
 2.2.2 Flood Control Center (FCC)  
 2.2.3 Civil Emergency Relief Department (CERD) 
3. Local level: District Offices in Bangkok province 
 3.1 New Economic Zone: PayaThai, Dindeang  
 3.2 Preservation Zone: Bangkok Noi, Bangplad 
 3.3 Resident Zone: Laksi  
3.6.3.2 Translation of interviews and questionnaires 
Semi-structured questions in interviews and structured questions in the questionnaires were 
designed and constructed in English and translated into Thai by two professional translators who 
are faculty of the English Teaching School of University of Trade and Commerce, and School of 
Liberal Arts, Chulalongkorn University, Thailand. A translation of interviews was first done by 
the researcher and a back-translation of main concepts of interview transcription was also 
provided by the translators. I encountered difficulty regarding the level of literacy of the 
informants. Explanations of questions and time to obtain information were provided in person. 
The coding of scores and translation of demographic and detailed information from the 
questionnaires were processed and integrated into a database by the researchers. Manual 
verification of data coding is also provided by two graduate research assistants for accuracy.      
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Table 3.2. Sample Summary for Survey and Interview; Dated: June 20 - August 31, 2005 
AGENCY AND LEVEL OF 
AGENCY 
INTERVIEWS N QUESTIONNAIRES N 
DPM @ HEADQUARTER 1. DIRECTOR GENERAL 
2. DIRECTOR OF OPERATION 
3. CHIEF OF IT 
4. CHIEF OF SOCIAL SUPPORT 
5. SUPERVISOR OF PLANNING 
5 ALL LEVELS OF MANAGEMENT 
AND OPERATION 
43 
DPM @ REGIONAL CENTER  1. DIRECTOR OF REGIONAL 1 
(CENTRAL) 
2. DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF 
REGIONAL 11 (SOUTH)  
3. DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF 
REGIONAL 12 (SOUTH) 
3 C1=20 
C11=22 
C12=19 
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DPM @ PROVINCIAL OFFICES 1. CHIEF OF PHANGNGA 
2. CHIEF OF KRABI (PHUKET) 
2 PHANGNGA=12 
PHUKET=10 
KRABI=10 
32 
DPM @ DPM ACADEMY 
(REPRESENTATIVES OF 
PROVINCIAL OFFICES AROUND 
THAILAND PARTICIPATED IN 
TOXIC PLANNING AND 
OPERATION TRAINING)  
  NORTHERN PROVINCES=13 
N/E PROVINCES=17 
EASTERN PROVINCES=5 
CENTRAL PROVINCES=8 
SOUTHERN PROVINCES=14 
NOT SPECIFY PROVINCE=7 
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BMA HEADQUARTER 1. DEPUTY PERMANENT 
SECRETARY 
2. COUNSELOR TO BMA 
ADMINISTRATION 
3. DIRECTOR OF LOCAL 
DISTRICT ENFORCEMENT 
4. DIRECTOR OF BMA BUDGET 
4   
BMA @ FLOOD CONTROL 
CENTER (FCC) 
1. DIRECTOR  
2. DEPUTY DIRECTOR 
3. CHIEF OF IT 
4. OPERATIONAL PERSONNEL 
4 ALL LEVELS OF MANAGEMENT 
AND OPERATIONS 
21 
BMA @ CIVIL EMERGENCY 
RELIEF DEPARTMENT (CERD) 
1. DEPUTY DIRECTOR 
2. DEPUTY DIRECTOR (CHIEF 
OF TSUNAMI OPERATION) 
3. CHIEF OF OPERATION 
3 ALL 4 OPERATIONAL CENTERS 45 
BMA @ DISTRICT OFFICES 1. BANGKHEN DISTRICT 
     DEPUTY, CHIEF, PERSONNEL, 
VOLUNTEER  
2. BANGPLAD DISTRICT 
     DEPUTY, CHIEF, PERSONNEL, 
VOLUNTEER  
3. LAKSI DISTRICT 
     CHIEF, PERSONNEL, 
VOLUNTEER  
4. PAYATAI DISTRICT 
    CHIEFS, PERSONNEL, 
VOLUNTEER  
5. DINDAENG DISTRICT 
    CHIEF, PERSONNEL, 
VOLUNTEERS 
20 ALL PARTICIPATED PERSONNEL 
FROM DISTRICT OFFICE AND 
VOLUNTEER UNIT UNDER 
DISTRICT SUPERVISION 
87 
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AGENCY AND LEVEL OF 
AGENCY 
INTERVIEWS N QUESTIONNAIRES N 
MILITARY @ NAVY 1. COMMANDER OF NAVY BASE 
REGIONAL 3 (SOUTH) 
2. CHIEF OF ENGINEER (R3) 
3. CHIEF OF OPERATION (R3) 
4. COMMANDER OF TUBLAMU 
NAVY BASE 
5. CHIEF OF OPERATION, 
TUBLAMU NAVY BASE 
6. COMMANDER OF SEISMIC 
MONITORING NAVY BASE  
6 ALL MANAGEMENT AND 
PARTICIPATED PERSONNEL 
UNDER NAVY NETWORK 
24 
MILITARY @ ARMY 1. MEDICAL UNIT 
2. COMMAND CENTER 
2 ALL MANAGEMENT AND 
PARTICIPATED PERSONNEL 
UNDER ARMY NETWORK 
20 
MILITARY @ AIR FORCE 1. COMMAND CENTER 
2. AIR TRANSPORTATION 
CENTER (TSUNAMI)  
2 ALL MANAGEMENT AND 
PARTICIPATED PERSONNEL 
UNDER AIR FORCE NETWORK 
10 
MILITARY @ SUPREME 
COMMAND DEPARTMENT 
1. CHIEF AIR MARSHALL 
2. COMMAND CENTER 
3. COORDINATION TO RESCUE 
AND RELIEF CENTER 
3 ALL MANAGEMENT AND 
PARTICIPATED PERSONNEL  
17 
TOTAL 
% 
 54  424 
85% 
3.7 STEPS IN DATA ANALYSIS   
3.7.1 Analysis of Documents and Archive Data 
3.7.1.1 I investigated the emergency operations and crisis management policies of national, 
provincial and local levels. Bureaucratic pattern assessment and intergovernmental 
management analysis were used to capture the characteristics of all agencies and to 
understand structures of authority and the nature of coordination.  
3.7.1.2  I investigated the existence of coordination patterns in both levels and examined the 
effectiveness and efficiency in each level of response operations. Network and 
content analyses were conducted from regulation books of all core agencies, news, 
and reports to visualize the emergency response network which reflects how multiple 
agencies interact and identifies critical nodes in the network.  
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3.7.2 Analysis of Interviews and Participant Observation    
3.7.2.1 I investigated attitudes of emergency personnel toward their coordination patterns 
and the use of their connection. The limitations of their adaptive capacity to 
emergency operations and unexpected change or consequences may derive from the 
existing regulations and laws. .   
3.7.2.2  I assessed information technology and communication processes to identify the 
existing facilities and to examine how to make the best use of them. The use of an 
information network integrated into the warning process is also assessed from the 
concept of operations of the National Disaster Warning Center, Thailand. 
3.7.2.3 I assessed and analyzed communication patterns to evaluate their existence and 
effectiveness for the degree of familiarity with alternatives that emergency personnel 
and communities have during the period of emergency.   
3.7.2.4 I assessed the degree of self organization and learning in developing more 
appropriate solutions at the organizational level for 1) organizational adaptation, 2) 
cooperative capacity, and 3) local community participation.  
3.7.3 Analysis of Structural Questionnaires (Survey) 
3.7.3.1 I examined the characteristics and nature of emergency response for each emergency 
agency to identify factors affecting their performance and emergency operations. 
Information sharing and communication management patterns were analyzed to 
determine how emergency personnel used and exchanged their knowledge and 
experience to support problem solving in emergency response operations.     
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3.7.3.2 I analyzed survey data using multivariate and network analysis to assess the extent to 
which general patterns of collaboration and coordination exist, and to identify sources 
for improvement. In addition, the socio-technical components were assessed to 
identify statistically significant relations between the components and their 
performance in emergency response.  
3.8 SUMMARY 
Exploratory research using a nested case study gives an additional measure of the 
relationships among the three cases by using within-case and cross-case analyses to study the 
social phenomena. Analysis of each case in the nested design identified the factors affecting the 
performance and implementation of each core emergency agency and how it varied by case. This 
approach portrayed the effectiveness of intergovernmental coordination in emergency operations 
for the country.  
Mixed methods were employed to obtain and assess findings because a single method, 
quantitative or qualitative, would not be able to cover the gaps in analyses or deal with the 
threats to validity. In addition, this study was designed to explore emergency management at all 
levels of emergency operations in the nation. This effort covered a wide scale of management 
actions that requires the capacity to generalize findings to the national level as well as the ability 
to explain in detail of how such generalizations and residuals are constructed. Relationships 
among cases and core actors in each case require quantitative analysis to measure the strength 
and degree of coordination and networking. Qualitative interpretation was used to explain the 
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identified characteristics and why those relationships were initiated in the documented patterns. 
Both sets of findings contribute to understanding how a strong network of coordination develops.         
In order to analyze the documents, newspaper reports, field observations, interviews, 
social network, and survey, I used extensive materials from a wide range of sources and invested 
eight months of time in data collection. An exploratory study of emergency response and 
management on the scale of an entire nation requires multiple analyses and sufficient time to 
design an appropriate structure of analysis, collect the data, and interpret the findings.   
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4.0  DECEMBER 26, 2004 TSUNAMI IN SOUTHERN THAILAND 
In order to analyze emergency response to that 26 December 2004 Tsunami in Southern 
Thailand, several types of investigation were done. This research investigated the characteristics 
of affected areas and the operation of the participating agencies in disaster operations from five 
different perspectives. The geographical analysis identified the different physical structures of 
the area and the specific layout of the region, so that the emergency team can create appropriate 
hazard and evacuation maps. The organizational analysis characterized the content of the 
devastation and outlined the design of an information system. The knowledge database includes 
information regarding all participating agencies and demonstrates the gap in knowledge between 
plans and practice. A content analysis of news reports and secondary sources was done to 
document the chronology and details of the tsunami operation in order to build a systematic 
database and cross check the validity and reliability of different sources in their report of 
emergency conditions. A summary of findings from in-depth interviews with selected officials 
and managers was used to verify the facts of the situation and identify the strengths and 
weaknesses of emergency operations. Finally, an analysis of knowledge gained from seminars 
and workshops was done to identify obstacles and to develop back-up plans for response and 
communication systems.  
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4.1 EMERGENCY STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATIONS 
Thailand governs 75 provinces through provincial governments headed by governors 
under the Ministry of Interior, national government. Bangkok, as the capital city (76th province) 
has its own system of government and a special law that is discussed in the next chapter.  
In a state of emergency, all involved government agencies and organizations are managed 
under the Civil Defense Act 1979.  
4.1.1 National level:  
The Minister of Interior, as the director of civil defense, is automatically the commander 
in chief for emergency operations of the country. There are committees from responsible 
government agencies mobilized to support the emergency operations. 
4.1.1.1 Civil Defense Committee 
This committee is authorized to approve policies and strategic plans for civil defense 
operations as well as budget management. It includes representatives of decision makers from the 
responsible government agencies, Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of 
Public Health, Bangkok Governor, Director General of the Department of Meteorology, Director 
General of the Fiscal Bureau and Director General of the Department of Disaster Prevention and 
Mitigation.  
4.1.1.2 Office of the Secretary General for Civil Defense  
This office is chaired by the Director General of the Department of Disaster Prevention 
and Mitigation as a Permanent Secretary. This office functions as a command center for the 
Director of Civil Defense (Minister of Interior) 
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4.1.2 Regional level: 
By special emergency regulation and order of the Director of National Civil Defense, 
four regional offices of the Civil Defense are established as the Command Center to direct and 
support emergency operations in every province. This regional body of civil defense serves as 
the coordinator in order to manage the interaction and collaboration of multiple agencies from 
public, non-governmental and private sectors.  
4.1.2.1 Lower Southern Region Command Center (Range of supervision: 7 provinces) 
4.1.2.2 Upper Southern Regional Command Center (Range of supervision: 7 provinces) 
4.1.2.3 Northern Regional Command Center (Range of supervision: 17 provinces) 
4.1.2.4 Northeastern Regional Command Center (Range of supervision: 14 provinces) 
 
In addition, the Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation (DDPM) has 
established 12 Regional Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Centers (RDPM) around the country 
to support and supervise emergency operations, function as emergency information centers as 
well as to conduct training for the Civil Defense Volunteers that serve in different areas in the 75 
provinces and Bangkok.  
4.1.3 Provincial and local levels: divided into 5 levels 
4.1.3.1 Bangkok Metropolis: Bangkok Governor is commander in chief. 
4.1.3.2 Provinces: Governors are the commanders in chief. 
4.1.3.3 District/ City: District Deputy or Sheriff is commander in chief. 
4.1.3.4 Sub-district/ Municipality: Mayor is commander in chief.  
4.1.3.5 City of Pattaya: City Permanent Secretary is commander in chief. 
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Under the national emergency regulation, the commander in chief is also considered the 
Director of Civil Defense for the designated area. Each position has absolute authority to direct 
and manage operations during an emergency.  
4.1.4 Civil Defense Volunteer Units 
The Civil Defense Act 1979, chapter 26, authorizes the establishment of Civil Defense 
Volunteer Units in every district in Bangkok as well as for cities in provinces around the country 
to assist in the Civil defense activities. CDVU management is conducted under the Civil Defense 
Volunteer Regulation, 1988, of the Ministry of Interior. This study acknowledges the “two 
hatted” role of Civil Defense Volunteer Unit (CDVU) as emergency response personnel directed 
by local authorities and as representatives of community level.  
4.2 ORGANIZATIONAL AND INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 
Under the Civil Defense Act of 2002, the Provincial Civil Defense Command Center is 
responsible for emergency management in the respective provinces to direct the City or District 
and Municipality levels of emergency personnel through the jurisdictional Civil Defense 
Command Centers at each level. To manage emergency operations, the level of severity of 
disaster and emergency define the levels of emergency personnel assigned to implementing the 
emergency operations. The levels of response are: 
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4.2.1 The levels of response 
Level 1: Low scale of severity in small area: municipality is in charge 
Level 2: In case of overloaded capabilities, municipality should ask for assistance from 
neighboring local units. 
Level 3: Medium scale of severity or a wider affected area: municipalities ask for 
assistance from district or city civil defense units to direct and manage the 
operations of multiple units. In addition, the mobile unit is activated 24 hours/ 7 
days a week.  
 Level 4: High scale of severity: Provincial Civil Defense Unit is in charge. 
 Level 5: Very high scale of severity: National Civil Defense is in charge.    
4.2.2 Operations on December 26, 2004 
The devastation in southern Thailand from the December 26, 2004 tsunami was beyond 
the capability of each affected province to manage. The devastation expanded to six provinces 
along the southwestern coastline. After the devastation, the geography of some areas in Phuket 
province and almost all the area in PhangNga province was dramatically changed. It was difficult 
and complicated to get rescue teams into the area, especially with unskilled and inexperienced 
personnel. Main roads and bridges were washed away. The entire electrical system was blacked 
out. Other unexpected impacts were triggered by the first event. When the electricity failed, 
communication systems went down as well. All agencies worked blindly, physically in the dark, 
and they could not communicate with each other simultaneously. Radio frequencies as well as 
cell phone networks were overloaded. During this time, the use of cell phones increased from 3 
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million connections a day to 33 million connections (Manager Newspaper, March 21, 2005).  
The lack of communication made it difficult for participating agencies to update the situation and 
exchange information necessary for coordinating their operations with units from different areas 
and units. This period of blackout, even though it was shorter than in other areas affected by the 
tsunami, caused a significant delay in search and rescue.    
Phuket and PhangNga are governed in the provincial system under the national 
government. The governors are appointed by the Minister of Interior. Under a state of 
emergency, the governor, by the constitution, automatically becomes the head of the emergency 
operations center of the province. The governor commands the emergency operations and 
coordinates with all the participating agencies in the area. A single provincial system was not 
capable to respond either to the situation or to coordinate the assistance from neighboring 
agencies from the other five provinces, since all six provinces shared the same damaged 
coastline. This limitation signaled to the national government the need to send a national rescue 
and mitigation team into the area. More equipment, more manpower, and more medical 
personnel and resources poured, unorganized, into the affected areas like a second wave of 
water. This lack of organization delayed the rescue and recovery process. The low level of local 
participation in organizing response and recovery operations led to misinterpretation of needs for 
disaster assistance and dissatisfaction with the recovery process. Lack of valid information 
inhibited the development of trust among emergency agencies, and between citizens and 
governmental agencies. Distrust, in turn, affected the effectiveness of emergency response 
coordination.  
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4.3 INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE 
On December 26, 2004 after 10.00 am, a huge number of organizations, agencies, individuals 
and small groups rushed into the damaged area, trying to find survivors and deliver medical care. 
Every individual suddenly confronted extraordinary complexity. An unfamiliar natural disaster 
and a very large number of organizations engaged in providing the assistance, and a wide 
geographic area to serve a large number of survivors and injured led to near chaos. 
Lack of experience in disaster and emergency management and lack of skills in 
coordination created obstacles for organizations and agencies in adapting to unexpected events 
like the tsunami. Some of the survivors died because of delay in medical attention and lack of 
food, rather than suffering from blunt force trauma. There was no effective information and 
database management for the records of rescuers and rescued. Relatives reported missing persons 
twice with different centers because members of the families were separated in the disaster. This 
situation led to redundancy in sending multiple rescue teams to the same area for the same 
search.  The reports reflected unorganized coordination, interaction, information sharing and 
communication patterns for the emergency management which cost greater loss of lives and 
property.   
Figure 1 below shows a subsystem of 291 organizations that interacted with other 
organizations in the tsunami emergency response during the three week period from December 
26, 2004 to January 16, 2005. This subsystem of 291 organizations was identified out of 393 
organizations that were cited in news report (Thai Rath Newspaper, Bangkok, Thailand, 
December 27, 2004 – January 17, 2005). Information obtained from interviews on not-reported 
rescue and emergency operations will also be noted in the analysis.  
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 Figure 4.1 Map of Overall Organizational Interactions in the Thai Tsunami Response12/26/2004-1/16/2005 
Source: Extracted from ThaiRath Newspaper dated December 27, 2004 – January 17, 2005 
NOTE: Circles represent the initiators and squares represent correspondents in the interactions. 
 
The organizational interaction matrix reflects the complexity and anarchy of the 
coordination among those organizations engaged in disaster assistance. The entire network 
contains 1,035 activities conducted by the total of 393 organizations. Analyzed further, 781 
activities from this set of interactions created 531 ties among 320 organizations. Figure 4.1 
shows an extremely dense network that requires careful study to interpret and analyze the 
patterns of interaction. To better understand the scalable emergency response of national, 
provincial and local organizations and agencies, this study extracted the characteristics of these 
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organizations and agencies to identify their roles and operations in the emergency response. I 
then separated the domestic and international interaction networks, using national organizations 
and agencies as major players to present visual maps of the interaction matrix. This analysis also 
takes into account the chronological order of the organizations entering the system to discuss the 
readiness of response and the systems adaptive capabilities to cope with unexpected events or 
consequences. These analytical measures reveal the pattern of coordination across jurisdictions 
and sectors of funding work in the network. 
In table 4.1, the total number of organizations participating in the whole emergency 
response system was 393 with 157 or 39.9% national organizations, 76 or 19.4% provincial 
organizations and 57 or 14.5% local organizations. The response system included 52 or 13.3% 
private and 50 or 12.7% non-profit organizations.   
 
Table 4.1 Frequency Distribution of the 26 December 2004 Sumatran Earthquake and Tsunami Response, Thailand 
 PUBLIC NONPROFI PRIVATE TOTAL N OF
ORGANIZAT
ONS 
 N % N % N % N % 
INTERNATIONAL 80 20 13 3.3 9 2.3 1 26.0
NATIONAL 10 26 20 5.1 3 7.9 15 39.9
PROVINCIAL 62 15 4 1.0 10 2.6 7 19.4
LOCAL 42 10 13 3.3 2 0.5 57 14.5
SPECIAL INTERE
GROUP* 
1 0.3 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 0.2
 29 74 50 12.7 52 13.3 3 100
*DEMOCRAT PARTY 
 Source: Extracted from Thai Rath Newspaper, Thailand, December 27, 2004 – January 17, 2005. (see also Comfort 
and Haase (2005)) 
 
This characterization of the types of organizations participating in response operations 
reflects, first, less severe damage to the local infrastructure that enabled the local authorities and 
agencies to function in the response operations. Second, Table 4.1 documents the number of non-
governmental organizations that assisted and participated in response operations and indicates 
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their willingness to coordinate across sectors. Third, this pattern of interactions indicates a 
greater capacity for communication among organizations, despite the damage to local 
telecommunications. The communication channels in the affected area used substitute 
communications equipment, for example; mobile cars from telecommunication companies, trunk 
radios of the military, HAM or amateur radio, and several radio networks from the multiple 
emergency response agencies on scene. This redundancy in communications enabled multiple 
units to communicate with each other during the entire period of operations.  
As presented in Figures 4.2 and 4.3, the number of organizations entering the response 
system is categorized by jurisdiction and source of funding. As shown, the number of 
organization entering the system was very high in the first day and dropped dramatically in the 
next two days. This drop reflects the difficulties of organizing and managing a large number of 
organizations in chaos. In addition, the lack of knowledge of the situation and how to deal with 
states of emergency made it more difficult to manage a single unit, let alone coordinate among 
multiple units. As reported from interviews and participant observation, many organizations and 
agencies involved in emergency response on the very first days had no coordination and little 
effective interaction. New organizations were unlikely to enter the response systematically. 
Disaster assistance and medical supplies were therefore delayed or lost in transportation and 
distribution. Some international organizations, such as private rescue teams from Hong Kong and 
Korea, managed their operations without initiating any interaction with Thai government 
agencies or help centers. These organizations entered the target areas where they were informed 
by local sources of location where it was likely people were present before the tsunami wave, 
and they proceeded independently with their search and rescue. 
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Entry of Organizations Into Entire System by Date and Level of Jurisdiction
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
12
/2
7
12
/2
8
12
/2
9
12
/3
0
12
/3
1
1/
1
1/
2
1/
3
1/
4
1/
5
1/
6
1/
7
1/
8
1/
9
1/
10
1/
11
1/
12
1/
13
1/
14
1/
15
1/
16
1/
17
Date
N
um
be
r o
f O
rg
an
iz
at
io
ns
International National Provincial Local Total
Figure 4.2 Graph shows the entry of organizations into entire system by date and level of jurisdiction 
    Source: Extracted from Thai-Rath Newspaper, Thailand December 27, 2004 – January 17, 2005. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Entry of Organizations into Entire System by Date and Source of Funding
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Figure 4.3 Graph shows the entry of organizations into response system by date and source of funding 
 Source: Extracted from Thai-Rath Newspaper, Thailand, December 27, 2004 – January 17, 2005. 
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The practice of avoiding bureaucratic procedures and confusion during the first days and 
operating within their own small network was a pattern adopted by international organizations. 
Several groups of Thai private investors also managed their resources and personnel to response 
to the damage conditions. They communicated through their private radio networks and had their 
business network in Bangkok arrange transportation of medical supplies and toolkits. Delivery 
was arranged by private jets to their temporary contact points. To make the use of private jets 
efficient, the companies flew over-flight of the area to locate survivors and deliver inter-island 
necessities before returning to the bases. 
4.3.1 National-Provincial-Local Emergency Response 
Scalable emergency management needs to be systematically organized and flexible in the 
same time. States of emergency require appropriate understanding and skills in single and inter 
agency tasks. Yet, disaster and emergency conditions produce unexpected consequences and 
nonlinear complications that need adaptive capabilities to deal well with such events. Extreme 
events require a more robust analytical framework, as they are characterized by hundreds of 
organizations engaged in response operations over a wide geographic area with diverse 
populations. Organizations cross sector and jurisdiction boundaries and form a distinct 
operational system that can effectively respond to the needs generated by a complex event 
(Comfort, 1999). This study used network analysis as a method to analyze and evaluate the 
performance of inter-organizational systems that have evolved in response to extreme events, 
acknowledging that each system is composed of sub-networks interacting with one another and 
shaping the dynamics of the whole system. A statistical analysis calculated with UCINET 
software (Borgatti, 2003) is applied to interpret the degree of network performance. In addition 
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to the approach and application of social network analysis, this study also uses the information 
obtained from interviews and participant observation to create a comprehensive understanding of 
the response system.    
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Figure 4.4 Graph shows the entry of organizations into response system by date and level of jurisdiction 
Source: Extracted from Thai-Rath Newspaper, Thailand, December 27, 2004 – January 17, 2005. 
 
In order to better understand how the scalable emergency response operated through 
national, provincial and local levels, this study focuses its first discussion into the domestic 
network of tsunami emergency response. The international organizations were excluded from 
this analysis to provide a measure of the national network. The full list of organizations is listed 
and the acronyms shown on the organizational map are spelled out in full in the Appendix C. 
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Table 4.2 Number of Organizations Entering Tsunami Response System in Domestic Interaction Network 
Date National Provincial Local Total Date National Provincial Local Total 
12/27 24 11 10 45 1/7 6 1 0 7 
12/28 25 9 6 40 1/8 3 0 0 3 
12/29 9 6 3 18 1/9 2 0 1 3 
12/30 7 4 6 17 1/10 5 1 2 8 
12/31 32 17 7 56 1/11 0 0 0 0 
1/1 11 10 9 30 1/12 3 0 2 5 
1/2 5 3 6 14 1/13 3 0 1 4 
1/3 9 5 1 15 1/14 1 0 1 2 
1/4 7 4 1 12 1/15 0 0 0 0 
1/5 4 4 0 8 1/16 1 1 1 3 
1/6 0 0 0 0 1/17 1 0 0 1 
    Source: Extracted from Thai-Rath Newspaper, Thailand, December 27, 2004 – January 17, 2005. 
 
Given the size of this domestic operational network of 291 organizations, several sets of 
organizations were combined into a single category. For example, local military units were 
combined into one organization, the Thai military. A chart showing the combinations is included 
in Appendix D. With these combinations, the total number of Thai organizations participating in 
the domestic emergency response network was reduced to 220. As shown in figure 4.5, the map 
of domestic organizational interaction lays out the network of the emergency operations 
conducted. The international domain interaction network will be presented separately to discuss 
how the international organizations functioned in the emergency operations and how they 
coordinate and interact among themselves as well as with organizations.  
From the interaction matrix, circles represent organizations and lines represent 
interactions between organizations located in four different areas of the map. The first area on 
the right hand side of the map shows a scatter plot of organizations that interacted outside a main 
network. In the network, there are three layers of organizations, an outer layer of national 
organization circling around the edge, a middle layer of provincial organizations, and the center 
area shows those from local jurisdictions. 
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Figure 4.5 Map of Domestic Organizational Interactions in the Thai Tsunami Response 12/27/2004-1/17/2005 
Source: Extracted from ThaiRath Newspaper dated December 27, 2004 – January 17, 2005 
NOTE: (In color, green represents national organizations, black represents provincial organizations and pink 
represents local organizations) 
 (Scattered dots far right cannot be identified in black and white, please see acronym in Appendix C) 
 
The map shows, first, at least fifteen distinctive clusters of nodes that serve as hubs for 
linking with other organizations. The Thai government is the main actor of the network, with 120 
initiated interactions and 26 corresponding activities. Of the eleven identifiable hubs, four are 
anchored by Thai national ministries: Ministry of Finance; Ministry of Interior; Ministry of 
Public Health; and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Thai government managed the 
emergency response operations and mitigation through the major ministries as assigned by the 
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Prime Minister. The most significant agency is the Ministry of Interior. By constitution, the 
Minister of Interior is a commander in chief as the Director of National Civil Defense reporting 
directly to the Prime Minister. The Minister of Interior by line of authority has absolute power to 
mobilize all resources around the country through provincial governments. The Department of 
Disaster Prevention and Mitigation operated under the order of the Minister of Interior. The 
second hub is anchored by the Ministry of Health. The devastation of tsunami caused a lot of 
death and injuries and personnel from the Ministry of Public Health are authorized to coordinate 
all medical attentions from several units and distribute supplies to meet public health needs. The 
outbreak prevention program and psychological consultancy were also conducted by this 
department. Next, since the time was a Christmas holiday and the southwestern coast of Phuket 
and PhangNga are the tourist area, 50% of the casualties were foreigners who needed a special 
attention for search and rescue. In response to this need, many nations contact the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs directly and through their embassies in Thailand in order to bring in their experts 
and equipment in search and rescue as well as medical personnel to assist Thai agencies. Last, 
the Ministry of Finance is authorized to manage all budgets for emergency operations and 
recovery as well as approve the use of advance financial assistance to the local government 
agencies to pay the cost of living for the survivors. Many donations from private domestic 
organizations were also made through them.     
Four hubs in the network are anchored by the Thai Navy, Army, Air Force and the Local 
units of the Thai Military (combined) agencies that had primary responsibility for search and 
rescue operations and immediate logistical operations. A tenth distinctive node was the Forensic 
Science Institution (FSI) under the Ministry of Justice. The head of the FSI and her team were 
the very first medical personnel in the area who tried to set up the center for missing persons and 
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identification of the dead. Three other significant centers of contact are the provincial 
governments in the disaster affected region (Phuket, PhangNga, and Krabi provinces). 
Interestingly, this map of inter-organizational interactions shows a significant 
involvement of private sector and nonprofit sector involvement. The final four hubs were 
anchored by nonprofit foundations. RaCahPraChaNuKroh foundation, supported by the beloved 
King of Thailand, became the main actor to distribute financial aid for recovery projects as well 
as receiving all the donations made. YanYao temple played the role of the center for 
identification of dead bodies. FSI coordinated with the temple and locals to set up the 
information center and shelter for both operational staff and the homeless. The last two non-
profit organizations in the scene were in fact private rescue agencies, RuamKaTunYoo and 
PorTekTeung. In Thailand, these two agencies have the most experience in search and rescue 
during an emergency working in an unstable environment. Nonetheless, they are not well trained 
for tsunami response nor had they trained working with multiple agencies in a large scale area 
across six provinces. There still were problems and misunderstanding in coordinating operations. 
The network does not appear to be strongly interconnected as an overall response system. 
The statistics from Freeman’s degree centrality index show the degree of centralization within 
the whole network to be 24.11%. The Average Distance (among reachable pairs) = 3.390, the 
Distance-based cohesion = 0.229 (range 0 to 1; larger values indicate greater cohesiveness) and 
Distance-weighted Fragmentation = 0.771. The distance from one node to another is the length 
of a shortest path between them. This is the concept of “degree of separation” made familiar to 
many by a popular play. The density of the network shows a low average of 0.0134 with 
standard deviation of 0.1148. Dense networks are particularly good for coordination of activity 
among actors.  
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Table 4.3 Descriptive Statistics: Degree Centrality for Thai Domestic Tsunami Response Network 
 DEGRE NRMDEGRE SHARE 
MEAN 2.913 1.336 0.005 
STD DEV 5078 2.329 0.008 
SUM 638.000 292.661 1.000 
VARIANC 25.787 5.426 0.000 
SSQ 7506.00 1579.413 0.018 
MCSSQ 5647.35 1188.316 0.014 
EUC 
NORM 
86.637 39.742 0.136 
MINIMUM 1.000 0.459 0.002 
MAXIMU 55.000 25.229 0.086 
NETWORK CENTRALIZATION = 24.11% 
HETEROGENEITY = 1.84%, NORMALIZED = 1.39% 
 Source: Extracted from Thai-Rath Newspaper, Thailand December 27, 2004 – January 17, 2005. 
NOTE: SSQ = sum of square; MSCCQ = mean-centered sum of square; Euc Norm = Euclidean norm; 
NrmDegree = Normed Degree 
 
 
Table 4.4 Betweeness Centrality of Thai Domestic Tsunami Response Network 
 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR EACH MEASURE  
 BETWEENNE NBETWEENNESS
MEAN 180.201 0.762 
STD DEV 801.506 3.389 
SUM 3946.000 166.846 
VARIANCE 642411.938 11.483 
SSQ 147799664.000 2641.807 
MCSSQ 140688224.000 2514.695 
EUC NORM 12157.288 51.399 
MINIMUM 0.000 0.000 
MAXIMUM 10383.357 43.899 
NETWORK CENTRALIZATION INDEX = 43.33% 
 Source: Extracted from Thai-Rath Newspaper, Thailand December 27, 2004 – January 17, 2005. 
 NOTE: SSQ = sum of square; MSCCQ = mean-centered sum of square; Euc Norm = Euclidean norm;   
NrmDegree = Normed Degree 
 
Output distance: Geodesic Distance Analysis 
------------------------------------------------------ 
For each pair of nodes, the algorithm finds the number of edges in the shortest path as 
follow. 
Average distance 3.390 
Distance-based cohesion 0.229  
Distance-weighted Fragmentation 0.771 
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Centrality measures identify the most prominent actors that are extensively involved in 
relationships with other network members. Centrality indicates one type of “importance” of 
actors in a network: in lay terms, these are the “key” players, while degree of centrality is the 
sum of all other actors who are directly connected to key players. It signifies activity or 
popularity. Many ties coming in and going from an actor would increase degree centrality. 
Betweenness, in addition to degree of centrality, distance and density, is a measure of the 
potential for control as an actor who is high in betweenness is able to act as a gatekeeper, 
controlling the flow of resource between the alters with whom the actor connects.  
There is a large variation in actor betweenness from 0 to 10383.357. This measure means 
that many connections can be made in this network without the aid of any intermediary. The 
centralization index for the Thai domestic network at 43.33% indicates the importance of the 
main actor, the Thai Government, in mobilizing response operations. Clearly, there is a structural 
basis for the Thai government to view themselves as a mover-and-shaker. This role, even though 
there is not very much betweenness power in the system, is important for group formation and 
stratification. Interestingly, the Thai domestic network revealed a group of organizations that had 
the best fit in terms of the interacting with one another in reference to disaster-related issues as 
shown in table 4.5. 
In this group of ten organizations, the first six are governmental organizations. Four of 
these agencies, Forensic Science Institution, Thai Government, Ministries of Finance and Public 
Health, were discussed in the previous section (P.50). In addition, the Committee of Compulsory 
Education functioned as the contact point for assessment of damage and recovery needs for those 
schools affected from tsunami in the southern area. This committee was also indirectly assigned, 
by the King’s foundation, to expedite the process of resuming school activities. Second in the 
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row of six, the Department of Insurance managed the process of making the financial claims and 
distributing financial support to those who suffered loss of life and damage to properties. The 
DOI also adapted their loan programs flexible to meet the needs of the survivors. 
 
Table 4.5Group Centrality of Thai Domestic Tsunami Response Network 
STARTING FITNESS 34.000 
ROUND 0, 3 ITERATIONS 0.000 
OBSERVED NUMBER REACHED 139.000 (63.4%) 
GROUP MEMBER ORGANIZATIONS
1.   COMMITTEE OF COMPULSORY EDUCATION 
2.   DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE 
3.   FORENSIC SCIENCE INSTITUTE 
4.   GOVERNMENT OF THAILAND 
5.   MINISTRY OF FINANCE, THAILAND 
6.   MINISTRY OF PUBLIC HEALTH, THAILAND 
7.   OFFICE OF THE CROWN 
8.   RADIO STATION, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC RELATIONS 
9.   PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT, KRABI 
10. RAJ CHA PRA CHA NU KROH (RCPCNK) FOUNDATION 
Source: Extracted from Thai-Rath Newspaper, Thailand December 27, 2004 – January 17, 2005. 
 
An obviously important seventh hub in the Thai domestic network is the Office of the 
Crown, led by the crown prince, crown princess and their family who are beloved by the Thai 
people. Respectfully trusted by public, the programs and projects under the offices of the prince 
and princess were delivered to the affected communities very effectively and with a lot of 
willingness to coordinate and participate in voluntary activities from public, private, and non-
profit organizations. Local residents also volunteered to help facilitate resources through their 
community networks which helped to expedite the recovery operations.    
The eighth organization is, notably, a radio station of the Department of Public Relations 
that had the responsibility of reporting information about the tsunami and its consequences to the 
Thai people. A wide range of communication channels managed by the Department of Public 
Relation allowed the organization to deliver the information and update the situation to public as 
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well as emergency personnel. Although many mobile phones or satellite communications were 
available, local residents still relied on the information they obtained from transistor radios and 
local radio station, or through their megaphone network which in fact retrieved information from 
the department broadcast.  
The participation of the Krabi provincial government in this group indicates the active 
role played by this government. The characteristics of Krabi province and the emergency 
response operations were different from Phuket and PhangNga provinces. The damaged areas in 
Phuket and PhangNga were within the province and reachable by road. Even though the main 
road in PhangnNga was washed away for couple hours, a road along Phuket beach was still 
intact. This road condition made transportation available for every agency and organization to 
access the area while the most damaged area in Krabi, PP Island, was only accessible by boat. 
There was no electricity and telecommunication for five days which made the search and rescue 
very difficult. All agencies from every unit had to gather together in order to make the trip to the 
island optimally productive. Krabi provincial government therefore automatically turned out to 
be a point of contact. 
Last, the inclusion of the RajChaPraChaNuKroh (RCPCNK) Foundation underscores the 
substantive role played by nonprofit organizations in this response system. The RCPCNK 
foundation is directly supported by the King and the Crown Princess, and provides an important 
model of humanitarian assistance for the Thai people.    
The analysis of subgroups in the network further confirms this observation. The clique 
analysis in UCINET identified 59 subgroups in the network, as listed in Appendix E. The 
following list indicates the top 15 cliques in the Thai response system. Clique analysis proposes 
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that information spreads rapidly through densely knit subgroups because actors are strongly 
connected to one another and they directly share the information.  
 
Table 4.6 Cliques of Thai Domestic Tsunami Response Network 
1. DEPARTMENT OF DISASTER PREVENTION AND MITIGATION; GOVERNMENT OF 
THAILAND, MINISTRY OF CULTURE, MINISTRY OF INTERIOR 
2. COMMITTEE OF VICTIM RELIEF FUND, GOVERNMENT OF THAILAND, MINISTRY OF 
INTERIOR  
3. COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL DISASTER, GOVERNMENT OF THAILAND, MINISTRY OF 
INTERIOR 
4. GOVERNMENT OF THAILAND, MINISTRY OF INTERIOR, MINISTRY OF FINANCE, 
MINISTRY OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 
5. GOVERNMENT OF THAILAND, MINISTRY OF INTERIOR, KRABI GOVERNMENT, 
PHANGNGA GOVERNMENT 
6. DEPARTMENT OF FISHERY, GOVERNMENT OF THAILAND, KRABI GOVERNMENT 
7. DEPARTMENT OF WATER TRANSPORTATION, GOVERNMENT OF THAILAND, THAI 
ARMY 
8. FORENSIC INVESTIGATION OFFICE, GOVERNMENT OF THAILAND, MINISTRY OF 
PUBLIC HEALTH 
9. FORENSIC SCIENCE INSTITUTION, GOVERNMENT OF THAILAND, MINISTRY OF 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, NATIONAL POLICE 
10. FORENSIC SCIENCE INSTITUTION, GOVERNMENT OF THAILAND, MINISTRY OF 
JUSTICE, NATIONAL POLICE 
11. FORENSIC SCIENCE INSTITUTION, GOVERNMENT OF THAILAND, MINISTRY OF 
NATURAL RESOURCE AND ENVIRONMENT 
12. FORENSIC SCIENCE INSTITUTION, GOVERNMENT OF THAILAND, PHANGNGA LOCAL 
POLICE 
13. FORENSIC SCIENCE INSTITUTION, GOVERNMENT OF THAILAND, 
PEANPUNGPAYAMYAK FOUDATION 
14. GOVERNMENT OF THAILAND, KRUNGTHAI BANK, MINISTRY OF FINANCE 
15. GOVERNMENT OF THAILAND, KRUNGTHAI BANK, RAJCHAPRACHANUKROH 
FOUNDATION 
Source: Extracted from Thai-Rath Newspaper, Thailand December 27, 2004 – January 17, 2005. 
 
The cliques show overlapping memberships among the organizations, but the sheer 
number of cliques indicates that the response system was functioning essentially as a set of 
separate groups formed around specific problems rather than as a coherent system addressing 
this extreme event with a common strategy (Comfort and Haase 2005). 15 of the 59 Thai 
domestic tsunami response network cliques are identified by their acronyms. All 59 cliques are 
listed in Appendix E. Significant in a review of this list is the participation of the Government of 
Thailand. While the Government of Thailand is not always the first named actor, it is clearly a 
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primary actor in mobilizing response organizations. Also noteworthy is the interaction among the 
Government of Thailand and national ministries with the disaster-affected provincial 
governments. 
Nonetheless, the response system appears to be loosely connected, although with many 
organizations participating, but not necessarily interacting efficiently with one another. Group 
centrality reflects the operation by function. In addition, a more comprehensive look at the 
network maps on the right side of Figure 4.5 shows several organizations scattered and 
interacting outside of the network boundary. Those organizations represent public, private and 
non-profit sources of funding as well as national, provincial and local levels. This pattern reflects 
the poor connection and coordination among all levels of agencies. Those organizations entered 
the system by themselves and chose to interact with fewer organizations to accomplish specific 
tasks. In their interactions, these organizations frequently interacted with lower or higher levels 
of jurisdiction. Such interactions are functional. Most of those organizations finished their 
operations and withdrew from the damaged area on schedule. Those operations were more likely 
to be repeated because of lack of feedback and communication difficulties.  
This pattern of interaction also affects the coordination with international organizations 
discussed in the next section as the network will show the dependency of international 
organizations on those national agencies to manage activities through its network of operations 
and to move the tasks along to those in the front-base. The information obtained from the content 
analysis and interviews shows the significant reflection of how the international organizations 
interacted in the network. 
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4.3.2 International Interaction in Thai Emergency Response System 
    The exclusion of international organizations (102 of the total 393) from the analysis 
of the interaction of domestic agencies specifically focused the analysis on Thai emergency 
management. However, the content analysis also documented a significance of international 
interaction, coordination and operation during the first three weeks of tsunami response. 
Analyzing this pattern of interaction shows how the Thai agencies functioned with international 
organizations.  
 
Table 4.7 Frequency Distribution, Tsunami Disaster Response System, Thailand 
Total N of ALL   Public Nonprofit Private 
Organizations 
  N % N % N % N % 
International 63 53.8% 9 7.7% 8 6.8% 80 68.4% 
National 22 18.8% 3 2.6% 0 0.0% 25 21.4% 
Provincial 8 6.8% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 8 6.8% 
Local 3 2.6% 0 0.0% 1 0.9% 4 3.4% 
Totals 96 82.1% 12 10.3% 9 7.7% 117 100.0% 
Source: Extracted from ThaiRath Newspaper, Thailand dated December 27, 2004 – January 17, 2005 
 
 
Table 4.7 shows the number of international organizations that interacted with the Thai 
domestic tsunami response system. The international organizations that entered the system were 
from public, private, and non-profit sectors and interacted with all levels of domestic 
organizations. The highest proportion of international public organizations, 68.4%, indicates the 
significant role of the governments of several nations and their embassies in search and rescue 
effort for their citizens. Most of the entries were made by representative of the governments of 
those nations trying to send their expert teams with specialized equipment into the emergency 
response operations as well as financial support. Most of the interactions were between 
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international organizations and the national agencies (21.4%) in the system.  This pattern reflects 
the high level of dependency of international organizations on the Thai government to manage 
operations through its network.  
 
Activity of Organizations By Date and Level of Jurisdiction
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Figure 4.6 Number of organizations in international domain activities entering into the response system by date and 
level of jurisdiction 
 
Source: Extracted from Thai-Rath Newspaper, Thailand, December 27, 2004 – January 17, 2005. 
 
 
 The graph of international organizations interacting with other international or Thai 
agencies shows an increasing number of organizations entered the system on the second day after 
the tsunami attack. From the content analysis of news reports and semi-structured interviews, 
this study obtained information that many of these governments sent their expert teams, 
especially in search and rescue, to assist the emergency operations in Thailand. They recognized 
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the lack of skilled emergency personnel and effective equipment in Thailand for complicated 
tasks resulting from unexpected consequences. Later, the number of international organizations 
dropped dramatically because search and rescue operations were limited to authorized personnel 
only in order to organize a systematic process with feedback. When the significance of bringing 
those experts and equipment together in a more systematic operation emerged, the numbers of 
international organization again increased. The interactions among international organizations 
are mapped in an international interaction network to illustrate how and when those 
organizations entered the tsunami response system.  
Figure 4.7 shows the interactions of international organizations in the Thai tsunami 
response system. The analysis includes only the interactions that have at least one international 
organization involved. The map shows the obvious pattern of interactions among international 
organizations and Thai organizations. Those interactions were made mostly between 
international organizations and Thai national agencies. Only two local organizations were 
directly interacting with international organizations while there were six provincial organizations 
in the same direct interaction. Interestingly, one interaction, with Krabi provincial government 
(kpg) at the center, is in fact initiated by the Thai government to the State of Palis representative 
from Malaysia (spm), as well as other domestic organizations in the same activity. A 
visualization of the network map shows the high degree of dependency of international 
organizations on Thai national agencies to facilitate their involvement in the tsunami response 
system. 
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 Figure 4.7 Map of International Organizational Interactions in the Thai Tsunami Response 12/27/2004-1/17/2005 
Source: Extracted from ThaiRath Newspaper dated December 27, 2004 – January 17, 2005 
NOTE: Acronyms of organizations are spelt out in Appendix C   
 
 
As shown in table 4.8, the statistic of centrality confirms the importance of the Thai 
government, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Interior in connecting their actions with 
those in the lower levels of emergency response.  
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Table 4.8 Centrality Degree Analysis of International Interaction Network in Thailand Tsunami Disaster Response 
System 
 
                            1 2 3 
     ORGANIZATIONS               DEGRE NRMDEG SHARE 
GOVERNMENT OF THAILAND     32.000 27.586 0.117 
MINISTRY OF FINANCE, THAILAND     17.000 14.655 0.062 
MINISTRY OF INTERIOR, THAILAND      12.000 10.345 0.044 
UNITED STATE AIR FORCE        9.000 7.759 0.033 
KRABI PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT         8.000 6.897 0.029 
UNITED STATE DEPARTMENT OF STATE         6.000 5.172 0.022 
COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL DISASTER, THAILAND        5.000 4.310 0.018 
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATE          5.000 4.310 0.018 
UNITED NATIONS          5.000 4.310 0.018 
SWITZERLAND EMBASSY IN THAILAND        5.000 4.310 0.018 
Source: Extracted from Thai-Rath Newspaper, Thailand December 27, 2004 – January 17, 2005. 
NOTE: SSQ = sum of square; MSCCQ = mean-centered sum of square; Euc Norm = Euclidean norm; NrmDegree = 
Normed Degree 
 
The most interesting organizations are those from the United States, the US Air Force 
(usaf), the US Department of State (dosus) and the US government (gus). From the content 
analysis and interviews, these US agencies reacted very quickly to the news of tsunami and the 
large numbers of US citizens were also missing and deaths in the affected area. The US Air 
Force was one of the first agencies, even among Thai organizations, that accessed the area and 
proceeded with their search and rescue operations. 
The last three organizations entered into the system differently. The Committee of 
National Disaster of Thailand (cndth) was appointed right after the tsunami disaster to study 
disaster and technology management. It approved the strategic policies to prepare and enhance 
capabilities of the Thai government and agencies to manage such disaster in the near future. This 
committee became the focal point of all international experts especially those from Pacific 
Tsunami Warning Center (PTWC) based in Hawaii, USA. United Nations (UN) was definitely 
functioning as a focal point for those international governments and organizations that offered 
assistant in every form. Last, The Swiss Embassy in Thailand reacted quickly since they were 
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informed that a large number of Swiss citizens were on vacation and holiday in the southern 
coastal area of Thailand. The Swiss Embassy helped to coordinate the search and rescue from 
other nations as well as other activities initiated by other international organizations.  
The network does not appear to be strongly interconnected as an overall response system. 
The statistics from Freeman’s degree centrality index show the centralization within the whole 
network to be 26.01%. Yet the Average Distance (among reachable pairs) = 1.00 and the 
Distance-based cohesion = 1.00 (range 0 to 1; larger values indicate greater cohesiveness) and 
Distance-weighted Fragmentation = 1.00. These functions indicate a high level of cohesiveness 
which can be explained by the fact that those international organizations mostly interacted 
through one major Thai national agency. Nonetheless, the whole network is still not well 
connected since the major Thai national agencies were not well connected to their own domestic 
network, as previously discussed. The international interactions were based on specific tasks of 
their own sub networks.   
 
 
Table 4.9 Centrality Descriptive Statistic of International Interaction Network in Thailand Tsunami Disaster 
Response System 
 
 1 2 3  
 DEGREE NRMDEGREE SHARE  
        NETWORK 
CENTRALIZATION = 26.01% 
 MEAN 2.342 2.019 0.009  
 STD DEV 3.509 3.025 0.013  
 SUM 274.000 236.207 1.000  
 VARIANCE 12.310 9.149 0.000  
 SSQ 2082.000 1547.265 0.028  
 MCSSQ 1440.325 1070.396 0.019  
 EUC NORM 45.629 39.335 0.167  
 MINIMUM 1.000 0.862 0.004  
 MAXIMUM 32.000 27.586 0.117  
Source: Extracted from Thai-Rath Newspaper, Thailand December 27, 2004 – January 17, 2005. 
NOTE: SSQ = sum of square; MSCCQ = mean-centered sum of square; Euc Norm = Euclidean norm; NrmDegree = 
Normed Degree 
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Table 4.10 and Table 4.11 show the betweenness centrality and its descriptive statistic 
emphasizing the significant roles of the Thai government as well as those national agencies as 
the main actors in the network. Network centralization index gives a relatively similar index of 
45.5% as the domestic network, 43.33%. This finding confirms the degree of dependency of the 
international organizations on Thai national agencies to connect their activities to those agencies 
involved in the domestic network. There is a lot of variation in actor betweenness from 0 to 
3135.92. This finding indicates that a lot of connections can be made in this network without the 
aid of any intermediary. 
 
Table 4.10 Betweenness Centrality Analysis of International Interaction Network in Thailand Tsunami Disaster 
Response System 
 
                BETWEENNESS NBETWEENNESS 
  MEAN 26.838  1.902 
  STD DEV     359.329   5.387 
  SUM          14840.000   222.489 
  VARIANCE   129117.273   29.022 
  SSQ          16988992.000   3818.703 
  MCSSQ    15106721.000   3395.616 
  EUC NORM 4121.771   61.796 
  MINIMUM      0.000   0.000 
  MAXIMUM      3135.922   47.015 
NETWORK CENTRALIZATION INDEX = 45.50% NORMALIZEDCENTRALIZATION: 352062.859 
 Source: Extracted from Thai-Rath Newspaper, Thailand December 27, 2004 – January 17, 2005. 
 NOTE: SSQ = sum of square; MSCCQ = mean-centered sum of square; Euc Norm = Euclidean norm; NrmDegree 
= Normed Degree 
 
The centralization index for the Thai network at 45.5% underscores the importance of the 
main actor, the Thai Government, in connecting the interactions in entire response operations. 
Clearly, there is a structural basis for the Thai government to view itself as a central ‘mover-and-
shaker’. Even though there is not much betweenness power in the system, it could be important 
for group formation and stratification.  
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Table 4.11 Descriptive Betweenness of International Interaction Network in Thailand Tsunami Disaster   Response 
System 
 
ORGANIZATIONS BETWEENNESS NBETWEENNESS 
GOVERNMENT OF THAILAND 3135.922 47.015 
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 
THAILAND 
1761.023 26.402 
MINISTRY OF INTERIOR, THAILAND 1012.628 15.182 
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE 594.263 8.909 
KRABI PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT 555.944 8.335 
THAI ARMY 503.833 7.554 
PHUKET PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT 479.000 7.181 
FORENSIC SCIENCE DEPARTMENT, 
CHINA 
475.000 7.121 
COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL 
DISASTER, THAILAND 
416.477 6.244 
UNITED NATIONS 406.042 6.088 
FORENSIC SCIENCE INSTITUTION, 
THAILAND 
384.000 5.757 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, UNITED 
STATE 
381.878 5.725 
SWITZERLAND EMBASSY IN 
THAILAND 
348.333 5.222 
AFP NEWS 326.646 4.897 
GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN 303.216 4.546 
GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA 295.998 4.438 
RESCUE UNIT OF FRANCE 293.000 4.393 
AUSTRALIAN POLICE 291.000 4.363 
GOVERNMENT OF UNITED STATES 251.954 3.777 
GOVERNMENT OF RUSSIA 211.333 3.168 
  Source: Extracted from Thai-Rath Newspaper, Thailand December 27, 2004 – January 17, 2005. 
 
Interestingly, the international domain interaction network revealed a group of 
organizations that had the best fit in terms of the interacting with one another in reference to 
disaster-related issues as shown below in table 4.12. In this group, three new members appeared 
in this sub-network. They include the Forensic Team of Germany who helped search and rescue 
operations as a team of experts, and the Thai Royal Embassy in Washington DC that functioned 
as a focal point of donations from the United States to Thailand. The World Health Organization 
stepped in to investigate the probability of an outbreak of disease and to run the prevention 
program if needed. The analysis of subgroups in the network further confirms this observation.  
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Table 4.12 Group Centrality of International Interaction Network in Thailand Tsunami Disaster Response System 
 
STARTING FITNESS: 20.000, ROUND 0, 3 ITERATIONS FIT = 0.000, OBSERVED NO. REACHED = 
85.000 (72.6%) 
GROUP MEMBERS: 
COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL DISASTER, THAILAND 
FORENSIC TEAM, GERMANY 
GOVERNMENT OF THAILAND 
KRABI PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT 
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THAILAND 
MINISTRY OF INTERIOR, THAILAND 
MISTY OF JUSTICE, THAILAND 
THAI ROYAL EMBASSY, WASHINGTON DC 
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE 
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION 
    Source: Extracted from Thai-Rath Newspaper, Thailand December 27, 2004 – January 17, 2005. 
 
 
The clique analysis of the international domain interaction network from UCINET 
identified 12 subgroups in the network. Clique analysis proposes that information spreads rapidly 
through densely knit subgroups because the actors are strongly connected to one another and 
they directly share the information. The cliques show overlapping memberships among the 
organizations, but the high number of cliques indicates that the response system was functioning 
essentially as a set of separate groups formed around specific problems rather than as a coherent 
system addressing this extreme event with a common strategy. 
All cliques, identified by their acronyms, are listed above. Significant in a review of this 
list is the participation of the Government of Thailand. While the Government of Thailand is not 
always the first named actor in the 12 cliques, it is clearly a primary actor in mobilizing response 
organizations. Also noteworthy is the interaction among the Government of Thailand and Office 
of the King of Sweden and also with the United States government and agencies with the 
governments of other nations such as Switzerland, United Kingdom and Japan. Phuket Provincial 
government was active in the fourth clique as well. The Ministry of Interior participated in two 
of the 12 cliques. Nonetheless, the international interaction in the response system appears to be 
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loosely connected, with many organizations participating, but not necessarily interacting 
efficiently with one another. The group centrality reflects the operation by function. Each 
organization tended to make their own connections and to perform their specific tasks with their 
own connections.  
 
Table 4.13 Cliques Analysis of International Interaction Network in Thailand Tsunami Disaster Response    System 
 
12 CLIQUES ARE FOUND 
   1:  GOVERNMENT OF FINLAND, GOVERNMENT OF THAILAND, OFFICE OF THE KING (SWEDEN) 
   2:  GOVERNMENT OF NORWAY, GOVERNMENT OF THAILAND, OFFICE OF THE KING (SWEDEN) 
   3:  GOVERNMENT OF SWEDEN, GOVERNMENT OF THAILAND, OFFICE OF THE KING (SWEDEN) 
   4:  DEPT OF STATE (US), GOVERNMENT OF THAILAND, PHUKET PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT 
   5:  DEPT OF STATE (US), GOVERNMENT OF THAILAND, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE 
   6:  DISSECTOR VICTIM IDENTIFICATION, GOVERNMENT OF THAILAND, GOVERNMENT OF THE 
US 
   7:  GOVERNMENT OF UNITED KINGDOM, GOVERNMENT OF THAILAND, GOVERNMENT OF THE 
US 
   8:  GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN, GOVERNMENT OF SRI LANKA, GOVERNMENT OF THAILAND 
   9:  GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN, GOVERNMENT OF THAILAND, MINISTRY OF INTERIOR (TH) 
  10: GOVERNMENT OF THAILAND, MINISTRY OF INTERIOR (TH), RICKY MARTIN FOUNDATION 
  11: GOVERNMENT OF BRITAIN, GOVERNMENT OF THE US, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
(TH) 
  12: STATE OF PALIS (ML), UNITED STATES AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES NAVY 
Source: Extracted from Thai-Rath Newspaper, Thailand December 27, 2004 – January 17, 2005. 
4.4 THE ANALYSIS OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE MANAGEMENT 
From the discussions of emergency regulations, structure, organizations, and operations, it is 
clear that the Government of Thailand plays critical roles in mobilizing response operations as 
well as connecting the interaction from international organizations through the response network. 
Furthermore, Ministry of Interior is second in line to command the operations. This complies 
with the emergency regulation in the constitution that, under state of emergency of a large scale, 
the Minister of Interior is a commander in chief and the Ministry of Interior becomes a national 
command center.  
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 The frontline emergency response personnel were the agencies from Department of 
Disaster Prevention and Mitigation of Regional Center, Provincial Unit and Headquarter in 
Bangkok, Private Rescue Foundations and Civil Defense Volunteer Units. The response 
operations were slow and difficult due to lack of information and understanding in such disaster, 
less experience in dealing with tsunami response and consequence management and the absence 
of electricity, power and effective communication. Besides, there were many organizations and 
agencies in the area that tried to work the process of search and rescue without an understanding 
of how the other units worked. The problems of redundancy and repetition delayed the help to 
the victims and wasted manpower and resource needed for the operations.  
 From the content analyses, this study shows the importance of the Ministry of Interior 
through the front line emergency personnel of the Department of Disaster Prevention and 
Mitigation (DDPM) as an agency. In addition, this study also identifies the significance of 
knowledge and information sharing, and communication channel to keep DDPM agencies 
connected among themselves as well as with the other agencies in the response operation in 
different areas.  
  The next analysis of surveys data responds to the research questions posed earlier 
in Chapter Three. These questions address how emergency response agencies at the national 
level like DDPM function in the emergency operations and understand the elements that have 
effects toward their performance. Quantitative analysis on each factor proposed in the research 
design is also interpreted with a more informed discussion supported by data from the interviews 
conducted with those key personnel. Discussions of interaction pattern, information used and 
communication management are also provided.  
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4.4.1 Socio-Technical Components Analysis 
The three components are shown below in Table 4.14. 
 
Table 4.14 Socio-Technical Components Frequency Distribution 
 
I. ORGANIZATIONAL FLEXIBILITY COMPONENT 
   
HIGH 
N (%) 
MED 
N (%) 
LOW 
N (%) 
NONE 
N (%) 
NA    
N (%)    
TOTAL
(N) 
100% 
O1  NATIONAL EMERGENCY LAWS 17.61     51.70     19.60       3.69       7.39 352 
O2  SPECIAL EMERGENCY REGULATIONS 13.07     57.67     23.01       1.42       4.83 352 
O3  EMERGENCY INTEGRATED RESPONSE PLANS 16.19     61.08     17.61       1.14       3.98 352 
O4  EMERGENCY COMMANDS AND COORDINATION 15.06     61.36     19.03       1.70       2.84 352 
O5  EMERGENCY INTER-ORGANIZATION FOR 
COMMUNITIES 
15.91     56.25     20.17       3.13       4.55 352 
O6  EMERGENCY INTER-ORGANIZATION FOR AGENCIES   1.65     56.82     25.85       1.99       3.69 352 
O7  MULTI-WAYS OF INFO EXCHANGE BETWEEN 
AGENCIES 
  9.38     54.26     28.98       3.41       3.98 352 
O8  MULTI-WAYS OF INFO EXCHANGE ACROSS 
SECTORS 
  8.24     52.27     30.40       3.69       5.40 352 
O9  TRAINED PROFESSIONAL MANAGERS ON DUTY   9.09     49.15     34.66       3.13       3.98 352 
O10  TRAINED RESERVED PERSONNEL ON RECALL  5.06     51.99     26.70       2.84       3.41 352 
 
II. TECHNICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
HIGH 
N (%) 
MED 
N (%) 
LOW 
N (%) 
NONE 
N (%) 
NA    
N (%)    
TOTAL
(N) 
T1 RISK ASSESSMENT   9.09     61.93     21.59       1.70       5.68 352 
T2 BUILDING CODES   4.55     46.88     30.40       9.66       8.52 352 
T3 STRUCTURAL INSPECTION   7.39     36.93     29.83     15.34     10.51 352 
T4 ALTERNATIVE COMMUNICATION   8.81     51.70     26.14       5.40       7.95 352 
T5 ALTERNATIVE ELECTRICAL FACILITIES 10.80     46.31     28.13       6.82       7.95 352 
T6 SPECIAL EMERGENCY OPERATION AND EQUIPMENT 11.08     48.58     27.27       3.69       9.38 352 
T7 IDENTIFICATION OF MAJOR FACILITIES 11.65     55.97     22.16       3.69       6.53 352 
T8 ALTERNATIVE RESCUE OR EMERGENCY RESPONSE 13.35     53.41     24.43       3.69       5.11 352 
T9 SELF TECHNICAL MANUAL PROCEDURE   7.95     47.16     30.40       8.52       5.97 352 
T10 OTHER TECHNICAL SUPPORT*   0.57     13.07       9.38       2.56     74.43 352 
 
III. CULTURAL OPENNESS  
HIGH 
N (%) 
MED 
N (%) 
LOW 
N (%) 
NONE 
N (%) 
NA    
N (%)    
TOTAL
(N) 
C1 SHARED VALUE OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE 44.60     44.89       5.40        .85       4.26 352 
C2 COMMITMENT TO GOAL OF PROTECTING LIFE 33.24     55.11       6.82        .28       4.55 352 
C3 WILLINGNESS TO SHARE INFORMATION NEEDED 27.27     56.25     11.36        .28       4.83 352 
C4 ACCEPTANCE OF NEW INFORMATION 26.70     59.66       7.95        .57       5.11 352 
C5 OPENNESS TO NEW METHODS 28.13     51.70     14.49       1.42       4.26 352 
C6 WILLINGNESS TO REVIEW ACTIONS TAKEN 28.13     53.98     13.35        .85       3.69 352 
C7 WILLINGNESS TO CORRECT MISTAKES  9.26     51.70     13.07        .57       5.40 352 
C8 WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT RESPONSIBILITY,  
      SOLVE CONFLICTS 
30.11     49.43     13.35        .85       6.25 352 
C9 WILLINGNESS TO SERVICE PUBLIC 41.19     47.73       6.25        .28       4.55 352 
C10 CONTINUAL SEARCH FOR RELEVANT, ACCURATE 
INFO 
27.84     56.82       9.38        .85       5.11 352 
Source: Structural Survey of Emergency Personnel of National-Provincial-Local Levels of Jurisdiction, Thailand 
July – August 2005 
NOTE: * described as the capacity to obtain other information regarding known technical elements 
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 As discussed in Chapter Two that this study uses Comfort’s model to explain the existing 
emergency model in Thailand. This study applies three crucial indicators, which are technical 
structure, organizational flexibility, and cultural openness, to identify the type of emergency 
management at each level. This study modifies three socio-technical components from Comfort’s 
work in Shared Risk into a numerical scale 1-5 which 5 is the highest degree of a particular 
indicator. The comparison of the three components across multiple levels of operations for 
emergency response personnel will be discussed in Chapter Six. In addition, interaction patterns, 
extent of information flow and presence of communication channels are measured using ordinal 
scales. 
4.4.1.1 Pre-Analysis Data Screening 
There are four main purposes for screening data prior to conducting factor and 
multivariate analyses. The first deals with the accuracy of the data that have been collected 
because the results of any statistical analysis are only as good as the data that were analyzed. If 
inaccurate data are used, the computer program will run the analysis, and the researcher will 
obtain output that is inaccurate. This study uses frequency distributions and descriptive statistics 
to examine the range of values present the data to ensure that no cases have values outside the 
range of possible values. In addition, this study used two different data-entry personnel to 
perform a manual verification of the data entry list.  
The second purpose deals with missing data and attempts to assess the effect of, and ways 
to deal with, incomplete data. Missing data occur when measurement design fails, subjects do 
not respond to all items, or errors occur during data entry. The survey used an ordinal scale from 
1 to 5, which 5 is the highest score while 2 is the lowest which equal to none, and 1 is not 
applicable or do not answer. A no-response or blank answer of any question is declared “0” in 
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value. Therefore, the values “0” and “1” are coded as missing values and recoded as “9” and “8” 
respectively. A total number of questionnaires are 358 from three levels of emergency personnel. 
Three questionnaires were dropped from the analysis because they contained “0” scores in all 30 
questions of socio-technical components, which bring the total number of questionnaires before 
considering other cases of missing value in the analysis to 355. This study also analyzes the 
distribution of missing data to identify whether any pattern can be observed in the responses.  
There are twenty-one questionnaires with more than 5 significant missing values. 
Thirteen questionnaires are the responses of emergency personnel from the Bangkok 
Metropolitan Authority (BMA) while the other eight questionnaires are of the Department of 
Disaster Prevention and Mitigation (DDPM). The missing values were contained within the 
responses to the questionnaires that were distributed to every level of jurisdiction in both the 
BMA and DDPM. The data reveal that those who are emergency personnel within the BMA, 
twelve out of thirteen, did not respond to technical-infrastructure questions. This result is 
explained, also in Chapter 5, by the fact that BMA emergency personnel have less experience in 
using technical infrastructure and equipment as well as managing in multi-hazard operations, let 
alone the insufficient emergency response facilities.  Interestingly, those who are emergency 
personnel within DDPM, seven out of eight, did not respond to questions relating to cultural 
openness. It is clear that the 26 December, 2004 tsunami disaster response event triggered many 
questions about the DDPM’s performance and capability in managing emergency response.  
These missing answers may be the result of respondents being uncomfortable giving their 
opinion about issues related to their agency’s performance which may undermine their job 
security.   
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Hence, this study will exclude all 21 missing respondents in the analysis since they 
constitute only 5.9% of the total number of 355 cases. Moreover, these missing values are 
scattered throughout the BMA and DDPM in the patterns that are significant to the analyses of 
emergency response operations and performance. The total number of valid cases is 334.   
The third purpose in data screening is to assess the effects of extreme values on the 
analysis. Outliers often create problems in multivariate data analyses because they distort the 
results of a statistical test. This study uses the Box-Plot technique, shown in Figure 4.8, to 
identify outliers and investigate them further.  
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Figure 4.8 Box-Plot of Structural Survey of Emergency Personnel of National-Provincial-Local Levels of 
Jurisdiction, Thailand July – August 2005 
 
Source: Structural Survey of Emergency Personnel of National-Provincial-Local Levels of Jurisdiction, Thailand 
July – August 2005 
NOTE: Box-Plot from left to right; Organization Performance, Organization Readiness for Unexpected Event, 
Organization Communication, Average Point of Organizational Flexibility, Organizational Internal 
Training, Organizational Co-Training, Average Point of Technical Infrastructure, Average Point of Cultural 
Openness 
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In the outlier analysis, there are five outliers identified as extreme values from the sample 
population. When examining the values, there is a reasonable explanation for keeping these 
values. These values identified as outliers share the same characteristic of being “too low” 
scores. This causes by the combination of a low scores of “2” which indicate “none” and “1” 
which is “not applicable”. Although “1” is declared as “missing value”, the state of “none” and 
“not applicable” indicates lack of availability and information to be known which are significant 
to the study.  
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Figure 4.9 Scatter-Plot of Organization Performance of Structural Survey of Emergency Personnel of National-
Provincial-Local Levels of Jurisdiction, Thailand July – August 2005 
 
Source: Structural Survey of Emergency Personnel of National-Provincial-Local Levels of Jurisdiction, Thailand 
July – August 2005 
NOTE: Scatter-Plot of Regression; Dependent Variable is Organization Performance; Independent Variables are 
Socio-Technical Components 
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Normal Q-Q Plot of Organization Flexibility
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Normal Q-Q Plot of Technical Infrastructure
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Normal Q-Q Plot of Cultural Openness
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Figure 4.10 Q-Q Plot of Socio-Technical Components of Structural Survey of Emergency Personnel of National-
Provincial-Local Levels of Jurisdiction, Thailand July – August 2005 
 
Source: Structural Survey of Emergency Personnel of National-Provincial-Local Levels of Jurisdiction, Thailand July 
– August 2005 
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The last purpose of data screening is to assess the adequacy of fit between the data and 
the assumptions of a specific procedure. All multivariate statistical procedures are based on 
assumptions of normality, linearity, and independence. I examined the normal sample 
distribution by histogram and residual plot, shown in Figure 4.9, and Q-Q plot, shown below in 
Figure 4.10 for linearity. In addition, the statistics for “Skewness” and “Kurtosis” were used to 
identify the degree of normality. I used power-transformation to normalize the data, “Skewness” 
and Kurtosis” were recalculated to ensure the values are closer to “0” to indicate more normality, 
before running multivariate analysis.   
 
4.4.1.2 Factor Analysis of Socio-Technical Components      
   
Before proceeding with the analysis of the socio-technical components of the emergency 
operations under the Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation (also applied to an 
analysis in chapter 5), this study runs the principal component analysis to identify the factors, or 
clusters of variables, in the analysis. Factor analysis is a procedure used to determine the extent 
to which measurement overlap (Williams, 1992) or shared variance exists among a set of 
variables. Principal component analysis is usually the preferred method of factor extraction, 
especially when the focus of an analysis searching for underlying structure is truly exploratory, 
which is typically the case. To proceed with Factor analysis, I declared missing values, as 
discussed earlier, and recoded the scores of original data obtained from questionnaires. The 
ordinal scale of 5 to 1, when “1” is declared missing, is recoded from 5 to 4 as the highest, 4 to 3 
as moderate, 3 to 2 as low, and 2 to 1 as non. This is only for the purpose of not elevating a value 
of result when running principal component analysis as well as later in regression analysis. This 
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principal component of factor analysis serves to determine whether the three socio-technical 
components proposed in the theoretical framework are present in the data.       
 
Table 4.15 Principal Component Analysis: Total Variance Explained of Socio-Technical Components 
Initial Eigenvalues 
Extraction Sums of 
Squared Loadings 
Rotation Sums of 
Squared Loadings 
Com 
ponents 
  Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
%of 
Variance
Cumulative 
% Total 
%of 
Variance 
 
Cumulative 
% 
1 4.630 37.541 37.541 4.630 37.541 37.541 2.678 21.714 21.714
2 1.786 14.477 52.018 1.786 14.477 52.018 1.958 15.875 37.589
3 1.057 8.570 60.587 1.057 8.570 60.587 1.635 13.258 50.847
4 .883 7.162 67.749 .883 7.162 67.749 1.292 10.472 61.319
5 .542 4.391 72.141 .542 4.391 72.141 1.186 9.617 70.936
6 .495 4.012 76.153 .495 4.012 76.153 .643 5.217 76.153
Source: Structural Survey of Emergency Personnel of National-Provincial-Local Levels of Jurisdiction, Thailand 
July – August 2005 
 
 
 
Table 4.16 Principal Component Analysis: Communalities of Socio-Technical Components 
Code Initial Extraction  Code Initial Extraction  Code Initial Extraction 
O1 1.000 .796 T1 1.000 .517 C1 1.000 .799 
O2 1.000 .803 T2 1.000 .817 C2 1.000 .746 
O3 1.000 .779 T3 1.000 .839 C3 1.000 .766 
O4 1.000 .757 T4 1.000 .859 C4 1.000 .648 
O5 1.000 .737 T5 1.000 .643 C5 1.000 .785 
O6 1.000 .767 T6 1.000 .802 C6 1.000 .882 
O7 1.000 .550 T7 1.000 .790 C7 1.000 .852 
O8 1.000 .715 T8 1.000 .684 C8 1.000 .793 
O9 1.000 .738 T9 1.000 .737 C9 1.000 .586 
O10 1.000 .775 T10 1.000 .847 C10 1.000 .737 
Source: Structural Survey of Emergency Personnel of National-Provincial-Local Levels of Jurisdiction, Thailand 
July – August 2005 
NOTE: Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis;  
         O1-10 are Organizational Flexibility Indicators (Variables) 
         T1-10 are Technical Infrastructure Indicators (Variables) 
         C1-10 are Cultural Openness Indicators (Variables) 
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Table 4.17 Rotated Component Matrix 
Tech_1      Org_1      Cult_1     Cult_2     Tech_2    Org_2                                                   COMPONENTS               
                                                      
INDICATORS 1 2 3 4 5 6 
National emergency laws -.253 .644 .102 .181 .514 -.096
Special emergency regulations -.157 .610 .177 .261 .545 -.101
Emergency integrated response plans .120 .390 .308 .155 .268 .649
Emergency commands and coordination .036 .611 .230 .238 .185 .488
Emergency inter-organization for communities .498 .513 .089 .318 -.073 .333
Emergency inter-organization for agencies .534 .656 .055 .199 -.049 .083
Multi-ways of info exchange between agencies .202 .540 .329 .084 .188 .259
Multi-ways of info exchange across sectors .235 .770 .226 -.093 .051 .069
Trained professional managers on duty .232 .792 .108 .088 .190 .036
Trained reserved personnel on recall .429 .743 .082 .055 -.174 .013
Risk assessment .524 .308 -.072 .219 .304 -.042
Building codes .323 .067 .256 -.016 .789 .139
Structural inspection .285 .110 .107 .096 .843 .122
Alternative communication .704 -.065 -.140 .199 .365 .407
Alternative electrical facilities .716 .325 .048 .042 -.097 .102
Special emergency operation and equipment .878 .058 .102 .072 .107 .031
Identification of major facilities .826 .056 .052 .079 .256 -.173
Alternative rescue or emergency response .727 .168 .318 -.032 -.019 -.155
Self technical manual procedure .672 .266 .296 -.013 .347 .083
Other technical support .893 .149 -.012 .082 .024 .142
Shared value of humanitarian assistance -.072 .033 .266 .810 .166 .195
Commitment to goal of protecting life -.054 -.005 .218 .790 .173 .204
Willingness to share information needed .375 .066 .189 .611 .209 -.410
Acceptance of new information .249 .323 .298 .601 -.136 .119
Openness to new methods .067 .261 .746 .298 .060 .252
Willingness to review actions taken .074 .198 .820 .341 .217 -.037
Willingness to correct mistakes .069 .214 .824 .302 .111 .133
Willingness to accept responsibility, solve conflicts .094 .071 .790 .363 .144 -.050
Willingness to service public .287 .059 .426 .559 -.076 .014
Continual search for relevant, accurate info .161 .236 .326 .724 -.028 -.157
Source: Structural Survey of Emergency Personnel of National-Provincial-Local Levels of Jurisdiction, Thailand 
July – August 2005 
 
Principal component analysis was conducted utilizing a Varimax rotation. The initial 
analysis retained three components. This study used the Eigenvalue of at least 1.0, the 
Communality of over 0.5, allowed by the rule of sample size over 250, and Scree plot (Figure 
4.11) of a cut point at the third component. Criteria indicated that retaining the first three 
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components should be investigated. However, I also investigated the fourth, fifth, and sixth 
components because of the high value of communality.   
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Figure 4.11 Scree Plot of Principal Component AnalysisA Distribution of Eigenvalue of Socio-Technical 
Components 
Source: Structural Survey of Emergency Personnel of National-Provincial-Local Levels of    Jurisdiction, Thailand 
July – August 2005 
 
 
The first component accounted for 37.54% of the variance and the second for 14.47%. 
Component one includes variables in the group of “Technical Infrastructure” and component two 
includes variables in the group of “Organizational Flexibility”. Taking into account the 
significant loadings on the fifth and sixth components, the fifth component contains two 
variables of “Technical Infrastructure”, by theoretical framework, which are building codes and 
structural inspection, whereas the sixth component that contains a variable of integrated response 
plan which should belong to “Organizational Flexibility.”  
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From interviews and document analysis, building codes and structural inspection are 
responsibilities that are performed by other government agencies. Emergency personnel do not 
have sufficient knowledge of those two procedures and the information regarding them. As 
discussed earlier regarding the low degree of coordination among emergency personnel of 
different jurisdictional levels, it is reasonable to state that emergency personnel do not have 
enough information on their integrated response plan. It is not a surprise to see emergency 
personnel shift such action plans out of their concept of Organizational Flexibility. 
The third component, which is by a theoretical framework grouped as Cultural Openness, 
is close to the fourth component that obtains 0.88 Eigenvalue. The eigenvalues of the third and 
fourth components vary slightly and the scree plot shows a slightly different shift of line as well. 
The fourth component includes six other variables, regarding theoretical framework, that belong 
to Cultural Openness as well. I combined the third and fourth component under a group of 
variables indicating Cultural Openness, as there are two subgroups. The first group contains 
openness to new methods, willingness to review actions, to correct mistakes, and to accept 
responsibility, which are considered individual values. The second group contains organizational 
values that reflect humanitarian perspectives, shared goal of saving lives, willingness to share 
and accept new information as needed, public service orientation, and commitment to the 
continuing search for accurate information.  
Based on insights gained from responses to the semi-structured interviews, I retained 3 
components, Cultural Openness, Technical Infrastructure and Organizational Flexibility. This 
result basically confirms the theoretical framework proposed in Chapter 2. Undoubtedly, the 
principal component analysis shows the significant effect of Technical Infrastructure as the first 
component. This finding documents the frustration of the Thai government and emergency 
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agencies of not having sufficient knowledge, information, training, gap identification, solutions 
and technological expertise to be able to relocate personnel and resource to help people and to 
cope with the unexpected disaster. The surveys and interviews were conducted in two sessions, 
one month and six months after the attack. Only after six months had the technical infrastructure 
been gradually installed and was functioning. The National Disaster Warning Center was 
established to pool information and knowledge of expertise into a country. Resource, manpower, 
and training are increasingly provided.  
The second component of Organizational Flexibility is evidently leading to a long 
discussion. Changing organizations to be more flexible and effective in dealing with complexity 
and chaos is a long process. If knowledge and information are not yet provided or effectively 
accessible, agencies are unlikely to be willing to make decisions or adapt to changing situations 
based on limited experience and training. Personnel will rely on the top level of management to 
make decisions which then moves the organization back to a command-and-control pattern that 
is not flexible in emergency management.  
The third component of Cultural Openness is divided into individual and organizational 
levels. Willingness of emergency personnel to change and improve performance is no longer 
questionable because it means saving not only other lives, but also their own. However, 
behavioral change is time consuming especially when such change also concerns inter-
organizational values such as shared goal of serving public and saving lives or exchanging and 
accepting new information needed.   
Figure 4.12 below shows the mean scores of socio-technical components extracted from 
the emergency response personnel questionnaires, 184 respondents, from the Department of 
Disaster Prevention and Mitigation (DDPM).  
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Figure 4.12 Mean scores of socio-technical component in each unit of The Department of Disaster Prevention and 
Mitigation, Thailand 
 
Source: Structural Survey of Emergency Personnel of National-Provincial-Local Levels of Jurisdiction, Thailand July – 
August 2005 
NOTE:   Organization Name [org_name], DDPM representatives from 64 provinces [DPM_64], DDPM at 
Headquarter, Bangkok [DPM_HQ], DDPM at Central Regional Center [DPM_RC], DDPM at Southern 
Regional Center [DPM_RS], DDPM at tsunami affected provinces [DPM_TP] 
 
The investigation was conducted with emergency operational personnel, supervisors, and 
top level operational managers to identify the degree of perceived recognition of the three socio-
technical components in the national emergency response system. The interviews were also 
conducted to strengthen the interpretation and explanation of these results from surveys. The 
frequency distribution from the questionnaires corresponding to each socio-technical component 
is presented in Appendix H. 
From the graph, across the board, all units of DDPM indicate the lowest measures for 
technical infrastructure in comparison to the degree of organizational flexibility and cultural 
openness. This finding can be explained by the fact that Thailand was considered to be in the 
low-risk zone for the large scale natural disaster before the 2004 tsunami. The readiness and 
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preparation of technical equipment and infrastructure are lower.  Also as previously discussed, 
the willingness of people to accept knowledge, information and training to enhance their 
adaptive capability to disaster management is relatively high compared to the realization of how 
long it takes an organization to change in order to adapt to new settings of complexity and 
emergency management. 
DDPM Headquarters reports the lowest score of technical infrastructure and highest 
degree of organizational flexibility. The headquarters unit functions as the head of the emergency 
response system. DDPM Headquarters is mainly responsible for policy making, planning, 
budgeting, coordinating and training. It is unlikely for DDPM Headquarters in Bangkok to 
engage in the frontline emergency response operations. Bangkok Metropolis has its own 
agencies, Civil Emergency Relief Department and District office with the Civil Defense 
Volunteer Units, to function in the emergency response system (discussed in chapter 5). DDPM 
Headquarter has the highest degree of flexibility since the unit has full authority over its own 
functions and responsibilities. DDPM Headquarters has to coordinate with several units around 
the country within the DDPM network as well as with multiple agencies across sectors and level 
of jurisdictions.  
The data show that the cultural openness component for the DDPM provincial personnel 
is higher than for those in the central area. After the devastation of tsunami, the provincial 
personnel realized the limitations of their knowledge and capabilities to deal with such a large 
scale of damage and unexpected consequences. The personnel are more willing to learn from 
their mistakes and bring in more information to change and enhance their adaptive capacity. 
Among the provinces, technical infrastructure in the southern area, especially those provinces 
affected by tsunami, has been installed and activated to ensure the safety of public and help save 
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lives and properties. The Thai government realizes that emergency management needs not only 
response and mitigation infrastructure, but also warning dissemination infrastructure and 
technology. People need to be prepared for emergency situations that may confront them.  
I calculated the sums of each socio-technical component to use as a socio-technical 
indicator to compare roughly the working environment of the different units of DDPM in order 
to identify the strengths and weaknesses of each unit. The mean scores of the socio-technical 
indicator are 3.36 for DPM_RC, 3.72 for DPM_RS, 3.74 for DPM_TP, 3.66 for DPM_ 64, and 
3.33 for DPM_HQ. This result confirms a high degree of dynamic movement among emergency 
response personnel in the southern part of Thailand, especially for those in affected areas to 
change and improve their performance. 
4.4.2 Interaction and Coordination Analysis 
This analysis provides a general picture of how DDPM personnel interact among 
themselves as well as with other agencies across jurisdictions and sectors. I included questions in 
the survey to obtain the information regarding how each unit of DDPM coordinated and 
interacted with the others in the same and different levels of jurisdictions and sectors. The results 
are summarized as in the table 4.18.    
The summary indicates how personnel in each unit of DDPM view their frequent 
interactions with multiple agencies in emergency response operations. Surprisingly, national 
agencies are ranked the least frequent in interactions with DDPM at regional centers as well as 
those under the provincial level. DDPM personnel in the tsunami-affected provinces also 
reported their interaction with the national agencies less frequently than with provincial agencies 
and private rescue teams. Provincial and local agencies are evidently favored over other 
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organizations interacting in disaster response. Interestingly, the volunteers’ interaction with 
DDPM ranges from the most frequent to less frequent. I examined the importance of volunteers 
in their role as community representatives. 
 
Table 4.18 A Summary of Degree of Agencies Coordination between Department of   Disaster Prevention and 
Mitigation and Participating Response Agencies 
 
                                                      
LEVELS OF COORDINATION  
 
 
DEPARTMENT OF  
DISASTER PREVENTION  
AND MITIGATION UNIT 
 
MOST  
FREQUENT 
 
SECOND  
MOST 
FREQUENT 
 
MODERATE  
FREQUENT 
 
LESS  
FREQUENT 
 
LEAST  
FREQUENT
 
HEADQUARTER 
 
PROVINCIAL 
AGENCIES 
NATIONAL  
LOCAL 
AGENCIES 
 
VOLUNTEERS 
LOCALS 
 
NGOS 
 
PRIVATE 
 
CENTRAL REGION 
 
LOCAL  
AGENCIES 
 
PROVINCIAL 
AGENCIES 
 
NGOS 
LOCALS 
 
VOLUNTEERS 
PRIVATE 
 
NATIONAL 
 
SOUTHERN REGION 
 
VOLUNTEER 
 
LOCAL  
AGENCIES 
 
LOCALS 
PROVINCIAL 
 
PRIVATE 
NGOS 
 
NATIONAL 
 
TSUNAMI AFFECTED 
 
PROVINCIAL 
AGENCIES 
 
PRIVATE 
 
LOCAL AND 
NATIONAL  
 
NGOS 
VOLUNTEERS 
 
LOCALS 
 
64 PROVINCES REPRESENTATIVES 
 
PROVINCIAL 
AGENCIES 
 
LOCAL  
AGENCIES 
 
LOCALS 
VOLUNTEER 
 
NGOS 
 
NATIONAL 
Source: Structural Survey of Emergency Personnel of National-Provincial-Local Levels of Jurisdiction, Thailand 
July – August 2005 
 
 This finding on coordination is problematic as it relates to the analysis of the interaction 
network. The Thai domestic response network relies very much on the interconnection from the 
national agencies such as ministries and departments. Even though provincial governments 
several times played crucial roles as focal points, they still functioned less effectively due to lack 
of information and confidence in making decisions. Provincial governments tended to work in 
their sub-networks as identified in the analysis of cliques and group centrality. In the entire 
network, provincial organizations constituted 19.4% of the actors involved in response 
operations. This proportion was less compared to the number of national organizations, 39.9%, 
and it indicated fewer interactions or ties from provincial organizations to other organizations.  
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Figure 4.13 shows how each unit of DDPM personnel views its degree of coordination 
with other government agencies. This mean score shows the degree of interagency initiation 
during their operations in routine work and emergency situation.  Even though the results 
exceed the moderate degree (at 3.0), I need to investigate further the kind and patterns of 
coordination, because not every interaction is a basis of capacity building of interagency 
coordination in emergency response. The types of interaction patterns presented in table 4.19 
allow a clearer interpretation of those degrees in coordination. Some of the activities done among 
agencies may strictly be routine businesses regardless emergency response involvement. 
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Figure 4.13Mean score of organizational coordination by Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation 
emergency personnel 
 
Source: Structural Survey of Emergency Personnel of National-Provincial-Local Levels of Jurisdiction, Thailand 
July – August 2005 
NOTE: org_cord = Organization Coordination; em_org = Emergency Organizations; DPM_64 = Disaster Prevention 
and Mitigation 64 Provincial Representatives; DPM_HQ = DPM Headquarter; DPM_RC = DPM Central 
Regional Center; DPM_RD = DPM Southern Regional Center; DPM_TP = DPM as Tsunami Affected 
Provinces 
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Table 4.19 A Summary of Degree of Interaction Patterns by Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation 
emergency personnel 
 
                       
                           LEVELS OF  
                           COORDINATION 
 
DDPM UNIT 
 
 
THE MOST  
FREQUENT 
 
THE SECOND  
MOST 
FREQUENT 
 
LESS  
FREQUENT 
 
LEAST  
FREQUENT 
 
DDPM HEADQUARTER 
 
ROUTINE WORK, 
ASSISTANCE 
 
COMMAND 
 
PERSUASION 
 
NEGOTIATION 
 
DDPM CENTRAL REGION 
 
ROUTINE WORK 
 
COMMAND 
 
ASSISTANCE 
 
NEGOTIATION,  
PERSUASION 
 
DDPM SOUTHERN REGION 
 
ROUTINE 
 
PERSUASION 
 
ASSISTANCE 
COMMAND 
 
NEGOTIATION 
 
DDPM TSUNAMI AFFECTED 
 
ASSISTANCE 
 
ROUTINE WORK, 
COMMAND, 
PERSUASION 
 
ROUTINE WORK,  
COMMAND, 
PERSUASION 
 
NEGOTIATION 
 
DDPM 64 PROVINCES REPT 
 
 
ROUTINE WORK 
 
COMMAND 
 
ASSISTANCE, 
PERSUASION 
 
NEGOTIATION 
Source: Structural Survey of Emergency Personnel of National-Provincial-Local Levels of Jurisdiction, Thailand 
July – August 2005 
 
Most coordination and interaction between DDPM units with others is through their 
routine work. The second most frequent is the interaction through command and authority. This 
pattern tells the story of a long traditional management of bureaucracy that still has roots in the 
agency, although decentralization has been introduced into the system. It will take a long process 
to move them to interact through assistance, negotiation and persuasion for co-activities and 
practices. Such actions are still considered a high-profile decision making process which is 
reserved only for top management. It is also understandable, under emergency constraints, that 
less powerful and unauthorized personnel are not able to facilitate actions, reallocate resources, 
or request assistance across their jurisdiction. 
Figure 4.14 cites how frequently technical support and assistance were asked among the 
reported interactions between DDPM and other response agencies. There is a moderate level of 
technical support and assistance among organizations. The mobilization of resources and rotation 
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of well-trained personnel is expected among these organizations as one of the main interactions. 
It appears to be less frequent than routine works and command through authority lines. 
 
Bars show Means
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Figure 4.14Degrees of frequency of technical support provided by other organizations by Department of Disaster 
Prevention and Mitigation emergency personnel 
 
Source: Structural Survey of Emergency Personnel of National-Provincial-Local Levels of Jurisdiction, Thailand 
July – August 2005 
NOTE: tech_spp = Technical Support, em_org = Emergency Organizations; DPM_64 = Disaster Prevention and 
Mitigation 64 Provincial Representatives; DPM_HQ = DPM Headquarter; DPM_RC = DPM Central 
Regional Center; DPM_RD = DPM Southern Regional Center; DPM_TP = DPM as Tsunami Affected 
Provinces 
 
 
The lack of exchange in emergency response skills is also confirmed by the information 
regarding training programs reported by organizations in the surveys as shown in Figure 4.15. 
DDPM personnel receive training within their organization and are trained individually more 
frequently than any of the co-training programs provided by their agency or other organizations.  
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Figure 4.15 Graph shows the degrees of frequency of training programs provided by the organizations by 
Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation emergency personnel 
 
Source: Structural Survey of Emergency Personnel of National-Provincial-Local Levels of Jurisdiction, Thailand 
July – August 2005 
NOTE: IORG_TRN = Organizational Training; CORG_TRN = Co-Training; em_org = Emergency Organizations; 
DPM_64 = Disaster Prevention and Mitigation 64 Provincial Representatives; DPM_HQ = DPM 
Headquarter; DPM_RC = DPM Central Regional Center; DPM_RD = DPM Southern Regional Center; 
DPM_TP = DPM as Tsunami Affected Provinces 
 
 
This lack of training creates another problem in the lack of understanding of work 
processes in other response organizations and adaptive skills to compensate or substitute actions 
for problems that may be caused by those who failed. The purpose of co-training and skills 
transfer through interaction among the emergency response agencies is to facilitate knowledge 
and information sharing within the network. When information is shared sufficiently, emergency 
personnel at every level of operations and management can react faster and more accurately 
especially under urgent time constraints.  
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4.4.3 Information and Communication Management Analysis 
This section analyzes how information is managed and how it is transmitted to 
emergency personnel through the available communications infrastructure. Previous discussion 
has emphasized the importance of the processes by which information is received and used to 
make timely informed decisions. The characteristics of information flow and information and 
communication management are reported below, based on the following questions from the 
survey. 
4.4.3.1 Information Management and Decision Making Characteristics 
1. How would you describe the direction of information flow in your agency? 
2. To what extent do you get the information you need within your agency? 
3. How often do you use the information provided to your agency to make decisions 
related to your work operations? 
4. How often do you estimate that you and/or your colleagues make contingent 
decisions under states of emergency? 
5. At what level in your agency or unit are decisions formally made? 
6. To what extent do you think the regulations and procedures in which you have been 
trained help to accomplish the goals of emergency operations?  
7. To what extent do the participation and support from other organizations help to 
make more accurate decision related to your work? 
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Tables 4.20-4.24 show the characteristics of information flow and the use of information 
in the decision making processes for emergency operations at the management levels of each 
DDPM unit. It is interesting that the attitudes toward information use in decision making are at 
moderate to high levels across all DDPM personnel. 
 
Table 4.20 Summary of Characteristics of Information Management, DDPM Headquarter 
DDPM HQ 
 
 
 
Information 
Flows 
directions 
 
 
 
Information 
received 
within 
organization 
 
Information 
used for 
decision 
making 
 
Decision 
making 
made in 
organization 
 
 
Rules and 
regulations 
used in 
practice 
 
Decision 
making 
participation 
 
 
Decision 
making 
accuracy from 
coordination 
 
N Valid 41 41 41 41 41 41 41
  Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mean 4.24 3.54 3.98 2.95 3.61 3.29 3.22
Mode All ways  4 4 Top Mgt 4 4 4
Source: Structural Survey of Emergency Personnel of National-Provincial-Local Levels of Jurisdiction, Thailand 
July – August 2005 
 
 
Table 4.21 Summary of Characteristics of Information Management, DDPM Central Regional Center 
 DDPM RC 
 
 
 
Information 
Flows 
directions 
 
 
Information 
received 
within 
organization 
 
Information 
used for 
decision 
making 
 
Decision 
making 
made in 
organization 
 
Rules and 
regulations 
used in 
practice 
 
Decision 
making 
participation 
 
 
Decision 
making 
accuracy from 
coordination 
 
N Valid 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
  Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mean 4.05 3.50 3.60 3.05 3.60 3.45 4.00
Mode 
Bottom up and 
Top Down 3 4 
Chief of 
Operations 
under 
Supervision 
4 4 4
Source: Structural Survey of Emergency Personnel of National-Provincial-Local Levels of Jurisdiction, Thailand 
July – August 2005 
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Table 4.22  Summary of Characteristics of Information Management, DDPM Southern Regional Center 
 DPM RS 
 
 
 
Information 
Flows 
directions 
 
 
Information 
received 
within 
organization 
 
Information 
used for 
decision 
making 
 
Decision 
making made 
in organization 
 
Rules and 
regulations 
used in 
practice 
 
Decision 
making 
participation 
 
 
Decision 
making 
accuracy from 
coordination 
 
N Valid 41 41 41 41 41 41 41
  Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mean 2.95 3.37 3.51 3.49 4.02 3.56 3.68
Mode 
Bottom up and 
Top Down 3 3 
Chief of 
Operations 
under 
Supervision 
4 3 3
Source: Structural Survey of Emergency Personnel of National-Provincial-Local Levels of Jurisdiction, Thailand 
July – August 2005 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.23 Summary of Characteristics of Information Management, DDPM tsunami affected provinces 
 DDPM TP 
 
 
 
Information 
Flows 
directions 
 
 
Information 
received 
within 
organization 
 
Information 
used for 
decision 
making 
 
Decision 
making made 
in organization 
 
Rules and 
regulations 
used in 
practice 
 
Decision 
making 
participation 
 
 
Decision 
making 
accuracy from 
coordination 
 
N Valid 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
  Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mean 4.70 4.13 4.47 2.13 4.07 4.03 3.93
Mode Bottom up and 
Top Down 4 4 
Throughout 
organization or 
unit 
4 4 4
Source: Structural Survey of Emergency Personnel of National-Provincial-Local Levels of Jurisdiction, Thailand 
July – August 2005 
 
    
 
 
Table 4.24Summary of Characteristics of Information Management, DDPM 64 provinces representatives 
 DDPM 64 
 
 
 
Information 
Flows 
directions 
 
 
Information 
received 
within 
organization 
 
Information 
used for 
decision 
making 
 
Decision making 
made in 
organization 
 
Rules and 
regulations 
used in 
practice 
 
Decision 
making 
participation 
 
 
Decision 
making 
accuracy from 
coordination 
 
N Valid 64 64 64 64 64 64 64
  Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mean 4.53 3.83 4.08 3.16 4.06 3.80 3.84
Mode 
All Ways 4 4 
Chief of 
Operations 
under 
Supervision 
4 4 4
Source: Structural Survey of Emergency Personnel of National-Provincial-Local Levels of Jurisdiction, Thailand 
July – August 2005 
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The flow of information consistently identified more than one direction, all ways, and 
top-down with bottom-up. This indicates the possible existence of feedback from within the 
organization that can help to evaluate performance and insert new knowledge or solutions for 
previous problems. Information flow facilitates the dissemination of knowledge and information 
needed to understand tasks or problems that have not yet been experienced. The variety of 
directions of information flow assists in effective dissemination. One may argue that the 
redundancy of information from various source and directions creates confusion. Based on data 
from this survey as well from interviews regarding what types of decisions were made where and 
by whom in the organization, it is clear that decisions will still be made primarily by top or 
middle management personnel.  
It is more likely to be middle management personnel at the provincial level who confirm 
the assumption that the tsunami response system relied very much on decisions made by mid-
level managers of provincial agencies. However, lack of timely, accurate information weakened 
the validity and confidence of their decisions, especially under urgent time constraints that in 
turn delayed delivery of needed assistance. Although the organization tends to have a 
decentralized pattern of information flow and its personnel are willing to receive such 
information, it is critical to provide information that corresponds to the needs of emergency 
operations and problem solving. Rules and regulations still play a crucial role as guidelines and 
direction for emergency personnel to follow. From the interviews, most personnel view the use 
of law, rules, and regulations as directing their actions. In states of emergency for which 
personnel have less knowledge and experience, it is more difficult for them to make informed 
and accurate judgments and decisions. The flow of sufficient information and relevant 
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knowledge requires effective database management as well as efficient communication systems 
to support secure delivery of the information to operations personnel. 
4.4.3.2 Communication Management Characteristics 
1. How often does your unit communicate with others? 
2. In which circumstance does your unit or agency communicate most   frequently with 
other units or agencies? 
3. In states of emergency, what kinds of communication mechanisms are available? 
Please rank in terms of frequency of use?  
 
Bars show Means
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Figure 4.16 Degrees of frequency of communication by DDPM emergency personnel 
Source: Structural Survey of Emergency Personnel of National-Provincial-Local Levels of Jurisdiction, Thailand 
July – August 2005 
NOTE: org_cmm = Organization Communication;  em_org = Emergency Organizations; DPM_64 = Disaster 
Prevention and Mitigation 64 Provincial Representatives; DPM_HQ = DPM Headquarter; DPM_RC = 
DPM Central Regional Center; DPM_RD = DPM Southern Regional Center; DPM_TP = DPM as Tsunami 
Affected Provinces 
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Although Figure 4.16 shows a high frequency of communication among the units of 
DDPM, Table 4.25 reports that those communications are largely made through official 
documents and regular meetings. These communication channels contribute less to knowledge 
sharing than those initiated through field operations and resource and information transfers.    
    
Table 4.25 Summary of Characteristics of Communication Pattern, DDPM emergency personnel 
 DDPM  
 
 
Communication 
through field 
operation 
 
Communication 
through resource 
& info transfer 
Communication 
through regular 
meeting 
Communicatio
n through 
personal 
pleasure 
Communication 
through official 
document 
Communicati
on through 
training 
 
N Valid 196 196 196 196 196 196
  Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mean 3.36 2.38 3.44 2.11 3.70 3.29
Mode 6 2 6 1 6 5
Source: Structural Survey of Emergency Personnel of National-Provincial-Local Levels of Jurisdiction, Thailand 
July – August 2005 
 
A second important use of communication channels cites how emergency personnel 
communicate among each other all information at hand as well as update information regarding 
the situations they confront. A black-out of electricity and basic communications raises the 
question of back-up plans and possible alternate networks for power and communication.  
 
Table 4.26 Summary of Characteristics of Communication Channels, DDPM emergency personnel 
 
Low frequency 
radio 
 
 
High frequency 
radio 
 
 
Cell phone 
 
 
 
GPS and GIS 
applications 
and equipment 
 
Satellite 
communication 
 
 
Other 
equipment 
 
 
N Valid 196 196 196 196 196 196
  Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mean 3.14 2.53 4.76 1.82 .70 .97
Mode 0 0 6 0 0 0
Source: Structural Survey of Emergency Personnel of National-Provincial-Local Levels of Jurisdiction, Thailand 
July – August 2005 
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Cell phone networks, although very convenient, become congested and unavailable in 
large scale emergencies. Emergency personnel are unlikely to operate facilities and equipment 
through satellites and those applications such as Global Positioning System (GPS) and 
Geographical Information System (GIS). It leaves two alternatives for low radio frequency 
through local small networks and high frequency radio through HAM or amateur network. In the 
tsunami response network, I obtained evidence that the local residents preferred to use their 
mega-phone-network to communicate in their communities, villages and beach areas while the 
emergency front line personnel who mostly were local prefer the use of their amateur radio 
networks. Military and DDPM private radio networks are also activated under emergency 
conditions. Private organizations also communicated their operations and mobilization through 
their own radio networks. Interestingly, the information obtained about other equipment used in 
emergency reported the use of communities’ radio network that usually broadcasts communities’ 
news. This radio network can be used as a redundant communication in an emergency especially 
if the power is down since it uses power supply from the generators.  
Based on the findings from the survey and interviews, I propose to develop a strategic 
plan for linking these private and special networks of communication together in states of 
emergency. The most important obstacle that emergency personnel in both public and private 
organizations, provincial governments, and military confront was how to bring the focal points 
of contact together. It is not possible to have multiple agencies and multiple teams working in the 
field without communication among them, even if a command center has representatives of 
every agency sitting in a war-room, trying to keep one another connected. Each unit operated and 
communicated within its network to send updates to their personnel. In states of emergency, one 
single unit cannot work alone. Implementing and coordinating multiple tasks with multiple units 
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and agencies on a large scale area requires an effective communication system. The activation of 
special frequencies for radio networks in emergency may be one alternative. Telephone networks 
of “emergency bridging” through satellite maybe another. These alternatives will be discussed 
again in the recommendations.      
4.5 SUMMARY 
Findings from the exploratory study of tsunami emergency management document how 
the Thai emergency agencies operate during states of emergency. Multiple comprehensive 
analyses of emergency networks, participant observation, interviews and statistical variables of 
factors increase the validity and reliability in response to the research questions proposed in 
Chapter Three. This chapter presents the findings on how the Department of Disaster Prevention 
and Mitigation works throughout the national level of jurisdiction in coordination with other 
jurisdictions, and indicates the problems and obstacles of emergency response and management. 
The analyses also enable this study to identify the importance of information sharing used for 
making informed decisions and using efficient communication management to keep multiple 
agencies working together simultaneously.  
 The analyses also show how much emergency response operations and management 
need effective inter-organizational management as well as efficient information and 
communication networks. Despite a low level of technical infrastructure available to manage 
crises, the tsunami response reflected a lack of knowledge, skills, and adaptive capacities toward 
disaster and emergency consequences. This finding characterizes the national level response in 
the tsunami emergency as non-adaptive.   
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5.0  FLOOD CRISIS AND MASSIVE ACCIDENTS IN BANGKOK METROPOLIS 
The nested set of cases that reflects the Thai emergency management system includes 
two cases of emergency operations within the capital city of Bangkok. As previously discussed, 
the Bangkok metropolis has its emergency response agencies that are managed under its 
command and across levels of jurisdiction.  The Thai government has passed a law that considers 
Bangkok a provincial government that operates as a special area of governance. This inquiry into 
the emergency management operations of Thailand examines the role of the special unit of 
emergency personnel operating under Bangkok’s authority. As shown in the map of domestic 
tsunami response network, Figure 4.5, Chapter 4, the Bangkok Metropolitan Authority 
functioned as an independent emergency unit outside the boundary of the tsunami response 
network. The analyses of Bangkok emergency management   illustrates the link that l enables 
coordination among national, provincial, and local emergency agencies, as well as those across 
sectors in the entire emergency network.   
5.1 EMERGENCY STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATIONS 
Bangkok and the 75 other Thai provinces operate under the Civil Defense Act 1979, which 
establishes the emergency processes and procedures for Thailand.  As stated in the law, the 
Bangkok governor has the authority to appoint and assign emergency personnel as well as 
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establish a department to undertake civil emergency management responsibilities. These 
emergency units and personnel are also responsible for disaster prevention and help to coordinate 
emergency response with the other units operating under the control of the Bangkok Metropolitan 
Authority. 
 
5.1.1 Bangkok Metropolitan Authority 
This study refers to the Bangkok Metropolitan Authority as the Bangkok Metropolitan 
Administration (BMA), which is co-chaired by the Governor and the Deputy Governor (elected 
body of administration) of Bangkok.  The Permanent Secretary of the BMA is known as the 
Secretary of the Administration, who also serves as the head of civil services.  Figure 5.1 shows 
the structure of the emergency response organizations operating by law under the Bangkok 
Metropolitan Administration.   
 
 
Bangkok Metropolitan 
Authority (BMA) 
Sewerage and Drainage 
Department  (SDD) 
District Offices (50 offices) 
(DO) 
Civil Emergency Relief 
Department (CERD) 
Flood Control Center 
(FCC) 
Safety Enforcement Civil Defense Volunteer 
Unit (CDVU)
 
Figure 5.1 Structure of Emergency Response Organizations in Bangkok Metropolis 
Source: Extracted from Bangkok Metropolitan Administration Annual Report of 2004 
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5.1.2 Flood Control Center 
 The Flood Control Center (FCC) under the Sewerage and Drainage Department (SDD) 
operates as an information and coordination center that utilizes computer technology to achieve 
systematic and efficient management of flood protection facilities. The system comprises a 
master control center located in the SDD Building, with fifty-two (52) remote sites scattered 
around Bangkok.  The system covers approximately 1,000 square kilometers within the Bangkok 
Metropolis.  At these fifty-two sites, data reflecting water levels in canals, water levels in the 
Chao Phraya River, rainfall levels, pump status, and water quality for flood protection is 
automatically collected and transmitted in cyclic mode to the master control center via telemeter 
system over UHF radios. 
 
 
Figure 5.2 Map of Flood Control Remote Sites around Bangkok 
Source: Flood Control Center, Sewerage and Drainage Department, Bangkok Metropolitan Authority 
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The Control system is based on Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition software 
(SCADA).  Using TCP/IP and Ethernet links, SCADA provides an interface for data exchange  
between the main computer system and the remote data collection sites.  Real time data can be 
represented graphically so that it can be monitored on computer screens, video projectors, or 
mimic boards for instantaneous decision making.  Alarms and flooding events are also displayed 
and printed. Historical data are  stored for later analysis and simulation.  Figure 5.2 and 5.3 
below show the SCADA computer network and the location of the remote data collection sites 
around Bangkok. 
 
 
Figure 5.3 SCADA Computer Network of Bangkok Flood Control Center (FCC) 
Source: Flood Control Center, Sewerage and Drainage Department, Bangkok Metropolitan Authority 
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5.1.3 District Offices 
Bangkok is separated into 50 districts, which are grouped into 12 zones. These groups are 
organized to reflect the different types of communities, structures, and activities that occur within 
their boundaries. The 12 groups are categorized as: 
1) Center Zone 
2) Business Center Zone 
3) New Economic Zone 
4) New Economic River Zone 
5) Preservation Zone 
6) West New Economic Zone 
7) Northeast Resident Zone 
8) Transition Zone 
9) Agricultural and Resident Zone 
10) New Airport Zone 
11) Agricultural Zone 
12) Agricultural-Industrial Zone 
 
Following a recommendation made by a BMA official, who pointed out that each district 
is comprised of distinct communities with different types of emergency response activities, five 
districts were selected for this study:  Bang Plad, Bangkok Noi, Paya Tai, Din Deang, and Laksi.. 
Bang Plad and Bangkok Noi share a border and are located in a Preservation Zone because the 
communities are old with many historical places and government buildings. Paya Tai and 
Dindeang share a border and are located in the New Economic Zone where governmental, 
business, industrial activities are dominant, but there are a number of residents. Laksi, in 
contrast, is located in a Residential zone to which some governmental offices have recently 
moved. These land use and population characteristics create patterns of emergency response that 
differ from one zone to another.  These different patterns inhibit a coordinated, unified response 
to natural disaster.  
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 Recently, BMA assigned a task to the district offices to set up a special mobile unit to 
respond to emergency calls from the public. The Unit is called BEST, Bangkok Emergency 
Service Team, responsible for the maintenance of public properties and flood related problems. 
5.1.4 Civil Defense Volunteer Unit 
Supervised by district offices are Civil Defense Volunteer Units (CDVU), which work as 
front line emergency response units. As in every province, Bangkok Metropolitan 
Administration also encourages district offices to promote a significant role for CDVU in order 
to encourage citizens in the district to volunteer for the district unit. Basically, these units are 
composed of community members who live in each of the Bangkok districts. CDVU is also 
trained by the Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation periodically. On a routine basis, 
CDVU teams with district officers to conduct field inspections and risk assessments of the area. 
This collaboration results in greater familiarity of CDVU with the geography and communities. 
5.1.5 Civil Emergency Relief Department  
The Civil Emergency Relief Department (CERD) was established in 2005 by moving the 
Fire Fighter Section from the National Police Department (NPD) and merging it with BMA 
officials to be the major unit responsible   for managing emergencies. Starting out as experts in 
fire prevention and response, BMA has provided training to CERD to build its capacity to serve 
as trained emergency personnel that had the knowledge and experience to confront multiple 
hazards. CERD operates through four command centers that direct emergency response activities 
within four separate zones.  
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The Bangkok Metropolitan Authority implements its emergency response by managing 
the Civil Defense Volunteer Units that operate under the 50 District Offices (DO) discussed 
above in Section 5.1.3.  Disaster experts and emergency personnel from the Fire Fighter Unit of 
the National Police Department, the Department of Royal Irrigation, the Department of 
Meteorology and private rescue units, also participate with DO officers.  After the devastation 
from the 2004 tsunami, the BMA established the committee for Bangkok Disaster Prevention 
and Mitigation Strategy and Action Plan to design and deliver policies, plans, regulations and an 
organizational structure for emergency operations for BMA district offices.  
All of the organizations mentioned above operate within the Bangkok jurisdiction under 
BMA supervision.  The FCC functions as an auxiliary unit to support information dissemination 
and coordination among all agencies through communication processes.  The CERD functions as 
the major emergency unit with full resources and manpower, and the district officers (DO) and 
CDVU function as  front line emergency personnel who have  experience and familiarity with 
the people and geography within their operational regions. This study explores how these 
agencies work together and identifies patterns of coordination among the FCC, CERD, DO, and 
CDVU in their interactions with BMA and its agencies.   
5.2 INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE 
In order to operate effectively during a state of emergency, the BMA enforces the 2005 
Civil Defense Interagency Action Policy (CDIAP) by requiring the responsible parties to 
implement their specific action plans.  The CDIAL also determines level of severity of state of 
emergency into three scales, 1) low to medium, 2) high, and 3) very high.  This classification 
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allows the BMA to activate different levels of emergency response according to the nature of the 
threat, and to assign authority to field personnel according to the requirements for collaboration 
across jurisdictions and sectors.   
5.2.1 Levels of response agencies 
BMA’s emergency regulation in Civil Emergency Relief Department’s operations’ 
manual, 2005, identifies levels of emergency response agencies as follow. 
1. Provincial Personnel: Bangkok Metropolis 
1.1 Bangkok Incident Command Center (BICC), chaired by the governor and 
located in CERD headquarters 
1.2 Civil Emergency Relief Department (CERD) 
1.3 Representatives from public, non-profit and private sectors who serve as 
administrative committees  
2. District Personnel: district area 
2.1 District Incident Command Center (DICC),  chaired by the district deputy 
2.2 District emergency response personnel 
2.3 Civil Defense Volunteer Unit 
3. Supporting personnel 
3.1 Other agencies under BMA that support emergency response operations 
with manpower, facilities, equipment and necessities. 
3.2 Other governmental agencies and private organizations that provide 
support and function as expert teams or coordinators. 
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5.2.2 Scales of emergency and severity 
1. Level 1: Low to medium degree of  severity 
 District Incident Command Center is authorized to conduct emergency response 
operations alone. 
2. Level 2: High degree of severity 
 If DICC cannot control the situation, assistance from neighboring districts or other 
agencies under BMA such as CERD is requested. . In case CERD cannot control an 
extreme event, Bangkok governor is in charge. 
3. Level 3: Very high degree of severity 
 If an emergency is very severe, Bangkok governor requests assistance from other 
governmental agencies to provide experts or equipment as well as transfers command 
of the incident to the Director of National Civil Defense, the Minister of Interior,   
5.2.3 Action Plans for District Emergency Response 
1. General public or CDVU in the area notify   the district office (DO) of emergency 
incidents in the area through phone calls or the district radio network. In case of high 
potential of flood, FCC coordinates with the Department of Meteorology to confirm 
the information and activates the flood communication network through BMA and 
district office.  
2. District emergency response unit and CDVU on duty at the district office mobilize 
personnel, resources and equipments to the affected area. 
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3. Communications personnel of CERD communicate through hot-line 199 to dispatch 
the CERD emergency response team to the area. The CERD communications unit is 
also responsible for reporting an incident to BMA management through BMA 
command-radio-network (Ammarint).  
4. Activating Incident Command for Single Incidents: District Deputy is a commander 
in chief of the Incident Command Center.  
5. District Deputy and Director of CERD team establish a Command Post and 
Supporting Zone for other governmental agencies, private rescue teams, medical care 
units, and foundations that will assist upon request.   
6. District polices are in charge of safety, accessibility and traffic in the affected area. 
CDVU and district personnel are supporting personnel. 
7. CVDU in the area is automatically authorized to respond to an emergency until the 
District Deputy arrives and assumes command. 
8. Emergency personnel from other districts and CVDU are available upon request to 
assist in the affected areas if needed.   
9. Monitoring and maintaining good span of control 
10. Demobilizing organizational personnel   when they are no longer needed.  
5.2.4 Action Plans for Bangkok Emergency Response 
In case of overload for the District Command Center, the following policies and 
procedures are in effect. 
 
 
 141 
1. Bangkok governor is a commander in chief with coordination from Bangkok 
Permanent Secretary, Supreme Commander of Metropolitan Police Department and 
Director of CERD upon specific request. The Incident Unified Command may be 
activated if there are many participating organizations with diversity of operations 
that require many areas of expertise or multiple tasks simultaneously under a wider 
span of control.   
2. Bangkok command-radio-network (Ammarint) notifies neighboring districts to 
activate their emergency operations centers and mobilize their resources. Command-
radio-network notifies the other repeater-networks. . BMA has four repeater radio 
networks with other governmental agencies. Ministry of Interior and Military (radio 
and trunk radio) and non-governmental networks, Natrainthorn Medical Care Unit – 
Amateur Radio – Emergency Volunteers, share the same emergency communication 
frequency. . Information regarding the details of the radio network is discussed below 
in the analysis of information and communication management. 
3. CERD mobilizes information and equipment of base-data and dynamic data for the 
Director of Incident Command Center, who makes decisions on emergency response 
support from military units, Port of Authority, Pollution Control Department, 
National Police Department and other organizations.  
4. Other emergency response assistance from other governmental agencies, private 
rescue teams, foundations, medical care teams and others are directed by District 
Deputy, Director of CERD, and Permanent Secretary of BMA or Bangkok governor, 
depending upon the scale of the emergency. 
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5.3 POLICY TRANSLATION TO PRACTICE: ACTION PLANS 
The Bangkok Metropolitan Authority has the advantage of operating within a capital city 
that has significant governmental and business activity.  The BMA reinforces the national 
government by supporting emergency operations to secure public safety.  In the years following 
the tsunami disaster, the BMA has been able to mobilize political support for emergency 
response organization and operations.  The message is clear: Thailand needs to maintain an 
effective emergency response system.  
This study employs document analysis and interviews to identify emergency policies, 
organizational structures and inter-organizational cooperation within Bangkok’s emergency 
response system.  The study seeks to identify whether emergency response organizations are 
willing to accept various levels of organizational flexibility when responding to disasters.  The 
BMA appoints four sub-committees to design and deliver specific policies and action plans on 
Command and Management, Disaster Management Preparedness, Resource Management and 
Communication and Information Management.  
While these initiations suggest that the BMA recognizes that there are three critical socio-
technical components to an effective emergency response and management system, the system is 
not currently without shortcomings.  For example, there are questions about the skills and 
knowledge of emergency personnel operation under CERD.  Many of these personnel transferred 
from Fire Division of National Police Department whether or not they were able to manage 
disaster and emergency situations. In addition, new personnel recruited from academic 
institutions may not be able to translate their knowledge into practice. The BMA has anticipated 
these shortcomings and has initiated numerous training programs and expertise teams to enhance 
and increase capabilities of CERD team and emergency personnel of district offices.  
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The BMA must also solve problems of command and control, as well as figure out how 
to ensure that multiple organizations participate cooperatively in the event of a disaster.     Often 
times, the BMA and district commanders have difficulty issuing commands and directing 
activities when high level government officials arrive at the disaster scene.  Even though written 
policy identifies the BMA as the manager of emergency response activities, when government 
ministers or political party executives arrive at the scene, the BMA’s directives are often 
repeated or contradicted by the visitors.  The BMA responds to this issue by designing a 
“transfer of incident command” procedure for the Incident Commander.  This procedure can be 
used in two different situations.  First, if a high ranking government official arrives at the 
command center, the BMA can transfer the Incident Commander’s authority to that official, but 
only if the transfer is necessary to guarantee effective emergency response operations.  Second, 
the BMA can transfer the Incident Commander’s authority to a subordinate official when the 
incident that gave rise to the state of emergency has been brought under control. 
Another important problem that the BMA must confront is how to coordinate and 
cooperate with the community under stress, as well as the numerous private emergency response 
organizations and personnel.  These parties need to understand clearly the nature and scope of 
the emergency, as well as how they can effectively cooperate within the BMA response plan.  It 
is likely that private rescuers will want their own units to work as the main response actors 
during an emergency.  Yet, sometimes private rescuers initiate operations without informing 
district officers or CERD personnel.  Such an occurrence often leads to mismatched operations 
that can generate accidents and other negative consequences. Just as important are the citizens 
and organizations within the affected communities.  These actors must be educated and trained 
so that they understand emergency response laws and regulations and can prepare for, and 
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effectively respond to, an emergency.  The systematic and effective coordination of multiple 
parties is a significant element of emergency response, especially when response operations must 
occur within the complex environments presented by crowds, construction activities and traffic 
congestion.  Effective coordination between the BMA and local communities and private actors 
reduces the uncertainty that exists during a state of emergency, and helps to ensure improved 
emergency response.   
I collected data on emergency response operations conducted under the management of 
Bangkok Metropolitan Authority from the operation reports and emergency regulation manual 
documenting how different agencies interact under state of emergency. Additional data from the 
interviews and field observations enable me to assess the patterns of interactions among agencies 
and their effectiveness in performance.   
Figure 5.4 shows a map of the organizational coordination network for emergency 
response and management within the Bangkok Metropolitan region.  The map shows, first, that 8 
distinctive nodes serve as hubs for linking other organizations.  The BMA Board, CERD and 
FCC are the main actors within the network.  As the majority of information within the system is 
reported to these actors, they are more likely to be the actors who can coordinate response 
activities according to the laws, regulations, and action plans. District offices (DO) function as 
centers of emergency operations and coordination in the area while Private Rescue Unit and 
Narainthorn Medical Care enter into this coordination network as frontline personnel who have 
absolute expertise in specific areas.  
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 Figure 5.4 Map of Organizational Coordination in Bangkok Emergency Response and Management 
Source: Extracted from Civil Defense Action Plan of Bangkok Metropolitan Authority, 2005 
 
Table 5.1Acronyms List 
BMA (CENTRAL) 
 
OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES 
BMA BOARD: BMA ADMINISTRATIVE BOARD METEOROLOGY TH: DEPARTMENT OF METEOROLOGY 
BMA PR DIVISION:  BMA PUBLIC RELATION DIVISION EGAT: ELECTRICITY GENERATION AUTHORITY OF 
THAILAND 
BMA CIVENG OFFICE: OFFICE OF CIVIL ENGINEERING EMAT: ELECTRICITY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY OF 
THAILAND 
BMA MECH DIVISIO: BMA MECHANICAL CONTROL DIVISION NEZ DISTRICT POLICE:    NEW ECONOMIC ZONE POLICE 
FCC: FLOOD CONTROL CENTER PSV DISTRICT POLICE:     PRESERVATION ZONE POLICE 
CERD: CIVIL EMERGENCY RELIEF DEPARTMENT  RSD DISTRICT POLICE:    RESIDENT ZONE POLICE 
BMA (LOCAL/DISTRICT) ROYAL IRRIGATION TH 
 
NEZ_DO: NEW ECONOMIC ZONE DISTRICT OFFICES HYDROGRAPHIC TH: HYDROGRAPHIC DEPARTMENT, 
NAVY 
PSV_DO: PRESERVATION ZONE DISTRICT OFFICES 
 
NATIONAL POLICE 
RSD_DO: RESIDENT ZONE DISTRICT OFFICES 
 
PRIVATE RESCUE UNIT 
CDVU NEZ DO: NEW ECONOMIC ZONE CIVIL DEFENSE 
VOLUNTEER UNIT 
NARAINTHORN MEDICAL UNIT 
CDVU PSV DO: PRESERVATION ZONE CIVIL DEFENSE 
VOLUNTEER UNIT 
 
CDVU RSD DO: RESIDENT ZONE CIVIL DEFENSE VOLUNTEER 
UNIT 
 
 Source: Extracted from Civil Defense Action Plan of Bangkok Metropolitan Authority, 2005 
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Table 5.2 Degree of Centrality of Bangkok Emergency Response Netwrok 
     1 2                 3 
 DEGREE NRMDEGREE SHARE 
  CERD 24.000 100.000 0.083 
  BMA BOARD 23.000 95.833           0.079 
  FCC 18.000 75.000 0.062 
  PSV DO 16.000 66.667 0.055 
 NEZ DO 16.000 66.667 0.055 
 RSD DO 16.000 66.667 0.055 
 PRIVATE RESCUES 14.000 58.333 0.048 
NARAINTHORN 
MEDICAL UNIT 
13.000 54.167 0.045 
Source: Extracted from Civil Defense Action Plan of Bangkok Metropolitan Authority, 2005 
NOTE: SSQ = sum of square; MSCCQ = mean-centered sum of square; Euc Norm = Euclidean norm;   NrmDegree 
= Normed Degree 
 
 
Table 5.3 Centrality Descriptive Statistic of Bangkok Emergency Response Network 
 1 2 3 
 DEGREE NRMDEGREE SHARE 
 ------------ ------------ ------------ 
  1     MEAN 11.600 48.333 0.040 
  2  STD DEV 4.716 19.650 0.016 
  3      SUM 290.000 1208.333 1.000 
  4  VARIANCE 22.240 386.111 0.000 
  5      SSQ 3920.000 68055.555 0.047 
  6    MCSSQ 556.000 9652.777 0.007 
  7  EUC NORM 62.610 260.875 0.216 
  8  MINIMUM 5.000 20.833 0.017 
  9  MAXIMUM 24.000 100.000 0.083 
NETWORK CENTRALIZATION = 56.16% 
HETEROGENEITY = 4.66%.  NORMALIZED = 0.69% 
Source: Extracted from Civil Defense Action Plan of Bangkok Metropolitan Authority, 2005 
 
 
Centrality measures identify the most prominent actors; those who are extensively 
involved in relationships with other network members. Degree of centrality indicates the 
“importance” of actors within a network.  In lay terms, these are the “key” players, while degree 
of centrality is the sum of all other actors who are directly connected to ego. It signifies activity 
or popularity. Lots of ties coming in and lots of ties coming out of an actor would increase 
degree centrality. Interestingly, as an overall response system, the BMA emergency response 
coordination network appears to be strongly interconnected The statistics from Freeman’s degree 
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centrality index show the centralization within the whole network to be 56.16%, which indicates 
that BMA emergency network appears to be well connected.     
Distance is another way to measure the strength of a network. The distance from one 
node to another is the length of a shortest path between them.  The larger the number the more 
difficult it is to pass information from one side to the other. This is the notion of “degree of 
separation” made familiar to many by a popular play.  The Average Distance (among reachable 
pairs) is 1.53 and the Distance-based cohesion of 0.753 (range 0 to 1; larger values indicate 
greater cohesiveness). The Distance-weighted Fragmentation is 0.265. The density of the 
network shows a low average of 0.47 that indicates a state of medium density. Dense networks 
are particularly good for coordination of activity among actors.   
Betweenness, as indicated by tables 5.4 and 5.5, measures whether a node can operate as 
a gatekeeper in controlling the flow of resources and information between the other nodes within 
the network.  The amount of betweenness variation for this network ranges from 0 to 100.376.  
This finding suggests that only a few connections can be made within this network without the 
aid of any intermediary.  The centralization index for the BMA emergency response network is 
16.54%, which indicates the importance of CERD as the main network actor.  The statistics 
identify another main actor, the BMA Board, whose actions are closely tied to the main actor.  
Clearly, this network differs from the tsunami response network. Here the CERD staff are less 
likely to view themselves as gatekeepers.  In this sense, there is a high betweenness power in the 
system that is confirmed by group formation analysis reported below in table 5.6. Interestingly, 
the BMA emergency response network revealed a group of organizations that had the best fit in 
terms of the interacting with one another in reference to disaster-related issues. 
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Table 5.4 Betweenness Centrality of Bangkok Emergency Response Network 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTIC 1 2 
NETWORK CENTRALIZATION INDEX = 16.54% BETWEENNESS NBETWEENNESS 
  1  MEAN 12.720 2.304 
  2  STD DEV 24.188 4.382 
  3  SUM 318.000 57.609 
  4 VARIANCE 585.045 19.200 
  5  SSQ 18671.078 612.761 
  6  MCSSQ 14626.119 480.011 
  7  EUC NORM 136.642 24.754 
  8  MINIMUM 0.000 0.000 
  9  MAXIMUM 100.376 18.184 
Source: Extracted from Civil Defense Action Plan of Bangkok Metropolitan Authority, 2005 
 
Table 5.5 Betweenness of Bangkok Emergency Response Network 
 1 2 
 BETWEENNESS NBETWEENNESS 
  CIVIL EMERGENCY RELIEF DEPARTMENT 100.376 18.184 
  BANGKOK METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY BOARD 77.476 14.036 
  FLOOD CONTROL CENTER 35.933 6.510 
  PRESERVATION ZONE DISTRICT OFFICES 18.155 3.289 
  RESIDENTIAL ZONE DISTRICT OFFICES 18.155 3.289 
  NEW ECONOMIC ZONE DISTRICT OFFICES 17.988 3.259 
  PRIVATE RESCUES 11.540 2.091 
Source: Extracted from Civil Defense Action Plan of Bangkok Metropolitan Authority, 2005 
NOTE: SSQ = sum of square; MSCCQ = mean-centered sum of square; Euc Norm = Euclidean norm; NrmDegree = 
Normed Degree 
 
While the CERD may not be an extreme gatekeeper, it still functions as a coordinator of 
emergency response activities and personnel.  This gives CERD a new status as both 
implementer and linker.  The BMA also functions as the command center and linking pin. 
Regarding the action plan, both CERD and BMA are likely to activate their operations and 
retrieve information for the same emergency incidents.  District units are the frontline personnel 
who are usually in the area and can access the affected location faster and more accurately.   
The other actors within the network, the FCC, the Hydrographic Department of Navy and 
the Mechanical Control Division basically function as to provide information and personnel 
support.  The first two agencies are responsible for relaying information to those who have to 
prepare and implement emergency operations, while the latter agency works to provide 
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personnel, equipment and resources when they are needed. Last, in a state of emergency, all of 
these agencies need a reliable source of power.  This explains why the Electricity Metropolitan 
Authority of Thailand (EMAT) is identified within this network.  Nonetheless, group formation 
in the same pattern of coordination can be found with the different combinations of organizations 
and agencies. Closeness centrality analysis is identified below which supports this argument with 
measures of network-in and network-out centralization indices that are very high at almost 71%, 
shown in table 5.6 and 5.7.  
 
Table 5.6 Group Centrality of Bangkok Emergency Response Network 
STARTING FITNESS: 25.000, ROUND 0, 1, ITERATIONS FIT = 0.000,  
OBSERVED NO. REACHED = 25.000 (100.0%) 
GROUP MEMBERS: 
1 BANGKOK METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY BOARD 
6 FLOOD CONTROL CENTER 
7 CIVIL EMERGENCY RELIEF DEPARTMENT 
10 BANGKOK METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY MECHANICAL DIVISION 
13 HYDROGRAPHIC DEPARTMENT OF THAI ROYAL NAVY 
15 ELECTRICITY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY OF THAILAND 
17 OFFICE OF NATIONAL POLICE  
19 RESIDENTIAL ZONE DISTRICT POLICE 
23 CIVIL DEFENSE VOLUNTEER UNIT OF RESIDENTIAL ZONE DISTRICT OFFICES 
25 CIVIL DEFENSE VOLUNTEER UNIT OF  PRESERVATION ZONE DISTRICT OFFICES 
Source: Extracted from Civil Defense Action Plan of Bangkok Metropolitan Authority, 2005 
 
 
Table 5.7 Descriptive Statistics of Closeness of Bangkok Emergency Response Network 
 1 2 3 4 
 INFARNESS OUTFARNESS INCLOSENESS OUTCLOSENESS 
  1     MEAN 36.720 36.720 66.743 66.733 
  2  STD DEV 4.788 4.729 10.792 10.814 
  3      SUM 918.000 918.000 1668.567 1668.317 
  4 VARIANCE 22.922 22.362 116.458 116.953 
  5      SSQ 34282.000 34268.000 114276.117 114255.055 
  6    MCSSQ 573.040 559.040 2911.439 2923.834 
  7 EUC NORM 185.154 185.116 338.048 338.016 
  8  MINIMUM 24.000 24.000 54.545 55.814 
  9  MAXIMUM 44.000 43.000 100.000 100.000 
NETWORK IN-CENTRALIZATION = 70.79%, NETWORK OUT-CENTRALIZATION = 70.81% 
Source: Extracted from Civil Defense Action Plan of Bangkok Metropolitan Authority, 2005 
NOTE: SSQ = sum of square; MSCCQ = mean-centered sum of square; Euc Norm = Euclidean norm; NrmDegree = 
Normed Degree 
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The analysis of subgroups in the network further confirms the observation of interaction 
within subgroups. Clique analysis, shown in Table 5.8, proposes that information spreads rapidly 
through densely knit subgroups because actors are strongly connected to one another and they 
directly share the information.  The degrees of closeness are fairly high and not The clique 
analysis in UCINET identified 20 subgroups within the network.  These subgroups are identified 
within Table 5.9. 
 
Table 5.8 Closeness Centrality Measures of Bangkok Emergency Response Network  
 IN 
FARNESS 
OUT 
FARNESS 
IN 
CLOSENESS 
OUT 
CLOSENESS 
CIVIL EMERGENCY RELIEF DEPARTMENT 24.000 24.000 100.000 100.000 
BANGKOK METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY 
BOARD  
25.000 25.000 96.000 96.000 
PRESERVATION ZONE DISTRICT OFFICES 32.000 33.000 75.000 72.727 
NEW ECONOMIC ZONE DISTRICT OFFICES 32.000 33.000 75.000 72.727 
RESIDENTIAL ZONE DISTRICT OFFICES 32.000 33.000 75.000 72.727 
FLOOD CONTROL CENTER 33.000 30.000 72.727 80.000 
PRIVATE RESCUES 34.000 34.000 70.588 70.588 
NARAINTHORN MEDICAL UNIT 35.000 35.000 68.571 68.571 
BANGKOK METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY 
CIVIL ENGINEER OFFICE 
38.000 38.000 63.158 63.158 
BANGKOK METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY 
PUBLIC RELATION DIVISION 
38.000 38.000 63.158 63.158 
METEOROLOGY DEPARTMENT 38.000 38.000 63.158 63.158 
BANGKOK METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY  
MECHANICAL DIVISION 
38.000 38.000 63.158 63.158 
BANGKOK METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY 
BUDGET OFFICE 
38.000 38.000 63.158 63.158 
NEW ECONOMIC ZONE DISTRICT POLICE 38.000 39.000 63.158 61.538 
BANGKOK METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY 
OMBUDSMAN OFFICE 
39.000 39.000 61.538 61.538 
PRESERVATION ZONE DISTRICT POLICE 39.000 39.000 61.538 61.538 
CIVIL DEFENSE VOLUNTEER UNIT OF 
PRESERVATION  ZONE 
39.000 40.000 61.538 60.000 
CDVU REZ DO 39.000 40.000 61.538 60.000 
RSD DISTRICT POLICE 39.000 39.000 61.538 61.538 
CDVU RSD DO 39.000 40.000 61.538 60.000 
ELECTRICITY GENERATING AUTHORITY  40.000 40.000 60.000 60.000 
NATIONAL POLICE 40.000 39.000 60.000 61.538 
ROYAL IRRIGATION DEPARTMENT 42.000 42.000 57.143 57.143 
HYDROGRAPHIC DEPARTMENT OF ROYAL 
NAVY 
43.000 43.000 55.814 55.814 
ELECTRICITY METROPOLITAN 
AUTHORITY 
44.000 41.000 54.545 58.537 
Source: Extracted from Civil Defense Action Plan of Bangkok Metropolitan Authority, 2005 
 151 
Interestingly, the cliques show overlapping memberships among the organizations, but 
the sheer number of cliques indicates that the response system was functioning essentially as a 
set of separate groups formed around a specific geographical area. The set functioned as a 
coherent system in addressing this extreme event with a common strategy.   
 
Table 5.9 Cliques Analysis of Bangkok Metropolitan Emergency Response Network 
CLIQUES ANALYSIS: 20 CLIQUES FOUND (ACRONYMS IN BOLD ARE SPELT OUT AND REPEATED) 
 
   1:  BANGKOK METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY (BMA) BOARD, NEW RESIDENTIAL ZONE DISTRICT OFFICES 
(RSD_DO),  NEW ECONOMIC ZONE DISTRICT OFFICES (NEZ_DO), FLOOD CONTROL CENTER (FCC), CIVIL 
EMERGENCY RELIEF DEPARTMENT (CERD), BMA CIVIL ENGINEER OFFICE, BMA BUDGET OFFICE, BMA 
MECHANICAL DIVISION, BMA PUBLIC RELATION DIVISION 
   2:  BMA BOARD, NEZ_DO, RSD_DO, PSV_DO, FCC, CERD, METEOROLOGY DEPARTMENT  
   3:  BMA BOARD, NEZ_DO, RSD_DO, PSV_DO, FCC, CERD, ELECTRICITY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY 
(EMAT) 
   4:  BMA BOARD, RSD_DO, FCC, CERD, CIVIL DEFENSE VOLUNTEER UNIT (CDVU), RSD_DO 
   5:  BMA BOARD, FCC, CERD, METEOROLOGY DEPARTMENT, ELECTRICITY GENERATING AUTHORITY 
(EGAT), ROYAL IRRIGATION DEPARTMENT 
   6:  BMA BOARD, FCC, CERD, EGAT, EMAT 
   7:  BMA BOARD, FCC, CERD, EGAT, OFFICE OF NATIONAL POLICE 
   8:  BMA BOARD, FCC, CERD, CDVU, REZ_DO, CDVU, RSD_DO, CIVIL DEFENSE VOLUNTEER   UNIT OF 
PRESERVATION ZONE DISTRICT OFFICES (CDVU_PSV_DO) 
   9:  BMA BOARD, NEZ_ DO, FCC, CERD, CIVIL DEFENSE VOLUNTEER UNIT OF RESIDENTIAL ZONE 
DISTRICT OFFICES (CDVU_REZ_DO) 
  10: BMA BOARD, PSV_DO, FCC, CERD, CDVU_PSV_DO 
  11: BMA BOARD, BMA OMBUDSMAN OFFICE, NEZ_DO, RSD_DO, PSV_DO, CERD, BMA CIVIL ENGINEER 
OFFICE, BMA BUDGET OFFICE, BMA MECHANICAL DIVISION, BMA PUBLIC RELATION DIVISION 
(BMA_PR_DIVISION) 
  12: BMA BOARD, CERD, OFFICE NATIONAL POLICE, NEW ECONOMIC ZONE DISTRICT POLICE, 
RESIDENTIAL ZONE DISTRICT POLICE, PRESERVATION ZONE DISTRICT POLICE, NARAINTHORN MEDICAL 
UNIT, PRIVATE RESCUES 
  13: BMA BOARD, NEZ_DO, CERD, NEW ECONOMY ZONE DISTRICT POLICE, NARAINTHORN MEDICAL UNIT, 
PRIVATE RESCUES, CDVU_REZ_DO 
  14: BMA BOARD, CERD, EGAT, OFFICE OF NATIONAL POLICE, NEW ECONOMIC ZONE DISTRICT POLICE 
  15: BMA BOARD, RSD_DO, CERD, RESIDENTIAL ZONE DISTRICT POLICE, NARAINTHORN MEDICAL UNIT, 
PRIVATE RESCUES, CDVU_RSD_DO 
  16: BMA BOARD, PSV_DO, CERD, PRESERVATION ZONE DISTRICT POLICE, NARAINTHORN MEDICAL UNIT, 
PRIVATE RESCUES, CDVU_PSV_DO 
  17: BMA BOARD, NEZ_DO, RSD_DO, PSV_DO, CERD, NARAINTHORN MEDICAL UNIT, PRIVATE RESCUES 
  18: BMA BOARD, CERD, NARAINTHORN MEDICAL UNIT, PRIVATE RESCUES, CDVU_REZ_DO, 
CDVU_RSD_DO, CDVU_PSV_DO 
  19: BMA BOARD, NEZ DO, RSD DO, PSV DO, CERD, METEOROLOGY DEPARTMENT, PRIVATE RESCUES 
  20:  FCC, CERD, METEOROLOGY DEPARTMENT, HYDROGRAPHIC DEPARTMENT OF THAI ROYAL NAVY, 
EGAT, ROYAL IRRIGATION DEPARTMENT 
Source: Extracted from Civil Defense Action Plan of Bangkok Metropolitan Authority, 2005 
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BMA assigns responsibility for emergency operations according to coverage area and 
indicates which function of CERD, FCC as regular unit is activated. Significant in a review of 
this list is the participation of the BMA board and CERD. The BMA board is almost always the 
first named actor, and is clearly a primary actor in coordinating response organizations and 
conducting emergency operations. Also noteworthy is the finding that interactions among the 
cliques are very similar with the roles of BMA board, CERD, FCC, Private Rescue, Medical 
Unit and District Officers operating as emergency response units in the area affected.  
The response system appears to be strongly connected, with a fair number of 
organizations presented and necessarily interacting efficiently with one another. The measures of 
group centrality, closeness, betweenness and identification of cliques reflect the operations by 
geographical area with the same set of actors. The findings reflect strong connection and 
effective coordination among all levels of agencies. In practicing action plans and managing 
response operation, emergency response will be effective if coordination, information and 
communication can be mobilized through all organizational ties,.  
5.4 BMA RADIO NETWORK IN EMERGENCY RESPONSE 
I also collected data on communication patterns through the use of a very high frequency 
radio network. As this study discussed in reference to the tsunami response, the VHF radio 
network was identified by emergency personnel and citizens as a very effective means of 
communication during emergencies, especially if the infrastructures of communication are not 
available, if the telephone poles were destroyed by the tsunami or the cell phone network was 
overloaded.  
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Figure 5.5 below shows how specific radio networks are linked under emergency 
response operations. This, in turn, can provide an interpretation of how effectively information 
can be shared and how efficiently communication channels can be provided.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.5 Map of VHF Radio Network during Emergency Response Initiated by BMA 
Source: Extracted from Civil Defense Action Plan of Bangkok Metropolitan Authority, 2005 
 
It is clear from the map that the BMA command radio center functions as a 
communication center for all BMA repeaters and personnel.  Repeaters are critical to link with 
personnel outside the BMA network, especially with medical care and amateur radio networks. 
The first responders can disseminate the needs of paramedics, while the latter can broadcast 
news and update information to restrict population from entering the affected area.  
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Table 5.10 presents the UCINET analyses of the BMA Radio Network. The signal for 
this radio network is initiated by the BMA command radio center and sent to the BMA repeaters 
and other agencies. 
 
Table 5.10 Information Centralities of Bangkok Emergency Radio Network  
ACTOR INFORMATION CENTRALITIES  STATISTIC  
 INFORM              INFORM 
  1  BMA COMMAND RADIO CENTER 2.068 1     MEAN 1.590 
  2  BMA REPEATER1 1.519 2  STD DEV 0.305 
  3  BMA REPEATER 2 2.062 3  SUM 15.903 
  4  BMA REPEATER 3 1.781 4 VARIANCE 0.093 
  5  BMA REPEATER 4 1.725 5  SSQ 26.217 
  6  MEDICAL CARE UNIT 1.161 6  MCSSQ 0.928 
  7 MINISTRY OF INERIOR RADIO NETWORK 1.488 7 EUC NORM 5.120 
  8 OTHER VOLUNTEERS 1.493 8  MINIMUM 1.147 
  9  MILITARY 1.459 9  MAXIMUM 2.068 
 10 AMATURE 1.147   
Source: Extracted from Civil Defense Action Plan of Bangkok Metropolitan Authority, 2005 
NOTE: This version of centrality focuses on the information contained in all paths originating with a specific actor. 
The information of an actor averages the information in these paths, which, in turn, is inversely related to the 
variance in the transmission of a signal from one actor to another.  
 
 
The BMA command radio network creates a small, reliable network of communications 
that works to coordinate BMA emergency personnel and other critical agencies acting as 
response operations units. This network is purposely designed to facilitate and disseminate 
information related to the needs and activities of BMA emergency personnel.  As shown in Table 
5.11, the network centrality index at 33.33% has a high level of heterogeneity at 11. 42%, and 
has a clique structure that shows how the BMA command radio center and repeaters deliver 
information through the available channels of communication. 
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Table 5.11 Degree of Centrality of Bangkok Emergency Radio Network 
 1 2 3 
 DEGREE NRMDEGREE SHARE 
  1  MEAN 3.600 40.000 0.100 
  2  STD DEV 1.356 15.072 0.038 
  3 SUM 36.000 400.000 1.000 
  4 VARIANCE 1.840 227.160 0.001 
  5 SSQ 148.000 18271.604 0.114 
  6 MCSSQ 18.400 2271.605 0.014 
  7 EUC NORM 12.166 135.173 0.338 
  8  MINIMUM 2.000 22.222 0.056 
  9  MAXIMUM 6.000 66.667 0.167 
NETWORK CENTRALIZATION = 33.33% 
HETEROGENEITY = 11.42%.  NORMALIZED = 1.58% 
Source: Extracted from Civil Defense Action Plan of Bangkok Metropolitan Authority, 2005 
NOTE: SSQ = sum of square; MSCCQ = mean-centered sum of square;  
     Euc Norm = Euclidean norm;   NrmDegree = Normed Degree 
 
 
Table 5.12 Betweenness of Bangkok Emergency Radio Network 
 1 2 
 BETWEENNESS NBETWEENNESS 
  BMA COMMAND RADIO CENTER 23.467 32.593 
  BMA REPEATER 2 15.467 21.481 
  BMA REPEATER 4 10.133 14.074 
  MILITARY 9.167 12.731 
  OTHER VOLUNTEERS 6.167 8.565 
  BMA REPEATER 3 3.967 5.509 
  BMA REPEATER1 1.733 2.407 
  MINISTRY OF INERIOR RADIO NETWORK 1.667 2.315 
  MEDICAL CARE UNIT 1.400 1.944 
  AMATURE 0.833 1.157 
  NETWORK CENTRALIZATION INDEX = 24.79% 
Source: Extracted from Civil Defense Action Plan of Bangkok Metropolitan Authority, 2005 
 
Geodesic Distance and Density Analyses 
---------------------------------- 
Average distance = 1.822 
Distance-based cohesion = 0.653 
Distance-weighted Fragmentation = 0.347 
Density (matrix average) = 0.3667 
Standard deviation = 0.4819 
 
 156 
The BMA emergency radio network appears to be moderately well connected.  The radio 
network has a density of 0.3667, and a distance-based cohesion of 0.653. Although this network 
relies on the BMA command radio center, its centralization index is fairly low at 24.79%. This 
measure indicates that the BMA radio command center is less likely to play the role of 
gatekeeper.  Since the BMA utilizes four other repeaters to ensure redundancy, interconnection 
and communication throughout emergency radio network, the information can be disseminated 
throughout the network without having to pass through the command center. 
 
Table 5.13 Cliques Analysis of Bangkok Emergency Radio Network 
8 CLIQUES FOUND. 
  1: BMA COMMAND RADIO CENTER, BMA REPEATER1, BMA REPEATER 2 
  2: BMA COMMAND RADIO CENTER, BMA REPEATER 2, BMA REPEATER 3 
  3: BMA COMMAND RADIO CENTER, BMA REPEATER 2, MILITARY 
  4: BMA COMMAND RADIO CENTER, BMA REPEATER 3, BMA REPEATER 4 
  5: BMA COMMAND RADIO CENTER, BMA REPEATER 4, MINISTRY OF INTERIOR RADIO 
NETWORK 
  6: BMA COMMAND RADIO CENTER, BMA REPEATER 1, MINISTRY OF INTERIOR RADIO 
NETWORK 
  7: BMA REPEATER 2, BMA REPEATER 3, OTHER VOLUNTEERS 
  8: BMA REPEATER 2, MILITARY AMATEUR 
Source: Extracted from Civil Defense Action Plan of Bangkok Metropolitan Authority, 2005 
 
 
In context of a communications relationship, an actor is central if it can quickly interact 
with all others (Wasserman, 1994) If actors in the set of actors are engaged in problem solving 
and the focus is on communication links, efficient solutions occur when one actor has very short 
communication paths to the other actors.  This concept underlies the measure of closeness 
centrality (Wasserman, 1994).   
The BMA radio network has degrees of network-in centrality at 44.47% and network-out 
centrality at 43.25%, values that are considered medium to high. When the centrality results are 
considered in conjunction with the clique analysis, the BMA command radio center is identified 
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as the central network actor. Of particular interest is the BMA repeater 2.  Although it is not 
always identified as the first actor in each clique, its degree of closeness centrality is relatively 
close to the BMA command radio. This suggests that if the BMA radio command center wants to 
reach particular agencies located on the periphery of the network, it needs to rely on its repeater 
network. 
 
Table 5.14Closeness Centrality Measures of Bangkok Emergency Radio Network 
 1 2 3 4 
 INFARNESS OUTFARNESS INCLOSENESS OUTCLOSENESS 
 BMA COAND RADIO 
CENTER 
12.000 12.000 75.000 75.000 
 BMA REPEATER 2 13.000 14.000 69.231 64.286 
 BMA REPEATER 4 15.000 15.000 60.000 60.000 
 BMA REPEATER 3 16.000 14.000 56.250 64.286 
 BMA REPEATER1 17.000 16.000 52.941 56.250 
 OTHER VOLUNTEERS 17.000 17.000 52.941 52.941 
 MINISTRY OF INERIOR  17.000 17.000 52.941 52.941 
 MILITARY 18.000 16.000 50.000 56.250 
 AMATURE 19.000 24.000 47.368 37.500 
  MEDICAL CARE UNIT 20.000 19.000 45.000 47.368 
    Source: Extracted from Civil Defense Action Plan of Bangkok Metropolitan Authority, 2005 
 
Table 5.15Closeness Statistics of Bangkok Emergency Radio Network 
 1 2 3 4 
 INFARNESS OUTFARNESS INCLOSENESS OUTCLOSENES
S 
  1  MEAN 16.400 16.400 56.167 56.682 
  2  STD DEV 2.375 3.137 9.008 9.722 
  3  SUM 164.000 164.000 561.673 566.822 
  4 VARIANCE 5.640 9.840 81.141 94.524 
  5  SSQ 2746.000 2788.000 32359.033 33073.98
4 
  6  MCSSQ 56.400 98.400 811.409 945.244) 
  7 EUC NORM 52.402 52.802 179.886 181.863 
  8  MINIMUM 12.000 12.000 45.000 37.500 
  9  MAXIMUM 20.000 24.000 75.000 75.000 
NETWORK IN-CENTRALIZATION = 44.47%, NETWORK OUT-CENTRALIZATION = 43.25% 
Source: Extracted from Civil Defense Action Plan of Bangkok Metropolitan Authority, 2005 
NOTE: SSQ = sum of square; MSCCQ = mean-centered sum of square; Euc Norm = Euclidean norm;   
NrmDegree = Normed Degree 
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Based upon the interviews of governmental and non-governmental agencies such as the 
military and amateur radio personnel, I found that each network has its own technical 
infrastructure.  This technical infrastructure is used to support communications throughout the 
country.  In part, this is because there is a large number of communication repeaters located in 
locations in various parts of the country.  This technical infrastructure helps to overcome a 
weakness of the BMA emergency network that is highly dependent on the BMA command 
center.  With active communications supported by non-BMA technical infrastructure, the BMA 
has a back-up communications network that can function in the event that a failure occurs.  
These non-BMA communications networks increase the span of coverage so that information 
can be distributed more efficiently in the event of an emergency  
The first section of this chapter examined the coordination and communication networks 
of the BMA emergency response system in terms of how networks function in emergency 
response.  Such an examination is useful for the discussion in chapter 6, which explores how 
emergency management can be designed to operate effectively and efficiently, and what factors 
affect interactions, coordination, information sharing, communication and personnel 
performance.  The next section of this chapter focuses on socio-technical components, 
interaction patterns, information and communication management and other factors that affect 
emergency response operations and management.  
5.5 THE ANALYSIS OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE AND MANAGEMENT 
The findings from network analysis and the personnel interviews documented how 
response operations were conducted in Bangkok during states of emergency. The cases of 
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flooding and massive accidents within the Bangkok Metropolis demonstrate that the BMA 
manages emergency operations with the knowledge and skills acquired from the Fire Division 
and the district field officers.  The content analyses revealed that the BMA emergency response 
network is well connected and operates with the same connection pattern, but differs by 
geographical area of coverage and size of the emergency. 
The next phase of analysis focuses on qualitative data and addresses the research 
questions posed in chapter 3.  These research questions ask how the emergency response 
agencies of BMA and CERD function during emergency operations and what elements affect 
their performance.  An additional agency, the FCC completed surveys and was subjected to 
interviews to understand how modern information technology is used to share and disseminate 
information that is needed for emergency preparedness and mitigation.  Data related to the 
FCC’s coordination role within emergency response operation is also collected. In a previous 
chapter, a Factor Analysis confirmed that three components are critical for effective emergency 
management.  In the remainder of this chapter, quantitative analysis will show the relationships 
among these three factors and how they interact during an emergency.  Data derived from 
interviews with emergency response personnel is used to identify details of interaction patterns 
in the processes of information collection, management, and distribution.   
5.5.1 Socio-Technical Component Analysis 
Factor analysis of the data collected from the survey revealed three primary socio-
technical components within Thailand’s national emergency response system: organizational 
flexibility; technical infrastructure and cultural openness.  To collect data related to these socio-
technical indicators, questionnaires were distributed to emergency personnel working at the 
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Bangkok Metropolitan Authority (BMA).  Additional questionnaires were distributed to other 
emergency response agencies, including: 1) the Civil Emergency Relief Department, CERD: 
including representative personnel at all 4 command centers emergency personnel; 2) Flood 
Control Center, FCC; 3) New Economic Zone District Office, Newz_DO; 4) Preservation Zone 
District Office, Prsv_DO; 5) Resident Zone District Office, Rsdc_DO and 6) Civil Defense 
Volunteer Unit (CDVU) within each of these districts.  
The surveys were conducted with emergency operations personnel, as well as the 
supervisor and senior operations manager, to identify the extent to which these three socio-
technical components exist within the provincial emergency response system.  Responses to the 
survey were ranked on an ordinal scale of 1 to 5, where 5 is the highest score.  The mean scores 
of the socio-technical components for the emergency response personnel and managers are 
identified in Figure 5.6 below.  The interviews were also conducted with all levels of 
management and emergency operations to collect data regarding the perceptions and and 
knowledge of their organizations and operations. Data collected from the interviews is used to 
strengthen the interpretation of these results from the survey.  
 The findings shown for all units of the BMA indicate that, compared to 
organizational flexibility and cultural openness, the lowest component is technical infrastructure.  
This is especially true of agencies operating at the local district level, whose technical 
infrastructure is even lower than the agencies that operate at the provincial level.  This is 
explained by the fact that, even though Bangkok is a capital city, Thailand has traditionally been 
considered at low risk for large-scale natural disasters.  Accordingly, policy makers have not 
considered technical infrastructure for emergency response as important an issue as reducing 
traffic congestion.  Thus, readiness and preparation of technical equipment and infrastructure 
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within Thailand are not yet fully developed.  The damage and trauma wrought by the tsunami 
disaster, however, triggered awareness among policy-makers of the need to be prepared for 
complex emergencies.  In turn, the public has expressed an increased degree of willingness to 
have its emergency personnel engage in training to enhance their adaptive capability.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.6 Mean scores of socio-technical component of emergency unit of Bangkok Metropolitan Authority 
Source: Extracted from questionnaires distributed to Bangkok Metropolitan Authority (BMA) emergency personnel; 
dated July - August 2005 
NOTE: BMA_CERD is Civil Emergency Relief Department, BMA_FCC is Flood Control Center, BMA_Nez is 
New Economic Zone District Offices, BMA_Prsv is Preservation Zone District Offices, BMA_Res is 
Residential Zone District Offices 
 
 
Interestingly, the graphs show that the three socio-technical components are lower for the 
BMA district offices than for CERD, even though district officers are frontline emergency 
personnel. The BMA has traditionally focused less attention on emergency operations than on 
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the various other issues that the agency confronted.  During this time, the public accepted floods 
and massive accidents as a normal part of everyday life.  Only after the tsunami event made the 
public aware that emergency preparation could mitigate the effects of disaster, did the BMA 
begin to consider the need to improve emergency operations.  Rather than focusing on 
emergency units and local level operations, the BMA emphasized the development of the CERD 
to spearhead this role. 
CERD was established to be the single emergency response organization that would 
function at the provincial level.  However, the BMA cannot simply rely upon the CERD to 
ensure that emergency operations are effectively implemented. Twelve district zones present a 
unique set of characteristics and challenges.  It is necessary for the BMA and CERD to 
coordinate their emergency operations with local authorities who have knowledge about local 
communities as well as the geography of these communities.  Emergency personnel assigned to 
the district level remain a critical component of emergency response operations  
Of those working within the different zones, the emergency response personnel within 
the New Economic Zone have the lowest degree all socio-technical scores  In large part, this 
finding reflects the first priority of the District Office in the New Economic Zone, the 
development of business and economic activities.  Consequently, emergency response personnel 
within this zone have received less attention focused on improving their operational 
performance.   This zone also covers a wide geographic area and is over-populated.  This means 
that, in a time of emergency, it is extremely difficult for emergency personnel within this zone to 
manage operations without guidance from central agencies or a superior official operating from a 
district office. Compared to those within to New Economic Zone, emergency response personnel 
in the Preservation and Resident Zones have a higher degree of all socio-technical scores.  
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Emergency personnel operating within these two zones are better equipped and prepared to 
respond to an emergency.  The Preservation Zone receives attention from the BMA because of 
the numerous historical sites and government buildings located there.  The Residential Zone 
merits attention from the BMA because it is over-populated with citizens whose homes, stores, 
hospitals and schools require a high degree of protection, especially at night. 
As the emergency caretakers for the local level, the district officers rely on Civil Defense 
Volunteer Units to operate as frontline emergency response personnel and to relay timely 
information needed to conduct effective operations.  Unfortunately, some volunteers within the 
CDVU have low literacy levels, and do not have the time to participate in training.  These 
shortcomings make it difficult for the CDVU to accept new information and learn how to 
improve their overall performance.  While willingness exists on the part of CDVU personnel to 
change and build capabilities, their members often work without compensation.  To encourage 
change, the District Office must set an annual budget to fund CDVU training activities and 
maintenance.  This is a problem that exists throughout the Bangkok Metropolitan Region.  An 
effective solution requires the BMA to increase the funding it provides to support the training, 
technology, and personnel needed to maintain effective emergency response operations. 
 The results of this study suggest that trust enables emergency response agencies and 
personnel to quickly adapt to the changing environment posed by a natural disaster.  For 
example, the BMA needs to believe that district officers know their people, have good 
relationships with all personnel and volunteers, and can manage them successfully.  In turn, the 
BMA must listen to the needs of emergency personnel and respond quickly and positively.  
Likewise, because its volunteers have moderate levels of experience, skills and a familiarity of 
the area, the District Offices must trust that its volunteers will work effectively.  Finally, the 
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CDVU must realize that when decisions are made about emergency operations, these decisions 
are authorized and fully supported by their superiors.  All of these agencies must accept feedback 
and evaluation as a natural part of the emergency response process.  Without trust, emergency 
response personnel and organizations cannot operate effectively on their own.  Rather, they put-
off emergency operations until they receive directions from superiors or BMA officials.  District 
officers, district volunteers and the communities at risk must be capable of coping with an 
emergency until additional assistance arrives at the scene.  
 This study also calculates the sum of the socio-technical components, and uses this result 
as an indicator to compare the working environments within the agencies under observation.  
This indicator can also be used to identify the strengths and weaknesses within these agencies.  
There were a number of interesting results.  For example, the highest mean score of the socio-
technical indicator for CERD is 3.08, while the New Economic Zone DO is lowest at 2.69. These 
results confirm that there exists a high degree of dynamic movement among the emergency 
response personnel within CERD, which is relatively new to emergency operations and retains a 
high degree of political support and a budget that can support the requisite technical 
infrastructure, personnel and expertise and training courses.  There is substantially less 
movement, however, of the district emergency personnel that operate within the New Economic 
Zone. Lastly, FCC which has a significant role in flood management retains a score of 2.75. It is 
explained by its function as coordinator and information provider in flood crisis operation. FCC 
only owns flood forecast information technology and warning dissemination facilities and does 
not run an emergency response operation.  
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5.5.2 Interaction and Coordination Analysis 
This analysis provides a picture of how BMA emergency personnel interact among themselves, 
as well as with other agencies across multiple jurisdictions and sectors. Survey questions were 
designed to collect data about how each BMA unit coordinates its actions and interacts with the 
others when responding to an emergency.  The results, interpreted and summarized in table 5.16, 
show that BMA emergency personnel prefer to interact with local response agencies. This 
finding is confirmed by BMA network analysis, which shows that local district personnel 
function as frontline emergency personnel.  Additional findings suggest that agencies such as 
FCC and CERD serve as information providers and coordinate and support major emergency 
response activities of the frontline emergency personnel operating in affected areas. This finding 
corresponds to the emergency response procedures specifying that BMA manages its emergency 
through local authorities with help and support from CERD, and from FCC in flood crisis.    
 
Table 5.16Summary of Degree of Coordination from BMA Emergency Personnel 
                       
                               LEVELS OF  
                               COORDINATION
 
BMA UNITS 
 
 
THE MOST  
FREQUENT 
 
THE SECOND  
MOST 
FREQUENT 
 
MODERATE  
FREQUENT 
 
LESS  
FREQUENT 
 
LEAST  
FREQUENT
FLOOD CONTROL CENTER LOCAL AG 
PROVINCIAL 
PRIVATE VOLUNTEERS
 
NGOS NATIONAL 
CIVIL EMERGENCY RELIEF DEPTLOCAL AG 
PROVINCIAL 
NATIONAL  NGOS 
 
VOLUNTEERS
PRIVATE 
LOCALS 
NEW ECONOMIC ZONE  
DISTRICT OFFICE 
LOCAL AG PROVINCIAL  VOLUNTEERS
LOCALS 
PRIVATE 
 
NATIONAL
NGOS 
RESIDENCE ZONE DISTRICT  
OFFICE  
LOCAL AG LOCALS 
VOLUNTEERS 
PROVINCIAL  
PRIVATE NGOS 
 
NATIONAL 
PRESERVATION ZONE  
DISTRICT OFFICE 
LOCAL AG VOLUNTEERS 
LOCALS 
NGOS 
PROVINCIAL 
PRIVATE NATIONAL 
Source: Extracted from questionnaires distributed to Bangkok Metropolitan Authority (BMA) emergency personnel; 
dated July - August 2005 
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The data collected from the survey reveal another interesting result; a network pattern 
that corresponds to the BMA network displayed in figure 5.4. For example, CERD interacts 
frequently with local and national agencies, but less so with local agencies and district 
volunteers.  This is understandable since CERD functions at the provincial level as a BMA 
central agency. District or local authorities are, in fact, the designated coordinators for local 
residents and volunteers. Likewise, the FCC works closely with local and provincial agencies to 
transfer information, but works less frequently with national agencies since they are under the 
BMA Sewerage and Drainage Department.  When the FCC interacts with national agencies, such 
as the Department of Meteorology, the Hydrographic Department of the Navy, or the Royal 
Irrigation Department, it does so through the BMA Board.  Private organizations become 
involved because their activities can be interrupted seriously if an emergency unexpectedly 
occurs.  Lastly, the district offices interact with the local level through various agencies, but also 
maintain well-connected networks of coordination that run through central and national 
emergency response agencies. 
The survey also collected data about the frequency with which emergency response 
agencies coordinate their activities. Figure 5.7 shows how BMA personnel reported the 
frequency of their coordination activities. It shows that, when their coverage areas are connected, 
district personnel interact more with provincial agencies.  This is because residential areas in 
Bangkok are more likely to spread out at the periphery and come into contact with other 
provinces.  When emergency response personnel begin to operate in such an environment, they 
are likely to ask for assistance from emergency personnel within a nearby province.  In a similar 
fashion, the New Economy Zone, which has numerous developments, construction sites, 
business activities and an extremely crowded residential area, serves as gateway for the 
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international airport.  Driven in large part by the desire to maintain airport operations, provincial 
agencies will provide the New Economy Zone with significant attention during an emergency. 
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Figure 5.7 Graph shows a mean score of organizational coordination by BMA emergency personnel 
Source: Extracted from questionnaires distributed to Bangkok Metropolitan Authority (BMA) emergency personnel; 
dated July - August 2005 
NOTE: em_org is Emergency Organization, org_cord is organizational coordination, CERD is Civil Emergency 
Relief Department, FCC is Flood Control Center, NewzDO is New Economic Zone District Offices, 
PrsvDo is Preservation Zone District Offices, RsdcDO is Residential Zone District Offices 
 
   
Even though the results report a fairly high degree (above 3.5) of coordination, I   need to 
investigate further whether there exist patterns of coordination and interaction between 
emergency response agencies.  The patterns of coordination and interaction are identified in table 
5.17.  This Table provides a clear picture of how Thailand’s emergency response agencies 
coordinate their activities.  Some of the activities coordinated amongst agencies, however, may 
simply be routine activities that would occur whether an emergency existed or not. 
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Table 5.17Summary of Degree of Interaction Patterns of BMA emergency personnel 
                             
LEVELS OF            
COORDINATION 
 
BMA UNITS 
 
 
THE MOST  
FREQUENT 
 
THE SECOND  
MOST 
FREQUENT 
 
LESS  
FREQUENT 
 
LEAST  
FREQUENT 
FLOOD CONTROL CENTER NEGOTIATION ROUTINE WORK 
 
PERSUASION 
ASSISTANCE 
COMMAND 
CIVIL EMERGENCY  
RELIEF DEPARTMENT 
ASSISTANCE ROUTINE WORK 
 
COMMAND 
PERSUASION 
NEGOTIATION 
NEW ECONOMIC ZONE 
DISTRICT OFFICE 
ROUTINE WORK COMMAND ASSISTANCE 
PERSUASION 
NEGOTIATION 
RESIDENCE ZONE  
DISTRICT OFFICE  
ASSISTANCE ROUTINE WORK 
 
COMMAND NEGOTIATION 
PERSUASION 
PRESERVATION ZONE 
DISTRICT OFFICE 
ROUTINE WORK ASSISTANCE COMMAND 
PERSUASION 
NEGOTIATION 
Source: Extracted from questionnaires distributed to Bangkok Metropolitan Authority (BMA) emergency personnel; 
dated July - August 2005 
 
The data collected from the survey reveal that the majority of interactions between the 
BMA units and other agencies take the form of routine work activities.  This reflects the 
transition of the BMA system from a traditional command and control bureaucracy to a system 
that supports complex and dynamic operations, especially in terms of emergency management.  
While the BMA has moved towards becoming a more adaptive organization, it has yet to 
embrace interactions and activities that support assistance, negotiation and persuasion.  
The FCC, however, identified negotiation as the most frequent interaction pattern that 
they are involved in.  This is explained by the data obtained from the content analysis and 
interviews, which reports that the FCC has to provide information about flood risk, and how to 
best reduce or prevent flood damage.  Water management in Thailand is extremely complicated, 
and the FCC must balance the needs of the Royal Irrigation Department, whose mission is to 
prevent drought, and the needs of the BMA, whose mission is to prevent flood emergencies.  
While these goals at times conflict with each other, the FCC operates as the primary negotiator, 
balancing the diverse needs and concerns of the parties at interest. 
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The survey data also revealed how frequently emergency response organization requested 
technical support and assistance.  This type of interaction is reported in Figure 5.8.  With the 
exception of the CERD, there are a moderate number of interactions that reflect requests for 
technical support and assistance among organizations.  The CERD has a relatively high score 
because the agency is in a relatively early stage of development, and still needs to seek expertise 
and technical support to strengthen its capability to respond to multi-hazards.  
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Figure 5.8The degrees of frequency of technical support provided to BMA emergency personnel by other 
organizations 
 
Source: Extracted from questionnaires distributed to Bangkok Metropolitan Authority (BMA) emergency personnel; 
dated July - August 2005 
NOTE: em_org is Emergency Organization, org_cord is organizational coordination, CERD is Civil Emergency 
Relief Department, FCC is Flood Control Center, NewzDO is New Economic Zone District Offices, 
PrsvDo is Preservation Zone District Offices, RsdcDO is Residential Zone District Offices 
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While the mobilization of resources and the rotation of well-trained personnel are 
expected among these types of coordination, knowledge and skills can also be transferred among 
these agencies through training.  The interviews revealed that emergency personnel prefer to 
attend multiple training programs during the year.  They believe that by participating in training 
programs, they can acquire and hone the skills they need to operate effectively in a time of crisis.  
As shown in figure 5.9, BMA emergency personnel receive training within the organization and 
are trained individually significantly more frequent than their colleagues in other agencies and 
organizations.   
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Figure 5.9Graph shows the degrees of frequency of training programs provided by the BMA 
Source: Extracted from questionnaires distributed to Bangkok Metropolitan Authority (BMA) emergency personnel; 
dated July - August 2005 
NOTE: EM_ORG is Emergency Organization, ORG_TRN is Organizational Training, INT_TRN is Inter-
organizational Training, CERD is Civil Emergency Relief Department, FCC is Flood Control Center, 
NewzDO is New Economic Zone District Offices, PrsvDo is Preservation Zone District Offices, RsdcDO is 
Residential Zone District Offices 
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This data also reveals that the emergency response system under analysis fails to provide 
adequate inter-organizational training.  The goal of inter-organizational training is to share 
information and knowledge throughout the network.  When information is shared sufficiently, 
emergency personnel operating at jurisdictional levels can quickly adapt to unforeseen problems 
as they arise.  The emergency response failures that occurred during the tsunami response were 
in large part caused by the lack of inter-organizational training, which prevented emergency 
response agencies and personnel from working together to adapt to the hazard.   
This study confirms that information sharing and efficient communication channels can 
expand the cognitive capacity of individuals and their organizations in learning to adapt to 
complex situations and to make effective decisions under pressure.  Emergency response 
personnel need information that is reliable and actionable in order to maintain command of their 
operations.  The events that occur during a state of emergency are often complex and unforeseen, 
and emergency personnel must be able to react to change and effectively adapt their response 
activities.  Unfortunately, there are situations where emergency response personnel are unable to 
communicate the information that is needed to trigger adaptation.  While training programs can 
help to reduce the occurrence of such situations, it is crucial that all emergency response 
personnel and organizations learn how to effectively manage the communication of information 
within and among organizations.  
5.5.3 Information and Communication Management Analysis 
The study analyzes how information is managed and transferred to emergency response 
personnel and organizations in Thailand.  The findings answer the question how emergency 
organizations facilitate the sharing of information through the communication channels made 
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available to them.  These findings presented in this section show how to integrate information 
sharing and communication systems into intergovernmental networks. The characteristics of 
information flow, and how information is used to support the decision making processes of 
emergency personnel operating all levels of operation for the BMA are shown in Tables 5.18 
through 5.22.  An attitude toward information used in decision making is at a moderate to high 
level for all BMA personnel. The flow of information is identified as a vertical line pattern of 
top-down and bottom-up. This pattern reflects the existence of semi-decentralized information 
flows and decision making patterns. While superiors are in charge of the operations, they are 
provided with opportunities to receive crucial information from subordinates.   
This existence of feedback loops within organizations helps decision makers to evaluate 
performance and take alternative courses of action upon the arrival when new knowledge enters 
the system.  These information flows also help policy makers identify and respond to not-yet-
identified problems.  However, the system is not without weaknesses.  The BMA must create 
lateral channels of communication so that it can ensure that information is effectively 
disseminated to all participating parties.  This is a critical element of an effective emergency 
response system because information that is shared across multiple directions is less likely to be 
controlled.  While the BMA system is moving towards becoming an adaptive organization that 
shares information, decision makers still need to learn that the organization must develop 
effective relationships, not just between superiors and their subordinates, but also among all 
emergency response agencies.    
 
 
 
 
 
 173 
Table 5.18Summary of Characteristics of Information Management, Flood Control Center 
FCC 
 
 
Information 
Flows 
directions 
 
 
 
Information 
received 
within 
organization 
 
Information 
used for 
decision 
making 
 
Decision 
making made 
in 
organization 
 
 
Rules and 
regulations 
used in 
practice 
 
Decision 
making 
participation 
 
 
Decision 
making 
accuracy 
from 
coordination 
 
N Valid 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
  Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mean 3.75 3.45 3.8 3.15 3.75 3.60 3.50
 Bottom up 
and Top 
Down  
3 4 
Chief of 
Operations 
under 
Supervision 
4 4 4
Source: Extracted from questionnaires distributed to Bangkok Metropolitan Authority (BMA) emergency personnel; 
dated July - August 2005 
 
 
 
Table 5.19 Summary of Characteristics of Information Management, Civil Emergency Relief Department 
 CERD 
 
 
Information 
Flows 
directions 
 
 
Information 
received 
within 
organization 
 
Information 
used for 
decision 
making 
 
Decision 
making 
made in 
organization 
 
Rules and 
regulations 
used in 
practice 
 
Decision 
making 
participation 
 
 
Decision 
making 
accuracy from 
coordination 
 
N Valid 44 44 44 44 44 44 44
  Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mean 4.2 3.86 4.14 2.8 4.3 4.05 3.8
Mode Bottom up 
and Top 
Down 
4 5 
Chief of 
Operations 
under 
Supervision 
5 4 4
Source: Extracted from questionnaires distributed to Bangkok Metropolitan Authority (BMA) emergency personnel; 
dated July - August 2005 
  
 
 
Table 5.20 Summary of Characteristics of Information Management, New Economy Zone District Office 
 Newz_Do 
 
 
 
Information 
Flows 
directions 
 
 
Information 
received 
within 
organization 
 
Information 
used for 
decision 
making 
 
Decision 
making 
made in 
organization 
 
Rules and 
regulations 
used in 
practice 
 
Decision 
making 
participation 
 
 
Decision 
making 
accuracy from 
coordination 
 
N Valid 35 35 35 35 35 35 35
  Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mean 3.69 3.57 3.66 2.6 3.54 3.6 3.31
Mode Bottom up 
and Top 
Down 
4 4 
Chief of 
Operations 
under 
Supervision 
4 4 4
Source: Extracted from questionnaires distributed to Bangkok Metropolitan Authority (BMA) emergency personnel; 
dated July - August 2005 
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Table 5.21 Summary of Characteristics of Information Management, Preservation Zone District Office 
 Prsv_Do 
 
 
 
Information 
Flows 
directions 
 
 
Information 
received 
within 
organization 
 
Information 
used for 
decision 
making 
 
Decision 
making 
made in 
organization 
 
Rules and 
regulations 
used in 
practice 
 
Decision 
making 
participation 
 
 
Decision 
making 
accuracy from 
coordination 
 
N Valid 28 28 28 28 28 28 28
  Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mean 3.71 3.64 4.11 2.11 3.50 3.75 3.61
Mode Bottom up 
and Top 
Down 
4 4 Throughout Organization 4 4 4
Source: Extracted from questionnaires distributed to Bangkok Metropolitan Authority (BMA) emergency personnel; 
dated July - August 2005 
 
 
Table 5.22 Summary of Characteristics of Information Management, Residence Zone District Office 
 Rsdc_Do 
 
 
 
Information 
Flows 
directions 
 
 
Information 
received 
within 
organization 
 
Information 
used for 
decision 
making 
 
Decision 
making 
made in 
organization 
 
Rules and 
regulations 
used in 
practice 
 
Decision 
making 
participation 
 
 
Decision 
making 
accuracy from 
coordination 
 
N Valid 64 64 64 64 64 64 64
  Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mean 4.53 3.83 4.08 3.16 4.06 3.80 3.84
Mode Bottom up 
and Top 
Down 
3 4 
 
Throughout 
Organization 
 
4 4 4
Source: Extracted from questionnaires distributed to Bangkok Metropolitan Authority (BMA) emergency personnel; 
dated July - August 2005 
 
 
Although the BMA tends to have a decentralized pattern of information flow and its 
personnel are willing to give and receive critical information, it is important that the information 
being shared corresponds to the needs of emergency personnel confronting the problems of a 
disaster.  Sometimes, action must be taken without sufficient knowledge.  This is where rules and 
regulations play a crucial role in shaping the responsibilities and activities of emergency 
personnel.  In a state of emergency, personnel who have less knowledge and experience cannot 
make informed and accurate judgments or decisions.  As the interviews revealed, when such a 
situation arises, emergency personnel turn to laws, rules and regulation as guidelines for action. 
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Bars show Means
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Figure 5.10 Graph shows the degrees of frequency of communication by BMA emergency personnel 
Source: Extracted from questionnaires distributed to Bangkok Metropolitan Authority (BMA) emergency personnel; 
dated July - August 2005 
NOTE: em_org is Emergency Organization, org_cmm is Organizational Communication, CERD is Civil Emergency 
Relief Department, FCC is Flood Control Center, NewzDO is New Economic Zone District Offices, PrsvDo 
is Preservation Zone District Offices, RsdcDO is Residential Zone District Offices 
 
 
Table 5.23Summary of Characteristics of Communication Pattern, BMA emergency personnel 
 BMA 
 
 
Communicatio
n through field 
operation 
 
Communication 
through resource 
& info transfer 
 
Communication 
through regular 
meeting 
 
Communicatio
n through 
personal 
pleasure 
 
Communication 
through official 
document 
 
Communicatio
n through 
training 
 
N Valid 159 159 159 159 159 159
  Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mean 3.90 2.54 2.79 1.81 3.12 2.42
Median 5 2 3 1 4 3
    Source: Extracted from questionnaires distributed to Bangkok Metropolitan Authority (BMA) emergency 
personnel; dated July - August 2005 
 
 176 
As indicated by Figure 5.10 and Table 5.23, BMA emergency personnel frequently 
communicate with other organization through field operations and official documents.  These 
communication channels correspond to the previous finding: that the BMA is transitioning 
towards becoming a more decentralized, adaptive organization.  While it retains strong 
characteristics of a traditional bureaucracy that implements policies through plans, formal 
structures and official activities, BMA understands the need to develop a robust, adaptive 
capacity to respond to emergencies.  This transition is reflected in how the BMA communicates 
information during emergency response activities; emphasizes cooperation, and accepts the need 
to understand the knowledge, responsibilities and activities of other response agencies.  If the 
BMA continues this pattern of transformation, it will be in a better position to respond to future 
disasters, whether they come in the form of tsunami, flood or massive accident.    
 Apart from patterns of communication paths, an important question centers on the 
equipment that emergency personnel use to communicate the critical information.  In the 
accident that generated a fire and a subsequent building collapse, emergency personnel chose to 
make contact each other via cell phones rather than through the emergency radio network. 
Interviews conducted with personnel involved in this scenario revealed that, when an unexpected 
accident or consequence occurs, the human-cognitive decision making process often directs the 
actor to utilize tools that are most familiar, in this case a cell phone.  However, there are other 
practical reasons why emergency personnel may not elect to use tools such as the emergency 
radio network. In chaotic situations, people tend to seek assistance from individuals or 
organizations that they believe will actually respond.  Cell phones help to reassure people that 
when they place a call for assistance, information about their location and needs will be quickly 
passed along to the appropriate emergency response personnel.  
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Table 5.24 demonstrates that a wide range of communication technology and equipment 
is used to coordinate the activities of BMA personnel.  Each of these technologies, however, 
comes with certain limitations that can reduce communication.  For example, as discussed 
earlier, the DDPM emergency personnel surveys revealed that, while cell phones are convenient 
and handy in large-scale states of emergency, cellular networks often become congested and 
unavailable.  The Civil Defense Volunteer Units report that low frequency radios such as walky-
talkies are effective, but can create problems when their personnel operate outside the 
transmission range of the devices.  Alternatively, each District Office possesses special VHF 
radios, which communicate throughout the BMA radio network without having to rely upon 
repeaters.  In the event of an emergency, this radio can shorten communication paths between 
decision-makers and front-line responders. However, this radio can only be used when 
authorized by the District Deputy.  Given these limitations, it is important that emergency 
response personnel do not rely on any single form of technology or equipment to ensure 
communication.    
 
Table 5.24Summary of Characteristics of Communication Channels, BMA emergency personnel 
  
Low frequency 
radio 
 
 
High frequency 
radio 
 
 
 
Cellphone 
 
 
 
GPS and GIS applications 
and equipments 
 
 
Sattelite 
communication 
 
 
Other 
equipments 
 
 
N Valid 159 158 159 159 159 158
  Missing 0 1 0 0 0 1
Mean 3.59 2.58 4.34 .97 .49 .39
Median 5.00 3.00 5.00 .00 .00 .00
    Source: Extracted from questionnaires distributed to Bangkok Metropolitan Authority (BMA) emergency 
personnel; dated July - August 2005 
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This study suggests that steps must be taken to ensure the more effective use of 
communications technology and equipment.  The solution may not depend upon the adoption of 
expensive and sophisticated technology.  While these tools provide amazing capabilities, 
emergency personnel are unlikely to operate facilities and equipment through satellite phones 
and applications such as Global Positioning System (GPS) and Geographical Information System 
(GIS).  This leaves three low cost alternatives: low frequency radio used by small local networks; 
high frequency radio used by HAM or amateur networks; and VHF radio networks used by 
public and private organizations.  It is therefore critical for the BMA to develop a plan that will 
integrate these low cost and readily available methods of communication into a unified 
communication network that can facilitate the spread of information during a state of emergency. 
5.6 CONCLUSION 
Data collected through participant observation, interviews, and surveys, offer informed 
insight into how Bangkok’s government manages emergency response operations.    Data 
contained in this chapter revealed how the BMA works to coordinate and interact with other 
emergency response agencies, as well as other governmental and non-governmental 
organizations.  The analyses of the BMA radio network in particular, identified the important 
roles that information sharing and communication channels play in the decision making process.  
In order for the BMA to design an effective emergency response plan, it must learn to organize 
emergency personnel and organizations according to function, geography, and areas of expertise.  
Despite only moderate levels of technical infrastructure available to support the management of a 
crisis, Bangkok’s emergency response organizations are starting to develop self-adaptive 
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capabilities.  This is demonstrated by the fact that emergency personnel in Bangkok pay close 
attention to developing inter-organizational coordination, communication networks, and 
processes of information sharing. 
Bangkok’s emergency response organization is beginning to develop auto-adaptive 
characteristics.  Before moving forward, we must take a moment to examine the past.   Chapter 
Four[??] identified the lessons that were learned during the emergency response activities in the 
wake of the December 26, 2004 tsunami, and Chapter Five identified lessons from the flood 
crisis and massive accidents managed by BMA emergency agencies. These events allow a 
comparison of their advantages and disadvantages as a basis for strategies to improve emergency 
management in Thailand. Such a comparison under nested analysis reveals the gaps that exist 
within Thailand’s national emergency response system and documents the need to design a 
scalable coordinating operation. Chapter 6 will analyze the emergency operations managed by 
national, provincial, and local personnel, and will make specific recommendations as to how 
Thailand’s government can move its emergency response system towards an auto-adaptive 
future. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 180 
6.0  NESTED ANALYSIS OF THAILAND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 
Emergency management in Thailand is reflected in this study through an exploratory study of 
three cases: 1) the 2004 tsunami, 2) flooding in the Bangkok Metropolitan Area, and 3) a 
massive accident within a district of the Bangkok Metropolitan Authority. Case study research 
examines a set of actors bounded in time or place and the contextual material about the setting of 
the case. Creswell (1998) emphasized the use of within-case and cross-case analysis to identify 
the lessons learned. This study takes into account not only these two dimensions of analysis, but 
also the relationships among cases. The tie or relationship among the two core actors, the 
Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation (DDPM) and Bangkok Metropolitan 
Authority (BMA) in three cases illustrates the concept of a “nested-set case study”. The “nested 
analysis” focuses on the levels of analysis among the units under study. . Nested design exploits 
cross-unit variation and analysis to elucidate the features of an individual unit rather than 
examining an individual unit to explain a more general phenomenon (Coppedge, Lieberman 
2002). Inquiry into each case in the nested design seeks to identify the positive and negative 
factors in implementing the emergency plan of each core agency, and to examine the 
effectiveness of intergovernmental coordination which ties all cases and analyses together in a 
coherent emergency operation. 
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As discussed earlier, this study examines performance for single-unit and multiple-unit 
emergency operations. Nested analysis allows the exploration of not only a comparison of 
performance between core emergency units, but also strategies by which   core units can work 
together more effectively. Advantages and disadvantages revealed   in all three cases contribute 
to methods of improving emergency response and enhancing the capabilities of emergency 
response agencies.  Emergency response agencies at all three jurisdictional levels operate under 
the same Civil Defense Act 1979 and are supervised by the Minister of Interior for each scale of 
emergency. Provincial DPM and Bangkok district offices team their emergency personnel with 
Civil Defense Volunteer Units (CDVU) to work at the frontline in emergency situations. These 
collaborative actions reflect levels of shared goals and direction in coordinating emergency 
responses. Nested analysis allows comparison among the three cases of emergency response and 
relates the analysis to the criteria for scalable emergency management, critical to 
intergovernmental coordination under states of emergency. As a result, the analyses will 
contribute to identifying the factors needed to improve Thailand’s emergency management.     
As discussed in chapter 2, this study focuses on socio-technical components as crucial 
factors of effectiveness in managing emergency response. This study shows how the interaction 
of socio-technical components  differ among the three cases of  emergency response and how 
these differences  explain gaps  in performance among  the three levels of emergency operations. 
These gaps identify the states of effectiveness at each level of emergency response operations 
and illustrate how lessons learned from the analyses of each level may be used to improve 
performance for the entire emergency response system in Thailand.  
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6.1 SOCIO-TECHNICAL COMPONENTS IN EMERGENCY RESPONSE SYSTEMS  
This study uses Comfort’s model in her book, Shared Risk, (1999), to explain the existing 
emergency model in Thailand. This study applies three sets of indicators, technical structure, 
organizational flexibility, and cultural openness, to identify the type of emergency management 
in three cases of emergency response operations. The set of cases includes: 1) December 26, 
2006 tsunami in the southern Thailand; 2) Bangkok Metropolitan Authority’s response to flood 
crisis; and 3) district response to massive accidents. The three components are critical to the 
effectiveness of emergency response because under a state of emergency, every participating 
agency needs its full capabilities to adapt to unexpected events as well as to make timely, 
informed decisions. In doing so, emergency personnel need sufficient technical infrastructure to 
conduct  emergency operations, extensive organizational support,  flexibility in implementing 
their operations, and cooperative cultural openness among multiple emergency agencies to 
perform multiple tasks. The combination of characteristics for the three components is later used 
to identify the state of the emergency response system as non-adaptive, emergent-adaptive, 
operative-adaptive, or auto-adaptive. In this study, Comfort’s three sets of indicators have been 
modified and quantified into variables recoded as “socio-technical components,” as discussed in 
factor analysis in chapter 4.  
In a comparative aspect, at the national level, emergency response agencies confronted 
the devastation of the tsunami with low levels of technical structure, organizational flexibility, 
and cultural openness, classified as a non-adaptive system. Bangkok Metropolitan Authority’s 
emergency response agencies perform their emergency operations with higher levels of the three 
components, which illustrate an emergent adaptive system. Interestingly, the district level 
operations, with volunteer units and minimal training are characterized as somewhat both a non-
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adaptive and an emergent adaptive system. Although the degree of socio-technical components 
of district emergency operations is not significantly different from the national system, 
experience in confronting with emergencies and familiarity with the area for a long time helps to 
build a fundamental knowledge base needed to improve its emergency response. This study 
examined the significant factors needed to improve the existing emergency management systems 
of both national and local levels from states of non-adaptive and emergent-adaptive to auto-
adaptive. Such adaptive capacity and system performance will be analyzed from the perspective 
of individual as well as cooperative performance in emergency operations. The socio-technical 
components are shown as follows. 
 
Table 6.1Socio-Technical Matrices 
 
  I. Organizational Flexibility 
Component 
 
II. Technical Infrastructure 
Component    
 
III. Cultural Openness  
       Component 
 
National emergency laws 
 
Providing risk assessment 
 
Shared value of humanitarian 
assistance 
Special emergency regulations 
 
Designing and assigning building 
codes 
Commitment to goal of protecting 
life 
Emergency integrated 
response plans 
Structural inspection 
 
Willingness to share information 
needed 
Emergency commands and 
coordination 
Alternative communication 
 
Acceptance of new information 
 
Emergency inter-organization 
for communities 
Alternative electrical facilities 
 
Openness to new methods 
 
Emergency inter-organization 
for agencies 
Special emergency operation and 
equipment 
Willingness to review actions taken 
 
Multi-ways of information 
exchange between agencies 
Identification of major facilities 
 
Willingness to correct mistakes, 
solve conflicts 
Multi-ways of information 
exchange across sectors 
Alternative rescue or emergency 
response 
Willingness to accept responsibility 
 
Trained professional managers 
on duty 
Self technical manual procedure 
 
Willingness to service public 
 
Trained reserved personnel on 
recall 
Other technical support 
 
Continual search for relevant, 
accurate info 
Average point of organization 
flexibility 
Average point of technical 
infrastructure 
Average point of cultural openness 
 
Source: Group of questions in a survey given to emergency personnel in Thailand, July – August 2005 
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I will later discuss how to develop an approach for an auto-adaptive emergency response 
system, using the concept of intergovernmental management supporting collaboration among 
emergency units at national, metropolitan, and district levels. The goal is to develop   scalable 
emergency management for the entire country. 
Socio-technical components shown in Table 6.1 are categorized and quantified using an 
ordinal scale from 1 to 5 in the structured questionnaires distributed to all emergency personnel, 
as described in Chapter 3. The mean value of the indicators for each component is calculated to 
extract a single score to represent the level of organizational complexity, technical infrastructure 
and cultural openness for each respondent.  I computed the average mean scores for all three 
components by summing the three sets of indicators, and generated an average mean score of 
perceived performance on the socio-technical indicators. This single measure of a socio-technical 
mean score is used to compare the existing level of perceived performance among groups of 
emergency personnel. I identified four groups of emergency personnel as Civil Emergency 
Defense Department (CERD), Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation (DDPM), field 
personnel of district offices, and field personnel of the DDPM. As shown in Chapter Five, 
emergency personnel at headquarters or central command have different characteristics in 
performance than field personnel. The perspectives regarding the focal point of emergency 
response operations also differ.  The Bangkok administration is more likely to have control over 
its agencies and CERD personnel, unlike the DPM field personnel who serve under the 
provincial government and are supported by headquarters and regional centers.  
Figure 6.1 presents the summary of mean scores for the three socio-technical components 
and the sum of mean scores for the set of socio-technical components to show the comparison 
among different levels of operation of emergency personnel. As shown in the graph of mean 
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scores for each socio-technical component, DPM at headquarters is perceived to have a lower 
level of technical infrastructure than CERD. This finding is explained by DPM’s function as a 
policy maker, planner, and coordinator in emergency management, rather than providing 
technical support and field assistance as CERD does.  Under states of emergency in Bangkok, 
where DPM headquarters is based, CERD and district officers (DO) are emergency personnel in 
charge and on duty.   Headquarters and central agencies are perceived to have a higher degree of 
organizational flexibility, since they function as coordinators of assistance. Field emergency 
personnel in Thailand are still directed through command and control and decisions regarding 
performance are mostly made by superiors at the central command center or local command 
posts.     
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Figure 6.1 Graph shows a summary of socio-technical components of emergency personnel 
Source: Extracted from questionnaires distributed to Thailand emergency personnel; dated July - August 2005 
NOTE: CERD is Civil Emergency Relief Department, DPM_HQ is Disaster Prevention and Mitigation at 
Headquarter, BMA_Fld is Field District Officer, DDPM_Fld is Field Disaster Prevention and Mitigation.  
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Cultural openness becomes more interesting since it gains the highest score and differs 
significantly from other socio-technical components. Emergency personnel become aware of the 
risk they confront because of the frequent occurrence of natural and manmade hazards, and 
acquire skillful knowledge needed to cope with emergency operations. They become more open 
to new information and lessons learned from the past. CERD, in turn, is different because these 
personnel function in two roles in emergency operations, as coordinators and field support 
personnel. More importantly, CERD is relatively new to multi-hazards operations and members 
realize they need to be trained for these operations by experts in different fields as well as their 
colleagues who have more experience in such operations. 
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Figure 6.2 Graph shows mean scores of a sum of socio-technical components ofThailand emergency response 
systems by units of operations 
 
Source: Extracted from questionnaires distributed to Thailand emergency personnel; dated July - August 2005 
NOTE: CERD is Civil Emergency Relief Department, DPM_HQ is Disaster Prevention and Mitigation at 
Headquarter, BMA_Fld is Field District Officer, DDPM_Fld is Field Disaster Prevention and Mitigation.  
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The mean scores of socio-technical component, reported in Figure 6.2, show that all field 
personnel recognize the need for change in emergency response operations. This need concerns 
not only the safety of the public, but also the lives of emergency personnel. Lessons learned from 
losses sustained in the tsunami response and building collapse in Bangkok reflect the need for 
more skills, knowledge, information and equipment for emergency personnel to be able to 
function on individual tasks as well as coordinated ones. As also shown, mean scores on socio-
technical characteristics for field emergency personnel are low.  
In contrast, there is a significant difference in mean scores between CERD and DDPM.  
This difference can be explained by different functions in practice for the two central agencies. 
CERD functions as a coordinator and provider of information and technical support, and in a 
large scale event, CERD is a field supervisor or one of the unified commanders. CERD also has 
its own emergency response personnel who can assist in field operations. DDPM, on the other 
hand, functions as a strategic body for emergency response which designs policies, assigns 
action plans, and coordinates training programs. DDPM at headquarters participates less in 
emergency operations. With this difference, CERD has a higher mean score not only in 
perceived overall socio-technical performance, but also among each element of the emergency 
response system. 
Interestingly, DDPM Headquarters’ authority and responsibility are similar to Bangkok 
Metropolitan Administration in policy making and resources distribution rather than being 
central emergency personnel like CERD. DDPM field personnel who work under provincial 
governors have the same function as CERD. They both coordinate actions of the provincial 
government and local authorities. A significant difference is the authority structure. CERD is 
under the structure of BMA as an agency with line authority, while provincial DPM operate 
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under provincial governors as an auxiliary unit. This difference in authority makes it difficult for 
provincial DPM to coordinate city, district, and sub-district personnel in emergency operations 
without strong support from the governors.     
A comparative approach distinguishes between emergency agencies at headquarters or 
central office and field personnel, and also focuses on the integration of central and field 
agencies in an emergency response system. DDPM emergency response has a lower degree of 
perceived socio-technical performance. This finding was also confirmed by the content analysis 
that shows a more densely connected network of emergency response for BMA than DDPM, 
discussed in previous chapters. In the tsunami response, regional and provincial DPM functioned 
under the provincial governors facing an unknown situation and unfamiliar consequences. Lack 
of information to support action combined with diminished trust by the Command Center in their 
skills and experience resulted in less flexibility for frontline personnel to make decisions and 
mobilize their resources. A large scale of devastation increases difficulty in operations because 
regional and provincial DPM personnel have not trained together for coordination and operation 
across jurisdictions, especially without an effective communication channel. 
With stronger interconnections, CERD functions more effectively with a higher degree of 
flexibility. CERD also covers less area and has fewer local units.  BMA has field officers who 
have worked in emergency field operations for a decade longer than DDPM personnel. The 
emergency structure of BMA, operating through the CERD and district offices, increases the 
degree of organizational flexibility by having BMA serve as the top decision maker and direct 
emergency operations as needed or when the degree of severity increases. CERD functions as a 
linking pin of the operation as well as assisting when requested under the pre-planned procedures 
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in the action plans. This structure allows the district offices to direct their frontline emergency 
personnel and volunteers to work under states of emergency more effectively and systematically.  
To assess the effects of the socio-technical components on emergency response, I 
collected data on the readiness of emergency response agencies to cope with unexpected events. 
I sought their perceptions regarding the sufficiency of resources, manpower, training, and 
knowledge that they have received and whether the availability of resources and training affected 
their performance. I used the data collected from field personnel to conduct a regression analysis 
of the perceived socio-technical components and the performance of emergency agencies.  
The degree of public awareness of an emergency agency’s performance is considered a 
factor driving cultural openness. Public awareness and recognition of emergency personnel 
increased after the tsunami devastation and massive accidents in Bangkok. Public awareness 
pushed the national and provincial governments to commit to improving emergency 
management. This recognition reinforced the efforts of emergency personnel to maintain a 
higher standard of performance for the public and their own safety.  Support for enhancing 
emergency response performance comes from both top-down and bottom-up directions that can 
be effectively implemented by all parties.  
Figure 6.3 shows the degree of emergency response performance, readiness to confront 
unexpected events, and public recognition of the performance of the emergency organizations. 
Data are reported from surveys and interviews at every level of management for the four groups 
of emergency personnel.  The degree of public recognition of emergency response performance 
in Bangkok is higher than that for DDPM, because the national government is drawing attention 
to the establishment of the National Disaster Warning Center of Thailand and the international 
fund for the establishment of a Regional Disaster Warning Center or Indian Ocean Tsunami 
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Warning Center.  The indirect impact of the tsunami devastation has been to increase the level of 
awareness regarding how little Thai people know about disaster risk reduction and realization of 
the need to increase their capacity to adapt and confront such disaster risk.  
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Figure 6.3 Summary of mean scores of emergency personnel’s organizational performance, organizational readiness 
to unexpected event and public recognition of Thailand emergency personnel 
 
Source: Extracted from questionnaires distributed to Thailand emergency personnel; dated July - August 2005 
NOTE: EM_ORG is Emergency Organization, ORG_PERF is Organizational Performance, ORG_UNEX is 
Organizational Readiness to Confront with Unexpected Events, PUB_RECG is Public Recognition, CERD 
is Civil Emergency Relief Department, DPM_HQ is Disaster Prevention and Mitigation at Headquarter, 
FieldDO is Field District Officer, FiledDPM is Field Disaster Prevention and Mitigation.  
 
A direct impact of the tsunami disaster was to focus attention on disaster warning, rather 
than improving disaster management and emergency response system as the first priority. Once a 
warning system is activated, disaster still occurs and states of emergency are still activated for 
personnel to respond. This is a weakness of the situation of Thailand.  The moment that DDPM 
activates a warning system for disaster anywhere in the country, the agency has less support to 
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develop its capabilities to manage disaster and states of emergency. DDPM is functioning as 
coordinator when their members are supposed to work as front line emergency personnel 
This study suggests that co-training programs can pool expertise from other emergency 
agencies and outside expert organizations by engaging in related activities. Bangkok emergency 
personnel are trained by DDPM academy which brings in experts from various emergency 
institutions such as Pacific Disaster Center (PDC) and Asian Disaster Preparedness Center 
(ADPC). There is still a wide gap in the integration of emergency operations between the two 
systems. It is recorded by documentary analysis that BMA sent two emergency response teams 
of CERD into the affected area around Phuket and PhangNga to help search and rescue 
operations, yet none of the records indicated coordination or interaction between CERD units 
and DDPM local agencies. Until December 31, 2004 the operations report of the CERD deputy 
verify that CERD units were operating at one of the local shelters at BanNumKem Municipality 
in PhangNga province.     
There is a high possibility that BMA has to request assistance from DDPM if a large 
scale of disaster occurs. The other example is the possibility that a disaster may occur in the area 
of two provinces. Both BMA and DDPM are authorized to manage emergency response in such 
an affected area together. Lessons learned from the tsunami response and building collapse 
incidents are that multiple agencies work at their highest potential when they understand the 
others’ operations and have experience in coordinating and interacting with each other in 
practice.  
I analyzed the effects of socio-technical components on organizational performance and 
organizational readiness to unexpected events using factor analysis and multivariate regression. 
SPSS statistics in the tables below show the regression results. Data have been tested for normal 
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distribution and linearity. Data screening, recoding, and mean replacement, are done prior to 
factor analysis and linear regression analysis to meet the assumptions of normality and validity.    
I present the regression analysis in two dimensions. First, the analysis examines the 
relationship between socio-technical components and dependent variables. The variables of 
organizational performance and organizational readiness to unexpected event are examined 
without categorizing them as indicators of organizational flexibility, technical infrastructure, and 
cultural openness. The analysis computed a mean score, single value, of all components and uses 
it as socio-technical component value. The second aspect of the analysis identifies each group of 
socio-technical components to estimate the degrees of their relationships with the dependent 
variables. Tables 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4 present regression analyses of socio-technical components and 
organizational performance in the order discussed above.     
6.1.1 Organizational Performance and Socio-Technical Component 
6.1.1.1 Socio-Technical Component (Overall) 
From the statistical analysis of survey data, the regression model of organizational performance 
on the socio-technical components is significant at level of 0.01, which is considered very high. 
Emergency personnel consider their performance to have a significant correlation with socio-
technical components. From the interviews, emergency personnel are well aware of the needs of 
socio and technical components to help them perform their tasks to accomplish their goals and 
enable them to learn new methods and improve their performance. They realize that they have 
less knowledge, skill, and tools to help them do their operations effectively. They expressed their 
need for technical support as well as organizational and cultural assistance.   
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Table 6.2 Regression Analysis of Socio-technical Component and Organizational Performance of Thailand 
emergency personnel 
  
Descriptive Statistics 
  Mean Std. Deviation N 
Organization performance 2.94 .793 331 
MnSocTch 2.9017 .38734 331 
 
Model Summary 
Model R 
R 
Square 
Adjus
ted R Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .3
95(a) 
.1
56 .154 .730 
a  Predictors: (Constant), MnSocTch 
ANOVA(b) 
Model   
Sum of 
quares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 32.454 1 32.454 60.939 .000(a)
  Residual 175.214 329 .533    
  Total 207.668 330     
      a  Predictors: (Constant), MnSocTch 
      b  Dependent Variable: Organization performance 
 
Coefficients(a) 
Model   
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
    B Std. Error Beta     
1 (Constant) .587 .304  1.934 .054
  MnSocTch .810 .104 .395 7.806 .000
      a  Dependent Variable: Organization performance 
 
Source: Data collected from survey distributed to Thailand emergency personnel; dated July - August 2005 
NOTE: MnSocTch is Socio-Technical Component (mean score of a sum of Organizational Flexibility, Technical 
Infrastructure, and Cultural Openness) 
 
Regression model (shown in Table 6.2) 
Organizational Performance = 0.587 + 0.810Socio-Tehcial Component 
 
As discussed earlier, this study also seeks to explain the relationships between 
organizational performance and the three socio-technical components. The analysis shows a 
positive relationship between organizational performance and socio-technical component. As the 
level of socio-technical capability increases, so to does the level of the organizational 
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performance. The analysis also shows the real needs of Thailand emergency personnel when they 
report which factors affect their performance. Table 6.3 below presents a regression analysis of 
organizational performance and organizational flexibility, technical infrastructure, and cultural 
openness.  
6.1.1.2 Socio-Technical Component (By category) 
 
Regression model (shown in Table 6.3) 
Organizational Performance = 0.576 + 0.339 Organizational Flexibility + 0.214 
Technical Infrastructure + 0.259 Cultural 
Openness 
 
From the statistical analysis of the survey data, the regression model of organizational 
performance and the socio-technical components is significant at level of 0.01, which is 
considered high. Emergency personnel view their performance as having a significant correlation 
with all three socio-technical components at different degrees. From the regression analysis, 
organizational flexibility has the highest degree of positive relationship with organizational 
performance, cultural openness is second, and technical infrastructure has the lowest degree of 
relationship. From the interviews, emergency personnel consider change and new knowledge as 
necessary tools for them to operate. The awareness of disaster and emergency has emerged the 
recognition of learning the unknown. However, they consider that their performance 
effectiveness can change if the organizations provide more flexibility for them to improve. 
 Emergency personnel in both DDPM and BMA are looking for incentives in terms of 
more access to useful training programs, resource availability, and reliable information sharing to 
make decisions with the support of their superiors. Such decisions, from their perspective, need 
to have sufficient information in order for them to make more appropriate decisions that may 
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affect safety of lives. They view support from organizational top management as crucial to their 
overall performance. They indicate that superiors should also recognize the importance of 
changes and support their improvement with both financial and non-financial benefits. 
 
Table 6.3 Regression Analysis of Organizational Performance and Organizational Flexibility, Technical 
Infrastructure, and Cultural Openness 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Organization performance 2.94 .793 331 
OrgFlxSs 2.8192 .46004 331 
TchStrSs 2.6725 .48838 331 
CultOpSs 3.2134 .48006 331 
 
Model Summary 
Change Statistics 
Mo 
del R 
R  
Square 
Adjusted 
Square 
Std. Error 
of 
Estimate 
R  
Square 
Change
F 
Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
 Change 
1 .397(a) .158 .150 .731 .158 20.379 3 327 .000 
a  Predictors: (Constant), CultOpSs, TchStrSs, OrgFlxSs 
ANOVA(b) 
Mode  
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 32.711 3 10.904 20.379 .000(a) 
Residual 174.957 327 .535   
1 
Total 207.668 330    
       a  Predictors: CultOpSs, TchStrSs, OrgFlxSs, b  Dependent Variable: Organization performance 
Coefficients(a) 
Unstandardized Coefficien
Standardized 
Coefficients
Mode  B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) .576 .309  1.863 .063 
OrgFlxSs .339 .111 .196 3.041 .003 
TchStrSs .214 .102 .132 2.108 .036 
1 
CultOpSs .259 .099 .157 2.623 .009 
 
Source: Data collected from survey distributed to Thailand emergency personnel; dated July - August 2005 
NOTE: OrgFlxSs is a sum of mean scores of Organizational Flexibility, TchStrSs is a sum of mean scores of 
Technical Infrastructure, and CultOpSs is a sum of mean score of Cultural Openness  
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The regression model shows that socio-technical components do, in fact, play a 
significant role in organizational performance. The R square value of the model is relatively low 
because the sample size of the survey is large with a lot of variance. The survey was conducted 
with all emergency personnel around the country under different jurisdictions. The nested case 
design is complex.  Thailand emergency management has three levels of primary players which 
are DDPM, BMA and CERD, and the District emergency team. As discussed in chapters 4 and 5, 
DPM headquarters, regional centers, provincial personnel, BMA central agency CERD, and 
Field District Officers differ by their characteristics and structure of emergency operations. Thus, 
the R square value for the entire system is compounded by the errors at each level of 
performance.  
To check the argument made above, I ran a regression analysis for specific groups of 
emergency personnel. Tables 6.4-6.7 present regression analyses of organizational performance 
and socio-technical component of emergency personnel. The results explain in which states of 
the emergency response system each emergency service worker operates and offer insights into 
how to improve its operation.  
 
Table 6.4 Regression Model Summary of Organizational Performance and Socio-Technical Component of Civil 
Emergency Relief Department 
 
N R R Square Adjusted R Square Significant 
39 0.578 0.334 0.277 0.002 
Source: Data collected  from survey  distributed to Thailand emergency personnel (all levels); dated July - August 2005 
 
Regression model of the Civil Emergency Relief Department (CERD) 
Socio-Technical Component (By category) 
 
Organizational Performance = -1.3 + 0.68 Organizational Flexibility + 0.1 Technical 
Infrastructure + 0.65 Cultural Openness 
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Table 6.5 Regression Model Summary of Organizational Performance and Socio-Technical Component of District 
Emergency Personnel 
 
N R R Square Adjusted R Square Significant 
90 0.118 0.014 0.021 0.75 (not significant) 
Source: Data collected from survey distributed to Thailand emergency personnel; dated July - August 2005 
 
Regression model of the District Offices (DO), not statistically significant 
Socio-Technical Component (By category) 
 
Organizational Performance = 2.67 - 0.152 Organizational Flexibility + 0.24 Technical 
Infrastructure + 0.05 Cultural Openness 
 
 
 
Table 6.6 Regression Model Summary of Organizational Performance and Socio-Technical Component of 
Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Headquarters Emergency Personnel 
  
N R R Square Adjusted R Square Significant 
35 0.605 0.367 0.305 0.002 
Source: Data collected from survey distributed to Thailand emergency personnel; dated July - August 2005 
 
Regression model of the Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Headquarters  
Socio-Technical Component (By category) 
 
Organizational Performance = -0.03 + 0.893 Organizational Flexibility + 0.02 Technical 
Infrastructure + 0.16 Cultural Openness 
 
 
 
Table 6.7 Regression Model Summary of Organizational Performance and Socio-Technical Component of 
Provincial Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation (Field) Emergency Personnel 
 
N R R Square Adjusted R Square Significant 
88 0.434 0.188 0.159 0.001 
Source: Extracted from questionnaires distributed to Thailand emergency personnel; dated July - August 2005 
 
Regression model of the Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation (Provincial) 
Socio-Technical Component (By category) 
 
Organizational Performance = -0.005 + 0.595 Organizational Flexibility + 0.1 Technical 
Infrastructure + 0.261 Cultural Openness 
 
 
 198 
From regression analysis of all emergency personnel on their perceived relationships 
between their organizational performance and socio-technical components, the results reported 
that CERD as a provincial authority under BMA expressed their need for organizational 
flexibility and cultural openness. CERD is well equipped since they transfer all resources with 
them when they moved from the Fire Department. Although the zone-integrated-regression 
model is not significant,, all regression models are statistically significant when the regression 
analysis was run separately for each zone.. District personnel in the New Economic Zone view 
technical infrastructure (Coefficient = 1.136) as the first priority which confirms earlier findings 
that this zone needs more attention on emergency operations, apart from other problems with 
which they are coping. District personnel in the Preservation Zone expressed their concern for 
cultural openness (Coefficient = 0.559) as the first priority. The area is the center for important 
organizations and BMA focuses attention on having District personnel sufficiently well-equipped 
and flexible to enable them to make immediate decisions. Lastly, District personnel in the 
Resident Zone reported their greatest concern to be organizational flexibility (Coefficient = 
0.681).  Many residential structures are located in the area with a large population that needs 
extremely effective emergency operations and timely informed decisions.  
When the interviews were conducted, emergency personnel viewed their emergency 
response operations as one part of their performance. They consider other routine tasks they 
perform as part of how they evaluate their performance. I examined the readiness of the 
emergency response agencies to cope unexpected events to see whether the socio-technical 
components are significant for the level of readiness of emergency personnel.  
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6.1.2 Organizational Readiness to Confront with Unexpected Event and Socio-Technical 
Component 
6.1.2.1 Socio-Technical Component (Overall) 
 
Table 6.8 Regression Analysis of Socio-technical Component and Organizational Readiness for Unexpected Events 
of Thailand emergency personnel 
 
  
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Organization 
unexpected event 2.74 .659 310 
MnSocTch 2.9093 .37872 310 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .392(a) .153 .151 .608 
a  Predictors: (Constant), MnSocTch 
 
ANOVA 
Model  
Sum of 
Squares 
 
 Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 20.594 1 20.594 55.779 .000(a) 
Residual 113.716 308 .369   
1 
Total 134.310 309    
a  Predictors: (Constant), MnSocTch, b  Dependent Variable: Organization unexpected event 
 
Coefficients 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Model  B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) .752 .268  2.810 .005 1 
M
nSocTch 
.6
82 
.0
91 .392 
7.
469 
.0
00 
       a  Dependent Variable: Organization unexpected event 
 
 
Source: Data collected from a survey distributed to Thailand emergency personnel; dated July - August 2005 
NOTE: MnSocTch is Socio-Technical Component (mean score of a sum of Organizational Flexibility, Technical 
Infrastructure, and Cultural Openness) 
 
 
 
 200 
Regression model (shown in Table 6.8) 
Socio-Technical Components (Overall) 
 
Organizational Readiness = 0.752 + 0.682Socio-Technical Component 
 
From the statistical analysis of survey data, the regression model of organizational 
readiness and the socio-technical components is significant at the level of 0.01. Emergency 
personnel consider their readiness to be significantly correlated with socio-technical component. 
From the interviews, emergency personnel are well aware of their social and technical needs to 
help them react and respond more effectively to states of emergency and unexpected 
consequences. They realize that they have less knowledge, skill, and tools to help them adapt to 
rapid change effectively. Notably, a constant value of this model, 0.752, is higher than the one, 
0.576, in organizational model. This reflects the realization of the emergency personnel that they 
need to be more alert when states of emergency occur, and better prepared for unexpected 
consequences.   
Interestingly, the coefficient value of socio-technical component in this model, 0.682, is 
lower than the coefficient value, 0.810, in organizational performance model.  This is explained 
by the discussion above that emergency personnel view their performance broader and cover a 
wider range of tasks than a readiness to confront with unexpected events, which require higher 
degree of support from policy makers and superior in the organizations. To support this 
argument, I also examined how each socio-technical component contributes to organizational 
readiness to confront unexpected events. Regression analysis tested the relationship between 
organizational readiness and the three socio-technical components:   organizational flexibility, 
technical infrastructure, and cultural openness. 
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6.1.2.2 Socio-Technical Component (by category) 
 
Table 6.9 Regression Analysis of Organizational Performance and Organizational Flexibility, Technical 
Infrastructure, and Cultural Openness 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Organization unexpected event 2.74 .659 310 
OrgFlxSs 2.8311 .45245 310 
TchStrSs 2.6756 .48799 310 
CultOpSs 3.2211 .47157 310 
 
Model Summary 
Change Statistics 
Mod
el R 
R 
Square 
Adjuste
d R 
Square 
Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate 
R 
Square 
Change 
F 
Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .426(a) .182 .174 .599 .182 22.664 3 306 .000 
a  Predictors: (Constant), CultOpSs, TchStrSs, OrgFlxSs 
 
ANOVA(b) 
Model  
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 24.418 3 8.139 22.664 .000(a) 
Residual 109.892 306 .359   
1 
Total 134.310 309    
a  Predictors: CultOpSs, TchStrSs, OrgFlxSs, b  Dependent Variable: Organization unexpected event 
 
Coefficients(a) 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Model  B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) .900 .269  3.345 .001 
OrgFlxSs .353 .094 .242 3.774 .000 
TchStrSs .346 .085 .256 4.087 .000 
1 
CultOpSs -.028 .084 -.020 -.335 .738 
 
Source: Data collected from survey distributed to Thailand emergency personnel; dated July - August 2005 
NOTE: OrgFlxSs is a sum of mean scores of Organizational Flexibility, TchStrSs is a sum of mean scores of 
Technical Infrastructure, and CultOpSs is a sum of mean score of Cultural Openness  
 
 
Regression model (Table 6.9) 
Socio-Technical Component (By category), * coefficient is not statistically significant  
 
Organizational Readiness = 0.9 + 0.353Organizational Flexibility + 0.346 Technical 
Infrastructure - 0.028 Cultural Openness* 
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Unexpected events and their consequences are characteristic of disaster and emergency 
management. Emergency personnel expect that their adaptive capabilities in unexpected events 
will increase if the organization provides more resources and flexibility to them. The degree of 
readiness of the personnel to adapt to unexpected events is explained by the model at 0.05 
significant level. This model revealed the significance of organizational flexibility and technical 
infrastructure as the first two priorities in managing emergency response. Compared to 
organizational performance model, emergency personnel view there is a higher degree of need in 
technical infrastructure when they confront with unexpected event. 
Nevertheless, question falls into why cultural openness, in this model, has less effect to 
organizational readiness to confront with unexpected event. A negative coefficient value of 
cultural openness, even though is relatively low and not statistically significant, is the factor that 
reduced the overall effects of socio-technical component on organizational readiness in a 
previous model. Cultural openness should be individually examined whether its effects has a 
significant result to an organizational readiness.        
I ran the regression analysis of organizational readiness upon cultural openness. The 
relationship between the two variables is positive and statistically significant at 0.01 level of 
confidence with a coefficient of 0.28. I classified the levels of culture into two categories: 
“organizational culture” and “individual cultures”. I regressed the variable of organizational 
readiness on the two levels of culture. The model is significant with a positive relationship 
between the dependent variable, organizational readiness, and two independent variables of 
culture. Interestingly, organizational culture has a higher degree of relationship (0.2) to 
organizational readiness than individual culture (0.08). This finding is supported by data 
obtained from interviews and professional observation as well as previous regression analysis 
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reported for all socio-technical components. Organizational flexibility is likely to have a higher 
degree of relationship for personnel performance and readiness in emergencies. Personnel are 
more likely to consider their operations and response to have a strong tie with organizational 
structure, authority, flexibility, culture, shared goal, and underlying values. They believe that 
these factors are crucial to the accomplishment of their goals.    
From the interviews, emergency personnel view their learning process as their 
preparation to deal with unexpected events. They consider the elements in cultural openness as 
crucial factors to have in their training programs. Willingness to change, to adapt, to learn new 
knowledge, to accept mistakes and to solve conflict are taken into account as fundamental value 
of personnel in order to change their performance more than applying them in unexpected 
events. They view new knowledge of the unknown as to build and enhance their capability to 
operate their emergency response. 
In the regression of organizational readiness to cope with unexpected events, the R square 
value is also explained in the same manner as in the regression of organizational performance. 
That is, there is a wide range of types of emergency personnel under investigation in this study 
with a higher degree of variation. Tables 6.10-6.13 below show regression analysis of 
organizational readiness for unexpected events and socio-technical component of emergency 
personnel. 
Statistic regressions analyses of each level of emergency personnel are presented below. 
R squares extracted from each regression reflect a stronger prediction power of the model. 
However, as discussed before, the regression model is analyzed in order to find statistical support 
for the argument of this study that socio-technical components play crucial roles in emergency 
operations and management. The regression analyses for each emergency personnel unit point in 
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the same direction.  The socio-technical components are statistically significant for 
organizational performance and readiness to confront unexpected events. Nonetheless, with the 
differences in organizational characteristics, emergency response structure, response action 
plans, organizational values, and nature of risks that emergency personnel confront, the effects of 
socio-technical components and the demand for such elements differ among the agencies.   
 
Table 6.10 Regression Model Summary of Organizational Readiness to confront unexpected Event and Socio-
Technical Component of Civil Emergency Relief Department Emergency Personnel 
 
N R R Square Adjusted R Square Significant 
39 0.433 0.187 0.108 0.089 
Source: Data collected from survey distributed to Thailand emergency personnel; dated July - August 2005 
 
Regression model of the Department of Civil Emergency Relief Department (CERD) 
Socio-Technical Component (By category) 
Organizational Readiness = 0.93 + 0.39 Organizational Flexibility + 0.38 Technical 
Infrastructure + 0.063 Cultural Openness 
 
 
 
Table 6.11 Regression Model Summary of Organizational Readiness to confront unexpected Event and Socio-
Technical Component of District Office Emergency Personnel 
 
N R R Square Adjusted R Square Significant 
80 0.278 0.078 0.041 0.10 
Source: Data collected from survey distributed to Thailand emergency personnel; dated July - August 2005 
 
 
Regression model of the Department of District Offices (DO) 
Socio-Technical Component (By category) 
 
Organizational Readiness = 1.94 + 0.18 Organizational Flexibility + 0.33 Technical 
Infrastructure + 0.177 Cultural Openness 
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Table 6.12 Regression Model Summary of Organizational Readiness to confront unexpected Event and Socio-
Technical Component of Department of Prevention and Mitigation at Headquarters Emergency Personnel 
 
N R R Square Adjusted R Square Significant 
35 0.544 0.296 0.217 0.022 
Source: Data collected from survey distributed to Thailand emergency personnel; dated July - August 2005 
 
Regression model of the Department of Prevention and Mitigation at Headquarters  
Socio-Technical Component (By category) 
 
Organizational Readiness = -0.05 + 0.457 Organizational Flexibility + 0.516 Technical 
Infrastructure + 0.042 Cultural Openness 
 
 
Table 6.13 Regression Model Summary of Organizational Readiness to confront unexpected Event and Socio-
Technical Component of Department of Prevention and Mitigation at Provincial Field Emergency Personnel 
 
N R R Square Adjusted R Square Significant 
88 0.479 0.23 0.201 0.000 
Source: Data collected from survey distributed to Thailand emergency personnel; dated July - August 2005 
 
Regression model of the Department of Prevention and Mitigation at Provincial (Field)  
Socio-Technical Component (By category) 
 
Organizational Readiness = 0.695 + 0.322 Organizational Flexibility + 0.345 Technical 
Infrastructure + 0.022 Cultural Openness 
 
 
Statistical regression models of how emergency personnel view their performance and 
adaptive capacities in unexpected events show the important effect of socio-technical 
components on their performance. From their perspective, technical infrastructure would 
certainly help their operations to become more efficient while they view themselves as being 
open-minded, willing to learn, and willing to improve their performance. All of the above will 
not effectively applied to their routine or special operation if the organization does not support 
their willingness to change. The structure of the organizations needs to be reorganized to clarify 
the line of authority, access to information, resource flows and coordination routes for personnel 
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to follow easily. These changes will enable them to learn how to make changes or decisions for 
the situations they confront. They also realize that change in the organization takes a long time; 
yet it can be done. The improvement of organizational performance and readiness for unexpected 
events has to have both organizational culture and individual beliefs that support their readiness 
to learn and change. Without the critical role of socio and technical components, emergency 
personnel cannot perform their responsibility effectively and efficiently.  
6.2 THE EVOLUTION OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE SYSTEMS  
Based on the three-dimensional model, Comfort groups emergency response systems into four 
sub-sets reflecting the dominant characteristics of their state of transition toward self –
organization during their emergency response operations. The four groups are: 1) non-adaptive 
response system with a low level of presence of socio-technical components, 2) emergent 
adaptive response system with a low to medium level on indications for the three components, 3) 
operative-adaptive response system with a medium to high degree of socio-technical elements, 
and 4) auto-adaptive response system that has a high level of performance on every element in 
the three-dimensional model. Based on findings from study, the tsunami response is classified as 
a non-adaptive response, and the Bangkok emergency response at provincial level is classified as 
an emergent-adaptive response while at district level is classified as a mixed state of   non-
adaptiveness and emergent-adaptiveness. I also explored how to improve the two related 
emergency management sub-systems to become an integrated auto-adaptive response system. 
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6.2.1 Tsunami response as a non-adaptive response system  
Findings from this research identified the tsunami response as a non-adaptive response system 
due to the lack of knowledge, emergency plans, response procedures and resource reallocation. It 
took the response system three days to implement systematically organized emergency response 
operations and recovery processes.  During those three days, assistance and resources were 
pouring into the affected areas without organized processes of coordination and distribution.  
That disorganization delayed the delivery of aid and supplies to the injured and needy survivors.   
As discussed in chapter 4, network analysis shows that the response system appears to be 
loosely connected with many organizations participating, but not necessarily interacting 
efficiently with one another.  In addition, there are several organizations that are involved in 
scattered interactions, or are engaged in interactions outside the network boundary. Those 
organizations represent public, private and non-profit sources of funding as well as national, 
provincial and local levels of jurisdiction. The network diagram reveals the poor connections and 
coordination among all levels of agencies. The loosely connected organizations entered the 
system by themselves, finished their operations, and then withdrew from the area.  Search-and-
rescue operations by these organizations were more likely to be repeated because of a lack of 
feedback of updated information and inefficient communication channels.  
The lack of knowledge and information reduced confidence in the decision making 
process when it came to responding to unexpected events and consequences.  Although the 
emergency personnel expressed a willingness to improve operations and collaborate, on-the job 
learning was not an effective choice given the time constraints during these emergencies.  The 
knowledge and information needed to collaborate and to make informed decisions must be 
internalized in each unit’s personnel, as well as facilitated among units.  As mentioned earlier, all 
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emergency personnel recognize the need of training and co-training which can help them learn to 
operate more effectively and coordinate more efficiently. The lack of infrastructure and the 
failure of communication channels can prevent organizations from managing effective response 
operations.  There remains significant room for improvement before the DDPM emergency 
response system evolves to a state that will enable it to function more effectively and efficiently. 
The subsequent discussion will focus on how collaboration among the three levels of authority: 
DDPM as a national authority, the BMA/CERD as a provincial authority, and district emergency 
units in Bangkok, can be improved. 
6.2.2 Bangkok flood emergency response system as an emergent-adaptive system  
The findings and previous analyses suggest that Bangkok’s flood emergency response system is 
an emergent-adaptive system.  The existence and functions of the FCC and BMA emergency 
radio networks reveal that their level of technical infrastructure is medium to high. The political 
commitment of the Bangkok governor, together with Bangkok being a center of government and 
business activities, increases the attention that the public gives towards emergency response 
issues. In addition, compared to the DDPM, which covers 75 provinces around the country, the 
BMA emergency response only covers a small area. This limited coverage area gives Bangkok a 
chance to improve and make constructive changes to its entire system.  CERD, although a new 
organization, has a lot of potential because its personnel have been trained in the Fire Division 
under the National Police Department. This informal network of relationships indirectly creates a 
strong connection between the emergency personnel of CERD and police department, and 
provides an incentive for them to work together if needed. As prior members of the Fire 
Department, CERD personnel have an acceptable knowledge of how the Police Department 
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operates.  This shared knowledge supports the development of more effective coordination 
between the two departments.       
As shown by the network analysis, the response system appears to be strongly connected, 
with a fair number of organizations represented and necessarily interacting efficiently with one 
another. The group centrality, closeness, betweenness and cliques reflect the operation by 
geographical area with the same set of actors. This reflects strong connections and effective 
coordination among all levels of agencies. If coordination, information and communication can 
be mobilized through all ties activated, emergency response will operate effectively. BMA and 
CERD need to maintain a degree of organizational flexibility because it enables the field district 
officers to feel more confident and empowered to make decisions under a state of emergency. A 
majority of district personnel still perceive their operations to be limited and centralized. This 
creates difficulty for rapid adaptation under the constraints of emergency.   
6.2.3 Bangkok massive accident emergency response system as a mixed state of   non-
adaptiveness and emergent-adaptiveness   
The combination of district officers and volunteers benefits emergency response in terms of 
having experienced personnel who know the area and the communities in which they operate.  
However, the lack of technical infrastructure and low degree of organizational flexibility makes 
effective emergency response operations difficult.  Although the degrees of coordination and 
network interactions reported by the network analysis are relatively high when compared to the 
other agencies, district office emergency personnel are more likely to seek approval from their 
superiors before making decisions and reacting to situational difficulties.   
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The analyses reflect the need to implement training programs for the emergency 
personnel within the District Offices so that they can increase and sustain high skill levels.  A co-
training program should be adopted that involves all parties. The accident involving the building 
collapse and injured emergency personnel is evidence of poor coordination and a lack of 
experience. District officers have more accurate information regarding procedures and resources 
while district volunteers have more familiarity with the geography and communities. These types 
of information and specific experience need to be shared so that they complement each other. 
District level emergency personnel often work with private rescue teams who frequently arrive at 
the damaged location first.  The other emergency units, provincial and district, subsequently 
arrived at the scene without being informed of current operations. They lack information about 
the status of the situation, and have difficulties updating reports on the state of emergency and 
coordinating actions. This gap in operational coordination was identified through a difficult 
lesson, but it garnered the attention needed to instigate improvement in emergency response 
collaboration.  
6.2.4 Moving to an auto-adaptive response or self-organizing system 
Systems operating at the edge of chaos have the potential for creative response to meet suddenly 
altered conditions of operations in effective ways. Yet, the margin for choice is narrow. Systems 
that do not move toward creative new actions will slide back toward chaos as their old patterns 
of performance fracture under the stress. Systems that move toward creative new actions are 
termed auto-adaptive or self-organizing (Comfort 1999). Such systems have a high degree of 
socio-technical components. This study provides its assessment how to move the two emergency 
response systems of Thailand to the state of auto-adaptive response system.   
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6.2.4.1 Technical Infrastructures 
Before discussing how to more effectively position the emergency response infrastructure, I 
evaluate the new infrastructure already being implemented.  The newly established National 
Disaster Warning Center, Thailand, ,installed 36 of 72 warning towers along the southern 
coastline. Those towers, activated from the national center in Bangkok, are linked to 
automatically warn people of upcoming threats to life and property.  The towers are expected be 
linked to the alarm systems of every hotel and building so that a warning message will be 
disseminated.  Signs, placed along the beaches, indicate evacuation routes and the nearest 
emergency facilities and shelters.  The Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation 
(DDPM) has been working with the Department of Mineral Resources, provincial governments 
of the six coastal provinces and municipality administration to develop evacuation maps, plans 
and building codes.  The Civil Emergency Relief Department (CERD) has purchased fire trucks, 
extinguishers, equipment and designed action plans that serve as a standardized operational 
manual.  Budgetary allocations for the construction of additional fire stations have also been 
approved.  In many places, the construction of these stations has already begun.  
This movement toward training and mitigation is a sign that emergency response 
agencies are attempting to coordinate their infrastructure and their operations. Drills for tsunami 
evacuations should encourage the DDPM to activate and update their evacuation maps with 
provincial governments and municipalities.  The DDPM information center should reorganize 
the information and knowledge needed for operations and make sure it is made available to 
emergency personnel.  The DDPM academy should develop curriculum for co-training programs 
that encourage all personnel to learn about their equipment, procedures, facilities, risk 
assessments and action plans for responding to multi-hazards.  The BMA should take this 
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opportunity to integrate district officers and volunteers and teach them about the facilities and 
procedures of CERD and DDPM that are available within and around the area of Bangkok.  
Regional DPM at the center, located in Bangkok vicinity’s area, which is structured as 
supporting unit for provincial DPM, can help Bangkok emergency personnel to reallocate more 
resources and personnel in a large scale emergency response. Knowing how to use alternate 
facilities, learning how the other emergency unit operates, and developing relationship through 
coordination help emergency personnel and organizations reach for assistance as needed.       
6.2.4.2 Cultural Openness 
It is unfortunate that it costs a huge number of deaths for people to recognize how important 
emergency response is. Willingness to learn is already rooted in the minds of all emergency 
personnel because they recognize that it is the unknown that caused people to suffer injury.  This 
is evidenced by the significantly different mean scores between the three socio-technical 
components.  As the study previously discussed, the cultural openness of emergency personnel is 
not driven by the enforcement of law or regulations. It is obviously pushed by the public that 
confront with an unknown disaster and experience an ineffectiveness of emergency response 
operations to ensure public safety. It is also emphasized by the emergency personnel’s 
recognition of their lack of knowledge and skill to operate effective emergency responses which 
can also cost their lives during the operations.   
High awareness of risk all parties creates the best opportunity for national and provincial 
governments to continue improving their emergency personnel and systems. In the practice of 
public management, culture and willingness to accept change are two of the most difficult factors 
to alter.  Most of the time, policy makers confront difficulties translating policy into practice 
because of a resistance to change within the personnel who implement such policy and change. 
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International experts and assistance have been offered to the country to enhance the capabilities 
to understand and manage disaster and emergency response. The establishment of the National 
Disaster Warning Center represents a big step towards accepting change, new technology, 
coordination and solving conflicts and mistakes made in the past.  The next time they confront a 
multi-hazard, the DPM, CERD and DO will be better equipped and prepared to learn new 
knowledge and skills. 
6.2.4.3 Organizational Flexibility 
Willingness to change and commitment to improvement can be worthless if the organizations do 
not provide flexibility in implementing the emergency response. BMA has a good start in 
designing two systems of single incident command and unified incident command. This will 
allow emergency response operations and personnel to move towards developing creative 
solutions if unexpected complications or consequences occur. The other pattern of transferring 
command to subordinates reflects the decentralized decision making process. This allows 
emergency personnel to make their own decisions about the situation at hand. These decision 
making capabilities are critical because emergency personnel need accurate, timely, and updated 
information to make informed decisions. DDPM has to focus on the changes within BMA and 
consider whether these changes can be applied to their system. Co-training programs will help 
connect their operation and share the information and knowledge needed in the operation into 
practice. An effective information sharing network needs effective database administration, 
organizational willingness to share knowledge and information, and efficient communication 
management to facilitate acquired information to emergency personnel at the time they need.  
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6.3 CONCLUSION 
As the study moves toward the integration of intergovernmental and information-
communication networks into emergency response in immediate crises or disasters, this chapter 
has laid out the elements needed to improve emergency systems of Thailand and how to move 
them to the next step of an auto-adaptive emergency response system. A single emergency 
response [unit – organization??] will not likely be able to manage a large scale disaster.  Multiple 
agencies need to learn to work with one another.  Such cooperation requires organizations to be 
flexible, and to adopt training programs that give emergency personnel a learning environment, 
as well as the tools, to encourage self-improvement and the development of coordination.  
Likewise, political commitment from national and provincial governments helps to strengthen 
and ensure a continuity of development of emergency personnel, organization and infrastructure 
of all level of authorities. In conclusion, policy makers should focus their energy on developing a 
scalable emergency response that exhibits self-learning and adaptive characteristics.  
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7.0  THE INTEGRATION OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL COORDINATION AND 
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT IN RESPONSE TO IMMEDIATE CRISES 
In a state of emergency, emergency response personnel must understand the nature of the 
emergency, and develop a coordinated and systematic response.  Scales of severity from disaster 
or unexpected consequences are nonlinear and unpredictable. Emergency response may require 
multiple agencies to perform many tasks in different areas simultaneously. This complexity 
indicates the need for effective and efficient information sharing and communication between 
multiple agencies and communities at risks.  Local emergency response personnel have the most 
experience and familiarity with the area in which they live and operate.  Information and 
knowledge acquired by local personnel can help agencies operate faster and more effectively.  
The knowledge of emergency management is interdisciplinary and comes from multiple sources 
with various types of expertise. There is a high need for knowledge and information sharing to 
keep emergency personnel current  e and able to function adaptively.  
Adaptive capacity also requires the ability to coordinate actions during emergency 
response operations.  Emergency personnel need to understand their operations, as well as the 
operations of other agencies, in order to meet their responsibilities. Additionally, emergency 
agencies need to be able to access updated disaster information and make it available to the 
public so that communities become familiar with the situation they are confronting.  The 
availability of accurate information assists a community to learn, adapt, and recover in a time of 
crisis. This study provides a framework to improve Thailand’s emergency response system.  By 
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integrating three emergency management functions -- intergovernmental coordination; 
information communication, and resilient community interaction -- Thailand can create an 
environment that encourages self learning and adaptive capability among emergency personnel.  
Such improvements will strengthen Thailand’s ability to respond to complex disasters such as 
the December 26, 2004 tsunami. 
7.1 RESPONSE TO THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
This study focused on the following research questions, stated in Chapter Three: 
1. To what extent do the key agencies responsible for disaster operations collaborate in 
large scale emergencies?  
2. To what extent are authority and responsibility for emergency management assigned 
to specific public agencies? 
3. To what extent does an intergovernmental coordination process operate in emergency 
management in practice?   
4. To what extent does the use of information technology facilitate inter-organizational 
coordination and communication in emergency management? 
4 In what ways are intergovernmental coordination and information management 
integrated in Thai emergency management?  
5 What factors would move the existing emergency response system toward auto 
adaptation, and how?  
 
The findings in reference to these research questions are spread out through the various 
chapters of this dissertation.  Findings characterizing the national response to the December 26, 
2004 tsunami are presented in Chapter 4.  Chapter 5 takes a local perspective, and characterizes 
how emergency response personnel within in the Bangkok metropolitan region responded to two 
specific crises: flood and massive accident.  The fact that the response to these two crises is 
governed by the same national emergency law, Emergency Act 1979, allows them to be 
organized and analyzed within a single chapter.  For example, the emergency response to these 
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two incidents was directed by the Bangkok Metropolitan Authority and managed by District 
Offices and Volunteer Units.  Both cases share the same emergency response and support 
structure, the Civil Emergency Relief Department, which provides assistance in the event that 
operations become overloaded.  The critical functions of the Flood Control Center and Vicinity’s 
involvement in flood crisis management were discussed as well. The findings suggest that two 
emergency response systems are best described as non-adaptive, under the management of 
DDPM, and the third, managed by BMA, as an emergent adaptive system,.  In Chapter 6, I 
examined the relationships among factors identified by the theoretical framework, and the 
emergency agencies’ performance in unexpected events to determine their effects on emergency 
response operations.  The intent of this analysis is to contribute to improving the emergency 
response system so that it becomes more auto-adaptive in performance. 
The findings presented in the previous chapters demonstrate what must be done to 
improve Thailand’s emergency response system at all jurisdictional levels, so that the system is 
in a state of constant auto-adaptation.  This chapter, in conclusion, presents a conceptual model 
of the integration of intergovernmental coordination and information and communication 
management, toward establishing more effective, scalable emergency management. It also 
presents recommendations for improving the performance of emergency response in Thailand. 
These recommendations recognize the significance of individual units, as well as the need to 
coordinate operations across multiple units and jurisdictions. The emphasis is on building 
resilient communities and self learning environments to better cope with states of emergency. 
 To illustrate the translation of the integration of intergovernmental coordination 
and information management into a practice of emergency operation and management, this 
chapter will demonstrate how government agencies involved in emergency response perform 
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their functions, and coordinate with each other by using the information that is available to them.  
The integration of the intergovernmental coordination and information management is illustrated 
in two steps of disaster management: disaster warning and emergency response. 
7.2 THE INTEGRATION IN DISASTER WARNING MANAGEMENT 
 
Figure 7.1 Map shows the integration of intergovernmental, information, and public network for Disaster Warning 
System 
 
Source: Concept of Operations, National Disaster Warning Center, Thailand, modified by Stanley Goosby, Pacific 
Disaster Center, and Tavida Kamolvej, University of Pittsburgh, USA. 2006  
 
 
 219 
To illustrate how this element works in disaster and emergency management, I use the 
concept of operations for the National Disaster Warning Center that was developed and 
implemented in Thailand after the tsunami disaster.  Figure 7.1 shows how intergovernmental, 
information and public networks were integrated into the disaster warning system.  What is most 
apparent is how the system utilizes communication and information technology to connect 
multiple networks together so that disaster warnings and information are better channeled and 
disseminated throughout Thailand. 
7.2.1 Intergovernmental Coordination: Scalable Agency Management 
As Figure 7.1 demonstrates, the National Disaster Warning Center (NDWC) receives its 
information from intergovernmental networks, international information providers and the 
general public.  Under order of the Prime Minister’s Office, November 2005, the NDWC is 
authorized to disseminate tsunami warning messages, for example the potential that a tsunami 
will be generated after an earthquake, to governmental emergency response agencies and the 
general public. The order requires all other agencies with emergency expertise to provide 
knowledge, information, analyses and technology to the NDWC if requested.  Any conflict that 
might occur between or among the parties will be resolved by the Office of the Prime Minister.  
This official order supports emergency response coordination through a lateral line of authority. 
Using the automated data integration and analysis from a decision support system about 
potential tsunami generation, analysts at NDWC will make decision whether or not, and at what 
level of alert, state of emergency occurs and is needed to be warned. Once a decision is made by 
the experts that state of emergency is at a high risk, the executive director of NDWC authorizes 
the dissemination of a warning message to the requisite governmental agencies.  These agencies 
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include high level decision-makers within the national government, middle level of managers 
within the provincial governments, and operational actors that reside at the local level, often the 
frontline of any given emergency.  All levels of emergency response will prepare and mobilize 
their resources according to the emergency management laws and regulations.  In addition, the 
military, police, coast guard and Civil Defense Volunteer Units receive the NDWC warning and 
will coordinate with provincial and local jurisdictions to assist with the process of evacuation.  
After the NDWC ensures the safety of the situation, a message of cancellation of evacuation will 
be disseminated through governmental agencies, emergency personnel and the general public.  
Depending upon where the epicenter of an earthquake is located, Thailand could only 
have between forty-five and ninety minutes of response time before a tsunami strikes its coast.  
Because the potential area of tsunami impact covers six coastal provinces, the intergovernmental 
effort in delivering an informative warning message must be prompt and well distributed in order 
to be effective. Retrieving, analyzing and disseminating information for disaster warning 
requires effective and efficient information sharing and communication networks. In addition, 
this study emphasizes the importance of communication feedback, represented in Figure 7.1 by 
the dotted lines.  Feed back ensures that both emergency personnel and the general public are 
informed about the status of the emergency by allowing the constant dissemination of situational 
updates, reports of change, and requests for critical information.  
7.2.2 Information and Communication Management 
Within this system, information and data are retrieved from various domestic and international 
sources, integrated, recorded, processed, and analyzed by both an automated decision support 
system and experts on duty.  The automation of data feed and electronic bulletins are designed to 
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reduce the time it takes to generate the analysis and reports that experts need to make decisions.  
Once a decision to disseminate a warning message is made, it is distributed via facsimiles, cell 
phone text messages, emails, television broadcasting, radio transmissions, and phone lines to the 
governmental decision makers, emergency response agencies, and the general public.  As of 
February 2006, 36 out of 72 warning towers within Thailand can be automatically activated from 
the NDWC.  Once activated, the alarm disseminates warning messages in five different 
languages through broadcast equipment installed at these towers.  This automated warning 
system provides information to local residents, as well as tourists, of the danger and the need to 
immediately start the process of evacuating coastal areas.  
Another interesting communication channel is the process that is used to disseminate 
warning messages throughout local communities and villages. From field research and 
interviews, I found the use of “megaphones” within some villages. The megaphone functions as 
a radio station for the communities, and is utilized to communicate news and weather updates for 
the local residents, especially fishermen. This communication channel is crucial, not only 
because it is used to facilitate information among the locals in their native language, but also 
because it the channel is operated by a local resident who is often a trusted community 
representative.  The fact that a trusted community representative disseminates information and 
warning messages increases cooperation between the community residents and governmental 
emergency response agencies. It also increases the strength of intergovernmental emergency 
response networks by enhancing the ability of a community to prepare for and confront the 
consequences of disasters.  The local actor is a critical element in the construction of resilient 
communities. 
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7.2.3 Community Network: Resilient Community 
The findings from this study revealed that local communities maintain strong communication 
and relationship networks.  The trust that exists within local communities can assist 
governmental agencies disseminate warning messages, and can also serve as a basis for action in 
response to these warnings.  As such, local communities are critical to the emergency response 
system.  They possess specific knowledge of nature of disaster and risks being confronted.  Often 
times, local communities can detect environmental abnormalities and changes just as fast as high 
technology equipment. They can quickly disseminate information through amateur radio 
networks and hotlines.   
Building upon the strength of the local communities, the NDWC should create a local 
emergency agency and direct experts to collect the information informed generated and 
disseminated by the general public for the national information system.  It is necessary  to have 
the Department of Mineral Resource, the Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation and 
the various provincial governments work with local communities to develop evacuation routes, 
building codes, warning processes, procedures for resource allocation, and methods of 
communication and feedback.  By including the knowledge and information maintained by local 
communities and actors, Thailand’s emergency response system would be better positioned to 
coordinate large scale operations, such as tsunami evacuations, across multiple jurisdictions. 
While local residents provide knowledge and information that can assist governmental 
agencies disseminate accurate warning messages, the emergency agencies and expert 
organizations need to make knowledge and information available to the public.  The more 
information that local communities have about disasters and emergencies, the higher their level 
of readiness when they are confronted by such events. Drills also help emergency agencies and 
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local communities coordinate and understand emergency response and operations in practice.  If 
steps are taken to improve the relationships, trust and information processes within Thailand’s 
emergency response system, governmental and nongovernmental emergency response 
organizations will develop the tools they need to better coordinate and respond to the 
unanticipated problems that develop within the complex non-linear environment presented by 
natural disasters.  Such coordination, however, requires an environment that encourages both 
organizational learning and adaptability. 
7.2.4 Self-Learning: Adaptive Capability Building  
The complex adaptive system (CAS) model recognizes that social systems engage in continuous 
learning and self organization in reciprocal interactions with the environment in which they are 
embedded (Comfort, 2000). As discussed previously, both emergency personnel and 
communities need to develop their adaptive capacity in order to deal with emergencies, disasters, 
as well as the unexpected consequences. Fortunately, the tsunami disaster, the frequent of flash 
flood and landslides throughout the country, and the recent deaths of emergency personnel in 
Bangkok has helped to develop an awareness of risk posed by natural disaster.  Additionally, 
while these events revealed that Thailand lacked experience in effective emergency response 
management, the events have spawned a willingness to accept change, an interest in learning 
about the unknown, and most importantly, an increased interest in developing improved 
emergency response institutions and processes throughout the country. 
The findings show that tsunami devastation and damage were the result of more than a 
simple failure to warn the public.  There existed significant gaps between knowledge and 
information shared between experts. The Department of Mineral Resources had the knowledge 
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that tsunami could be caused by underwater earthquake, but the Department of Meteorology 
owned the seismic equipment that operated around Thailand.  It is clear that the two departments 
need to exchange information about their operations and share knowledge and data to enhance 
the capabilities of the disaster warning system for its effective implementation. 
As Thailand’s national center, the NDWC is the focal point of information that connects 
both domestic and international actors.  The agency collects, analyzes and assesses information, 
disseminate warnings, and assists in the critical process of mobilizing emergency response 
activities.  This agency can bridge the knowledge and information gaps that existed during the 
tsunami crisis.  To do so, the NDWC needs to train its in-house experts and staff to analyze data 
and information received from multiple sources, as well as how to make decisions about whether 
to disseminate a warning. More importantly, the NDWC must also be prepared to expand its 
capacities so it can respond to multiple hazards, not only in terms of issuing warnings, but also 
coordinating and supporting the emergency response. 
7.3 THE INTEGRATION IN EMERGENCY RESPONSE MANAGEMENT 
The concept of integrating intergovernmental coordination and information management can be 
applied to the processes of emergency response. Using the latest tsunami response as a 
simulation of this integration system, given the situation that a potential of tsunami generating is 
confirmed and a warning message is already disseminated to general public, we can learn how 
the scenario should have been managed. Later, I will explore what would happen if a large scale 
emergency occurs in the Bangkok metropolitan area and a commander in chief at the emergency 
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response command center requested assistance from emergency response agencies across 
jurisdictions. 
7.3.1 Intergovernmental Coordination: Scalable Agency Management 
The Ministers of national governmental agencies, the Governors of affected provinces, the 
Director Generals of participating agencies and Supreme Commanders of the Military get the 
information the same time as the governors and all emergency response personnel. The Minister 
of Interior can activate the National Command Center in case the scale of disaster is larger than 
provincial command centers can manage. Provincial governors start forming the command center 
with provincial Disaster Prevention and Mitigation personnel. The provincial command center 
personnel make all contacts to have all agencies in position as assigned in the drill manual. The 
sirens at the towers go off simultaneously along a coastal area with the relay time of satellite 
communication up to 2 minutes.  
Provincial and local enforcement together with provincial DPM and Civil Defense 
Volunteer Units start evacuating the local residents and manage traffic through a planned 
evacuation map. Provincial governors are the commanders in chief of their provinces. Each 
province is divided by geography into municipalities that have designated personnel responsible 
by council or administrative law for initiating emergency response operations in their specific 
areas. Villages and communities are guided to move to safe places by the Civil Defense 
Volunteer Units, local police, local military, provincial DPM and the assistance of the leaders of 
such villages or communities. These leaders know not only the numbers and identification of the 
community residents, but also the scale of geographical area that can expedite the evacuation. 
Another team of police and military is in assigned positions to secure the safety of property from 
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theft and other incidents so that the local residents evacuate willingly and will return upon the 
official cancellation of the state of emergency from the National Disaster Warning Center.    
For other emergency agencies, there is a need for preparation and activation of a 
redundant emergency response as a back-up plan to assist provincial emergency response and 
personnel. BMA mobilizes an emergency response unit at CERD on stand-by alert to provide 
support, if requested.  Air Force and Navy mobilize their transportation units and equipment to 
transport assistances and supplies. Local Army and Regional Center of Disaster Prevention and 
Mitigation begin to mobilize resources and relocate equipment, if necessary. All supervisors in 
each geographical area are authorized to take action and make decisions on upcoming problems 
and requests for assistance. Shelters as assigned in evacuation map are activated and receive 
evacuees until a safety message and cancellation of the emergency are disseminated. 
In case of a large emergency in the Bangkok metropolitan area, as discussed of the 
assistances requested, collaboration between the BMA  and DDPM (?) agencies should be two 
way in practice. BMA, with the governor or district deputy as a commander in chief is able to 
authorize a request of support and assistance from nearby DDPM personnel. There are five 
provinces in the Bangkok vicinity from whom BMA can request assistance in emergency 
situations. The central regional DPM center is located in PathumThani, vicinity province. 
Provincial governors and directors of provincial DPM and regional DPM centers should be 
authorized to mobilize resources and personnel to assist BMA emergency operations. 
7.3.2 Information and Communication Management 
The findings from this study show that scalable information sharing and communication 
management work effectively in emergency response. Municipality and provincial personnel 
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keep in touch through their emergency radio network of DDPM frequency. Communication 
personnel keep updating and relaying information to the superiors and ministries in Bangkok.  
Emergency personnel frequently identify facsimiles and landline telephone as their critical 
communication channels. These channels are familiar and reliable in delivering detailed 
information and provide continuity of contact. Cell-phones and VHF radio networks are the most 
convenient types of equipment used in communication among agencies. There is a need to limit 
cell-phone use for the general public in states of emergency. Each call should be made only upon 
extreme necessity because such a network needs to maintain availability for emergency 
connections.       
Based on lessons learned from the tsunami devastation, I recommend having 
representatives of each emergency agency sit in the command center communication room and 
function as focal point of contact. in case of communication failures due to the destruction of 
electrical and/or telecommunication infrastructures or overloaded emergency radio network, A 
continual feedback loop of communications activated during disaster operations among local, 
provincial and national agencies keeps all parties informed and enables them to react effectively. 
In the best scenario, an emergency frequency network is activated with sufficient availability for 
emergency personnel and participating agencies to communicate. Emergency communication via 
satellite phone should be made available for connections among headquarters and central offices 
to local agencies and centers. Updated situation reports and information needed for emergency 
response needs to be shared through the communication network so that all agencies can function 
effectively.    
Lastly, the findings show that the Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation 
database is available, yet the processes of information sharing and accessibility have not been 
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effectively implemented. The intra-network of DDPM is operated separately by each section, 
while the inter-network that links DDPM headquarters to the regional and provincial offices is 
not fully operational. DDPM provincial offices only updated daily reports to the disaster 
command center at headquarters. The systems lack a feedback loop of information. Since DDPM 
is the major emergency agency that has a network around the country, the information in the 
internal and external systems is critical for instruction of disaster prevention and mitigation tasks 
and public education. Internal information regarding resources, facilities, evacuation maps, 
statistical data, and disaster knowledge need to be made available and accessible to all 
emergency personnel.  Knowledge required for the public to learn about disaster management 
should also be made widely accessible for public through internet or traditional means such as 
manuals. This sharing of knowledge and information will enable the DDPM agency, other 
emergency agencies and public to build a common understanding of disaster management. It also 
creates an environment for self-organization and good relationships among all parties. 
7.3.3   Community Network: Resilient Communities 
Communities and villages operate in the frontline of emergency response.. Their personnel are 
closer to events that may occur and know how to access the area more effectively. If local 
personnel are educated about disaster risk in their communities, it is in their best interest to 
interpret the situation accurately so they can react appropriately to save lives. Although it differs 
from Bangkok to other provinces, the involvement of local communities in public activities is 
crucial. In Bangkok, representatives of each district have a regular meeting with district officers 
and participate in the districts’ public activities such as career week, school networking and 
community welfare on regular basis. In the southern provinces, representatives of the villages 
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and communities participate more frequently in public activities with municipalities and sub-
districts than with the provinces. However, after the 2004 tsunami, local residents are willing to 
participate in drills and training programs provided by provinces and other emergency agencies. 
Drills are the most useful tool to educate the public regarding the requirements of emergency 
response. The six provinces’ interagency drill brings a new perspective to the national 
government. In a large scale emergency, effective coordination across jurisdictions and 
cooperation from local residents are essential..     
Civil Defense Volunteer Units are volunteers from the local communities who participate 
in emergency operations. The CDVU are local representatives who are trained and have 
moderate levels of skill and knowledge to operate under states of emergency. The CDVU has 
also worked closely with local emergency personnel to build good relationships and trust 
between them in emergency operations.  This unit can also reach out to the community to inform 
residents of emergency operations, rules, directions, procedures and shelters. The degree of 
understanding between the local residents and agencies increases the degree of effective 
cooperation and coordination. Redundancy in search and rescue operations is reduced by the 
presence of community representatives in the Emergency Operations Center and by updates from 
them regarding the emergency situation. In turn, public agencies and CDVU can train local 
personnel and provide information about disaster risk and how to cope with emergency situations 
to communities. Familiarity and trust among information providers and receivers increase the 
level of acceptance of warnings regarding risk and willingness to follow safety instructions. The 
communities learn to adapt to emergencies as well as to cooperate with public agencies.     
Social networks serve as the means to integrate local citizens’ groups into an 
organizational framework to work together with the government agencies to reduce risk and 
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manage emergencies. Local communities have knowledge of their area and people. This 
familiarity of location and resources becomes crucial when the authorities and participating 
agencies are unable to access this potential. This study suggests the process of enlisting 
community representatives to work together with public agencies from the very first step of 
emergency management as in the disaster warning and preparation processes discussed earlier. It 
allows local representatives to share their specific knowledge of the area as well as understand 
the developing response process. This exchange of knowledge facilitates the implementation of 
the emergency operations. 
7.3.4 Self-Learning: Adaptive Capability Building 
The effective and efficient integration of all networks to function systematically and 
cooperatively in emergency response requires a certain level of adaptive capacities and a self-
learning environment. Information communication technologies need to be created friendly to 
the users. Emergency response manuals, evacuation maps, directions, and signs on the beach 
need to be made available with easy access and in a format that is simple to understand and 
follow. The knowledge and information need to be transmitted to emergency agencies and 
general public in such ways that they can comprehensively understand and implement. This 
process also requires emergency personnel and local communities to learn and adapt through 
change. 
Community outreach programs conducted by Thai Royal Navy, the Department of 
Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, and the provincial government educate local residents about 
disaster risk and survival skills. Emergency personnel also learn from the communities how to 
manage systematically in evacuation and emergency response. Through these programs, multiple 
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emergency agencies create relationships and better understanding about their operations by 
exchanging information. The Department of Mineral Resources and the National Disaster 
Warning Center provide a toolkit and pocket books to schools to educate the children of such 
danger. In turn, these children learn and share their lessons with other members of their families, 
which spread knowledge and understanding of risks.  
Drills help all parties to practice for emergency response. The language used in a warning 
message needs alteration to be simply interpreted by local residents without ambiguity. The 
volume of the sirens and broadcasts needs to be calculated against the degree of wind speed and 
noise caused by incidents that may disturb communication. Evacuation may cause accidents and 
injuries. Medical care units need to locate at critical points in the closest safety area and at the 
shelters. Hotels need to distribute manuals for how to differentiate warning signs and sirens for 
fire and tsunami, because the two types of disaster require different types of evacuation. In a fire 
incident, emergency personnel would evacuate people horizontally out of the building, while 
tsunami response suggests moving people up to a higher ground. Security teams of police and 
military need to be trained to secure property at the border of inundation and safety area. The 
teams need to be ale to function and make decisions in situations that threaten their lives and 
safety. The existence of an effective warning system does not eliminate disasters. Effective 
emergency response by each individual emergency responder and cooperative operations among 
agencies to manage the situation and return to normal are needed. Each individual still has the 
possibility of coping with unexpected consequences. At some level, they need to be able to adapt 
and help themselves and each other before assistance arrives. This is why self-learning and 
adaptive capabilities are crucial to emergency response and management. 
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7.4 FUTURE STUDY AND LIMITATIONS 
7.4.1 Future Study 
While conducting the content analysis and data-entry, I used a chaos code to identify the 
characteristics of each interaction or transaction between inter-organizational activities. With this 
chaos code, further analysis on functional interaction network can be effectively studied. A chaos 
code will be useful in conducting a functional analysis of emergency response operations. As 
discussed earlier, the emergency response network that developed in response to the 2004 
tsunami in Thailand demonstrates a functional network. Chaos codes will help identify each 
functional network as well as to analyze how to mobilize resources in each network and how to 
coordinate among them more comprehensively. 
I was also able to obtain the strength of each tie in the interactions between multiple 
organizations. The strength of tie is a numeric indicator of how many times each organization 
interacts with another. It can be used to identify the degree of relationships among organizations 
that operate in emergency response and to construct the core network for response, as well as an 
alternative network for activating a back-up plan.  
I also collected data on the level of jurisdiction and source of funding for organizations 
participating in emergency response that can be used in multiple mode network analysis. This 
analysis is based on a nested case study of Thailand’s emergency response network. With 
multiple mode analysis, instead of only reporting and identifying the number of organizations in 
each jurisdiction by source of funding, an emergency response network can be identified and 
analyzed separately by jurisdiction and source of funding. With such results, scalable emergency 
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management can be studied more comprehensively to understand where bottlenecks exist and 
what critical paths may be used to mobilize resources more efficiently and prevent discontinuity.  
Lastly, this study has focused on two perspectives of analyses; 1) macro: national-
provincial-local emergency response performed by DDPM, and 2) Micro: provincial-local 
emergency response performed by BMA. There are 75 other provinces under the national 
emergency response system that can be examined. Specific characteristics regarding the  nature 
of emergency and culture of emergency personnel may result in identifying significant 
differences and factors that affect their performance.  
 
7.4.2 Limitation of the study 
Studying complex systems such as Thailand’s emergency response system is not without its 
difficulties.  No matter how meticulous the methodology and analysis might be, there is arguably 
always room for improvement.  As such, there are three specific limitations to this study that are 
worthy of further discussion: the scope of the study; the nature of the data collection; and the 
reliability and validity of the data.   
7.4.2.1 Scope of the Study 
Studying Thailand’s emergency response system in its entirety would be a difficult and time 
consuming process.  This study is limited by focusing on the in-depth field study of only three 
provinces, Phuket, PhangNga, and Bangkok, with an additional documentation and brief field 
study of another province, Krabi. Even with limiting the study to this small number of provinces, 
data collection, data entry and data verification took over 8 months to complete.  The analyses of 
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this data consumed an additional 4 months.  There remains an additional 75 provinces within 
Thailand that could be the subject of investigation.  Such an investigation, especially a 
quantitative investigation into the specific characteristics of emergency and emergency 
personnel, may provide a more comprehensive analysis of emergency response activities within 
Thailand.  The ability to complete a more through study, however, is contingent on acquiring 
additional resources, specifically time and money.   
7.4.2.2 Nature of the Data Collection 
A significant section of data utilized by this study was derived from a content analysis of 
newspaper articles.  This process of data collection is limited by the amount of information that 
is available from a single source, and most importantly, whether the information contained 
within that source is related to the research questions.  As such, content analysis must be 
carefully performed by a well-trained and patient researcher.  While cross-checking between 
sources was performed to obtain a higher accuracy and improved access to information, it is 
recognized that this process may have resulted in the duplication of information within the 
database.   
7.4.2.3 Data Reliability and Validity 
The findings of this study indicate that culture plays the most significant role in emergency 
response and management.  While this study clearly identified the role of culture, it did not 
attempt to delve into or dissect the concept in any meaningful manner.  The obvious problem 
with the concept of culture is that it is difficult to define, let alone measure and compare, 
especially across geographic regions in a country as diverse as Thailand.  To this end, additional 
research is needed to understand the specific role that culture plays within Thailand’s emergency 
 235 
response system.  As discussed in chapter three, there are critical issues of measurement 
reliability and validity that must be taken into consideration when attempting to measure a 
concept as complex as culture.   
7.5 CONCLUSION 
The analysis and findings presented throughout this study demonstrates the significant need to 
integrate intergovernmental coordination, which requires collaboration among emergency 
agencies through a systematic scalable agency management, and information sharing through 
communication management.  Such integration will enable multiple agencies to perform multiple 
tasks simultaneously, while allowing the agencies to stay connected and abreast of all situational 
changes.  To strengthen their individual and cooperative capabilities to manage crises and 
emergency response capabilities, emergency agencies need a moderate to high level of technical 
infrastructure, organizational flexibility and cultural openness   Effective interagency emergency 
response, however, must also take into account the need for multi-jurisdictional cooperation 
among all actors, whether they are governmental or non-governmental.  A self-adaptive system 
will be managed from the top by national agencies through the operational level of local level 
actors and communities.  
At the core of this self-adaptive emergency response system are the local actors and 
communities that feel the impact of any given disaster.  Local actors are closer and more familiar 
to the area under stress, which makes their reaction to the situation critical to mitigation if they 
are informed and trained to perform basic steps of emergency response effectively.  The 
knowledge and cooperation of these actors also helps to facilitate effective emergency 
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operations. The effective development of understanding and trust between local communities and 
emergency agencies can work to eliminate risk in two ways.  First, communities that learn to 
understand risks and cope with emergency can better adapt to situations that might cause a 
dramatic change to their lifestyle.  This process strengthens the fundamental concept of resilient 
communities, which is argued, is the best manner to prevent the potential for disaster and 
massive crisis in local communities.  Second, emergency personnel that understand local 
dynamics can better deliver emergency response activities in time of crisis.  Both of these 
situations initiate a feedback loop of information that assists local communities operating under 
stress, as well as the emergency agencies providing relief. 
An effective emergency response system requires two important elements.  The first 
element is the development of a single emergency response network.  The technical 
infrastructure, communication networks and organizational emergency structures must be 
designed to ensure that operations are properly assigned and managed.  The second element 
consists of actors who are capable of learning and adapting under stressful environments.   
Emergency personnel must be able to use their equipment and resources while sharing 
information with local officials and communities.  An organizational design that contains these 
two elements will provide the system with the flexibility to survive the shock created by an 
unforeseen disaster.  This flexibility will enable the system and its actors to adapt and respond to 
the emergency before the full-scale emergency response assistance arrives. 
To be effective, the individuals and organizations that operate within an emergency 
response system must have the ability to learn, cooperate and adapt.  The ability to learn supports 
the management and coordination of operations under the time constraints and life threatening 
circumstances presented by disasters and complex emergencies.  The ability to cooperate though 
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the sharing of information and knowledge assists with building and reinforcing of mutual 
understanding between the actors within the emergency response system.  The ability to adapt 
strengthens the emergency response network as a whole so that governmental agencies and local 
communities can better confront the complex problems that arise during extreme events. In such 
an environment, emergency response personnel will develop tools and techniques that will assist 
them to make informed policy decisions that affect the safety of the general public. 
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DATA COLLECTION PHASE III: SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
This interview is to explore how different levels of participating agencies contribute to 
emergency management and operations, and how information technology and communication 
systems are used in coordinating inter-agency operations and supporting their decision making 
under states of emergency.  
 All your response and personal information will be strictly confidential and will not be 
released to any party. The information obtained from the interview by tape-recorder for 
transcription will only be used for analyses of this research. The final report and results may be 
provided at your request. 
  
1. How do you view states of emergency, and to what extent is your agency involved in 
emergency management and operation? 
 
2. How would you describe the structure of your agency’s legal responsibilities and 
operations in states of emergency? 
 
3. How would you describe the effectiveness of your agency’s performance and/or entire 
operations in managing emergency? (use cases) 
 
4. How would you describe obstacles of your agency’s performance in responding to 
extreme events? (use cases) 
 
5. Are collaborations or coordination established vertically and/or laterally? In the other 
words, how would you explain the collaborations between your agency and the other 
agencies under the same and across jurisdictions?   
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6. How important is support from other agencies to meet your agency’s needs? In what 
specific ways do you think your agency has collaborated or coordinated with other 
agencies? 
 
7. What types of communication technology and management does your agency uses to 
facilitate information needed for operational procedure and decision making within your 
organization and among participating agencies? How effective and efficient do you think 
existing information and communication systems are? 
 
8.  How much do you think the information and knowledge sharing within your 
organization and among participating agencies help in decision making? 
 
9. To what extent has increasing interactions, co-training, information and knowledge 
sharing, and communication contributed to your agency’s performances to the entire 
emergency operation effectiveness? Why?  
 
10. How would you compare your agency’s emergency management and emergency 
response readiness before and after the nation-wide awareness of disaster and emergency 
management of December 26, 2004 tsunami.  
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DATA COLLECTION PHASE III: STRUCTURED SURVEY QUESTIONS 
This survey is designed to explore how emergency response agencies understand their specific 
tasks and adaptive capacities under states of emergency. It seeks to document how core agencies 
operate their functions in intergovernmental network as well as how they facilitate their 
knowledge and information through inter-agency communication systems.  
 Please answer all questions corresponded with your belief, feeling, and practice as 
realistically as you can. Circle (o) or cross (x) the number which best response to your answer. 
All your answers and information are strictly confidential and will not be released to other 
parties. Thank you for your cooperation.  
 
[Organizational Information] 
 
1. In what organization you are working ……………………………………….... 
What is the main responsibility or task of your unit in emergency management and 
operations?  
1) Field Personnel (Emergency Operation Unit) 
2) Communications Function (Radio Unit) 
3) Coordination Center (Arrangement Unit)  
4) Auxiliary (Resource and Transportation Unit) 
5) Command (Administrative Unit) 
6) Others, please specify ………………………………………………….. 
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2. In how many emergency incidents has your agency participated? Please indicate the 
number of times for each type of incident.  
 
_____Flood ………. times  
_____Fire  ………. times 
_____Earthquake ………. times 
_____Building Collapse ………. times 
_____Landslide ………. times  
_____Massive Traffic Accident ………. times 
_____Bio or Chemical Hazard ………. times 
_____Animal Control ………. times 
_____Terrorism ………. times 
_____Others, please specify ……………………………………………….. 
 
3. Did your agency participate in emergency incidents listed below? Please check all 
possible answer(s) and indicate how long your agency had participated? 
 
____December 26th 2004 Tsunami for _____________ (hours, days, weeks) 
 
____Flood in Bangkok Metropolis for _____________ (hours, days, weeks) 
 
____Massive accident in Bangkok for _____________ (hours, days, weeks) 
** For flood and massive accident in Bangkok, please indicate an average time your 
agency encounters emergency each time.**  
 
[Organizational Flexibility and Collaboration] 
 
4. How would you describe the level of overall performance of your unit in managing 
emergency and crises?   
 
     Excellent          Very Good     Good      Fair  Poor 
           5       4          3         2    1 
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5. To what extent do you think your unit is capable of confronting unexpected situations or 
sudden impacts? 
 
Great extent     Moderate extent Small extent   Not at all NA. 
         5       4         3          2    1 
 
6. How would you assess the organizational flexibility that your agency has to operate in 
emergency management, please rate according to the following characteristics? 
 
Organizational Flexibility High Med Low None NA 
1. Existence of national law establishing legal   
authority for emergency response. 
     
2. Existence of special law or regulation 
indicating emergency response plan to be 
activated at local. 
     
3. Existence of emergency response plan that 
integrates capacity from several jurisdictional 
levels to meet the needs of assistance.  
     
4. Existence of emergency response plan that 
indicates the authorization of command center 
to coordinate resources from private and non 
governmental sectors.  
     
5. Existence of an inter-organizational, inter-
jurisdictional knowledge base for emergency 
risk, response, and possible consequences for 
the community.  
     
6. Existence of an inter-organizational, inter-
jurisdictional knowledge base for emergency 
risk, response, and possible consequences for 
the participating agencies. 
     
7. Existence of multi-way patterns of 
information exchange between agencies and 
jurisdictions.   
     
8. Existence of multi-way patterns of 
information exchange across sectors.  
     
9. Existence of trained, professional managers 
with the experience and authority to adapt 
existing administrative plans to the demand of 
the event.  
     
10. Existence of trained reserve personnel 
available on recall in emergency events. 
     
Indicators are modified from Shared Risk (Comfort, 1999) 
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7. With what other agencies did you interact in managing emergencies? Please order in 
terms of frequency of interaction, from 8=highest to 1=lowest. 
 
_____National agencies 
_____Provincial agency 
_____Local agencies 
_____NGO 
_____Private emergency response units 
_____Municipal or District volunteers 
_____Locals 
_____Others, please specify ………………………………………. 
 
8. How frequently you communicate with other units or agencies in your operation?   
 
Frequently     Occasionally Unlikely   Not at all NA. 
         5    4        3          2    1 
 
9. How would you describe the dominant pattern of interaction between your agency and 
other agencies? Please order in terms of most frequent pattern? (6 is the most frequent) 
 
____Persuasion         
____Negotiation       
____Assistance      
____Command or Directing           
____Routine (such as regular meeting, official documentation contact)        
____NA.  
____Others, please specify ………………………………………….. 
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10. To what extent does your agency cooperate with, or coordinate its actions with other 
agencies? 
 
Great extent     Moderate extent  Small extent    Not at all     NA. 
        5       4          3           2        1 
11. How often does your agency have training exercise? 
 
Frequently     Occasionally Unlikely   Not at all   NA. 
         5       4         3          2      1 
 
12. How often does your agency participate in training exercises with other agencies? 
 
    Monthly       Quarterly          Twice a year   Not at all   NA. 
         5    4        3          2      1 
 
[Technical Infrastructure, Information Technology and Communication] 
 
13. How would you assess the technical infrastructure and mechanisms that your agency has 
to support in emergency operations? Please rate according to the following 
characteristics? 
       
Technical Structure High Med Low None NA 
1. Informed assessment of risks      
2. Building codes calibrated to risks      
3. Requirements for structural inspection prior to 
constructions of buildings, transportation  
     
4. Alternative communications capabilities      
5. Alternative electrical facilities and equipment      
6. Special Emergency Operations Centers and 
equipment for emergency response 
     
7. Identification of major facilities in community       
8. Alternative rescue or emergency response 
mechanisms  
     
9. Self technical manual procedure and 
equipment in community 
     
10. If others are available, please specify 
…………………………………………………
…………………………………………… 
     
Indicators are modified from Shared Risk (Comfort, 1999) 
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14. How frequently does your unit or agency use technical support and back up assistance 
from other agencies in managing your emergency operations? 
 
Frequently     Occasionally Unlikely   Not at all NA. 
        5    4        3          2    1 
 
15. In states of emergency, what kinds of communication mechanisms are available? Please 
rank in terms of frequency of use? (6 is the highest) If any of them is not available, please 
leave it blank. 
 
_____Low Frequency Radio 
_____Special High Frequency Radio 
_____Cell phone 
_____GPS and GIS 
_____Satellite Real-time Monitoring 
_____Others, please specify …………………………………………. 
 
16. How would you describe the direction of the information flow in your agency? 
 
All-Ways   Lateral    Bottom-up&Top-down    Bottom up    Top down    None 
       6  5     4             3         2             1 
 
17. To what extent do you get the information you need within your agency? 
 
Great extent     Moderate extent Small extent   Not at all NA. 
         5       4         3          2    1 
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18. In which circumstances your unit or agency most communicate most frequently with 
other units or agencies? Please rank from 1 to 6? (6 is the most frequent) 
 
 
_____Emergency Field Operation 
_____Resource Transfer 
_____Regular Meeting 
_____Personal Pleasure 
_____Official Documents 
_____Personnel Training 
 
19. How often do you use the information provided to your agency to make decisions related 
to your work operations? 
 
Frequently     Occasionally Unlikely   Not at all NA. 
         5       4         3          2    1 
 
 
[Cultural Openness] 
 
20. At what level in your agency or unit are decisions formally made? 
 
1) Widely throughout organization or unit 
2) Most decisions are made by particular groups at the operational level 
3) Most decisions are made by chief of operation unit but under supervision  
4) Most decisions are made by the middle management but under supervision 
5) Most decisions are made by the top management 
6) Others, please specify        
 
21. To what extent do you think the regulations and procedures in which you have been 
trained help to accomplish the goals of emergency operations?  
 
Great extent     Moderate extent Small extent   Not at all NA. 
         5       4         3          2    1 
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22. How often do you estimate that you and/or your colleagues make contingent decisions 
under states of emergency? 
 
Frequently     Occasionally Unlikely   Not at all NA. 
         5       4         3          2    1 
23. To what extent do the participation and support from other organizations help to make 
more accurate decision related to your work? 
 
Substantially      Moderately  Somewhat Not at all NA. 
         5     4          3          2    1 
24. After the December 26, 2004 tsunami, how would you describe the perception of public 
to your organization and emergency management? 
 
Highly favorable     Favorable     Neutral     Slightly unfavorable   Unfavorable 
5    4           3    2         1 
 
25. How would you assess the cultural openness that your agency has to operate in 
emergency management, please rate according to the following characteristics? 
 
Cultural Openness High Med Low None NA 
1. Shared value regarding humanitarian 
assistance to those need. 
     
2. Commitment to goal of protecting life and 
property for all members of community. 
     
3. Willingness to share information needed       
4. Ready acceptance of new information from 
valid source  
     
5. Openness to new methods of working or 
acting with other organizations 
     
6. Willingness to review actions taken      
7. Willingness to correct mistakes discovered 
between organizational working groups. 
     
8. Willingness to accept responsibilities and 
solve conflicts 
     
9. Willingness to service public and build trust 
among agencies and citizen. (friendly and trust 
building program)  
     
10 Continual search for relevant, accurate, 
timely, information to protect community 
     
Indicators are modified from Shared Risk (Comfort, 1999) 
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[Demographic Information] 
 
26. Age: ___20-25 ___26-35 ___36-45 ___45-55 ___over 55 
 
27. Gender : ___ male ___female 
 
28. Position: _________________________________ 
 
29. Years of service: ___under 5   ___6-10     ___11-15  ___16-20      ___over 21 
  
30. Type of your organization:  ___national ___provincial       ___local 
 
Thank you for your cooperation 
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LEGEND FOR FIGURE 4.1 
Interacting Organizations within the Thailand Emergency ResponseSystem, 
December 27, 2004 through January 17, 2005: 
Spell out the acronyms in full name of organizations 
 
Acronym Organization Acronym Organization 
AC_Bank Agricultural and Coop Bank PVC Phuket Vocational College 
BIFIOC Body Identification and Forensic Investigation Operations Center, Th PVS 
Phuket Vocational 
School  
CAT Communication Authority of Thailand Ran_Hosp Ranong Hospital 
CCE Committee of Compulsory Education, Th Ran_Prov_FO 
Ranong Provincial 
Fiscal Office 
Chul_Univ Chulalongkorn University Ran_Prov_LR Ranong Provincial Labor Relation 
CMCU Central Medical Care Unit, Th RCCTEV 
Relief Command Center 
of Tsunami and 
Earthquake Victims, 
Phuket  
CND Committee of National Disaster, Th RPAB Ranong Provincial Administration Board 
CVRF Committee of Victims Relief Fund, Th Sat_Prov_FO Satoon Provincial Fiscal Office 
Dep_NRG Department of Natural Resource and Geology, Th Siri_Bank 
Siriraj Hospital, 
Bangkok 
Dep_Tax Department of Tax Collection, Th SP_Prov_ODC 
Sra Buri Provincial 
Office of Disease 
Control  
Dept_CE Department of Civil Engineering, Th ST_Hosp Surath Thani Hospital 
Dept_COR Department of Correction, Th Trang_Hosp Trang Hospital 
Dept_CRP Department of Civil Right Protection, Th Trang_Prov_FO 
Trang Provincial Fiscal 
Office 
Dept_Cust Department of Custom, Th BM_DO Bang Muang District Office 
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Dept_DC Department of Disease Control, Th BSNP Bun Sea National Park 
Dept_DPM Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, Th IVC 
International Volunteer 
Center 
Dept_Fish Department of Fishery, Th KK_SD_Admin KeukKuk Sub-District Administration  
Dept_GAO Department of General Account  Office, Th KP_Hosp 
Krabi Provincial 
Hospital 
Dept_Geol Department of Geology, Reg. 4 Office, Th Krabi_Mun_DO 
Krabi Municipality 
District Office 
Dept_High Department of Highway Transportation, Th Kratu_DO Kratu District Office 
Dept_Ins Department of Insurance, Th LDPM_LU 
Local Disaster 
Prevention and 
Mitigation, Loma Unit 
Dept_LG Department of Local Governance, Th  Loc_Schools Local Schools 
Dept_MA Department of Medical Administration, Th LP_Nak 
Local Police, 
Nakornsrithammaraj 
Dept_Met Department of Meteorology, Th LP_PN Local Police, Phang Nga 
Dept_MH Department of Mental Health, Th LP_PP_Isl Local Police, PP Island, Krabi 
Dept_UP Department of Urban Planning, Th NT_Mun New-Thai Municipality 
Dept_WT Department of Water Transportation, Th NTCVG 
Nara Thiwat Citizen 
Volunteers Group 
ERAT Electricity Regional Authority of Thailand NTPCP 
Nara Thiwat Provincial 
Community Police 
EXIM_Bank EXIM Bank PDO_Ed Phuket District Office of Education 
FIO_Thai Forensic Investigation Office, NPD, Th PMKKC Pra Mong Kut Klao Camp 
FSI Forensic Science Institute, Th PN_DO_Ed Phang Nga District Office of Education 
Gov_Thai Government of Thailand PT_Hosp Pha Thong Hospital 
IT_Bank Islam-Thai Bank Ran_DO_Ed Ranong District Office of Education 
KT_Bank Krung Thai Bank SPPol_Acad Sam Pran Police Academy 
Mil_Thai Military of Thailand SSR_Mun Suk Sum Ran Municipality 
Min_Ag_Thai Ministry of Agriculture, Th TGP_Hosp Ta Gua Pa Hospital 
Min_Cul_Thai Ministry of Culture, Th TGP_Mun_DO Ta Gua Pa Municipality District Office 
Min_Def_Thai Ministry of Defense, Th TGP_Mun_DO_RO 
Registar Office of Ta 
Gua Pa Municipality 
District Office 
Min_Ed_Thai Ministry of Education, Th TGP_Mun_FD Ta Gua Pa Municipality Fishery Department 
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Min_Eng_Thai Ministry of Energy, Th TGP_Mun_HEC 
Ta Gua Pa Municipality 
Hygienical Environment 
Control 
Min_FA_Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Th TGP_Mun_PHO 
Public Health Office of 
Ta Gua Pa Municipality 
District 
Min_Fin_Thai Ministry of Finance, Th TM_Mun_Do 
Tai Mueng 
Municaipality District 
Office 
Min_ICT_Thai Ministry of Information and Communication Technology, Th TVC Thai Volunteer Center 
Min_Ind_Thai Ministry of Industry, Th DTA Domestic Travel Association, Th 
Min_Int_Thai Ministry of Interior, Th InsAssoc Insurance Association, Th 
Min_Jus_Thai Ministry of Justice, Th NBAssoc National Budhism Association of Thailand 
Min_LR_Thai Ministry of Labor Relation, Th NRNA 
News Reporter and 
Newspaper Association, 
Th 
Min_NRE_Thai Ministry of Natural Resource and Environment, Th OHB 
Office of Head of 
Budhism 
Min_PubHth_Thai Ministry of Public Health, Th PCSS_Found Pra Cha Sunti Suk Foundation 
Min_SDHS_Thai Ministry of Social Development and Human Stability, Th POWLOLP 
Private Organization of 
We Love Our Land and 
People 
Min_Tour_Thai Ministry of Tourism and Sport, Th PPYY_Found Peun Peng (Pa) Yam Yak Foundation 
Min_Transp_Thai Ministry of Transportation, Th PT_Found Portek Tung Foundation 
Nat_Pol National Police Department, Th PUA Private University Association 
NMC Narainthorn Medical Center RCPCNK_Found Raj Cha Pra Cha Nu Kroh Foundation 
OCE Office of Compulsory Education, Th RK_Found Ruam Katanyu Foundation 
OCSC Office of Civil Service Committee, Th TBNOP To Be Number One Program 
Off_Crown Office of the Crown Thai_Bank_Assoc Thai Bank Association 
OLEF Office of Loan for Education Fund, Th Thai_RC Thai Red Cross 
Omms_Bank Ommsin Bank UNICEF_Th UNICEF Thailand 
OMW Office of Ministers' Wives CDPM 
Center of Disaster 
Prevention and 
Mitigation, Phuket 
ONHI Office of National Health Insurance, Th CLRSDI 
Coast Line and Sea 
Resource Development 
Institute of Phuket 
Pol_Acad Police Academy KTBA Krabi Travel Business Association 
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Psy_Assoc Psychiatrist Association, Th PCC Phuket Commerce Council 
RS_Dept_PR Radio Station of Department of Public Relation SBU_RC 
Supan Buri Unit of Red 
Cross 
SDPMC Songkla Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Center TTBAP 
Tourism and Travel 
Business Association of 
Phuket 
SMEDT_Bank Small and Medium Enterprise Development of Thailand Bank BM_Temp Bang Muang Temple 
SMIL_Corp Small and Medium Industrial Leasing Corp. BMPG 
Bang Muang Protest 
Group 
SO_PM_Thai Secretary Office of the Prime Minister, Th BN_Temp Bang Niang Temple 
SRMU Sena Ruk Military Unit  CKKF Chumporn Karn Kusol Foundation 
STDPMC Surath Thani Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Center KP_Temp Kongka Pimuk Temple 
STY_Hosp Sri Tun Ya Hospital, Bangkok LaKa_Temp Lak Kaen Temple 
Thai_AirForce Thai Air Force Nik_Temp Nikorn Temple 
Thai_Army Thai Army Samuk_Temp Samukkee Temple 
Thai_CoastGuard Thai Coast Guard Samuk_Tham_Temp Samukkee Tham Temple 
Thai_Mil_Bank Thai Military Bank  Suw_Temp Suwankiri Temple 
Thai_Navy Thai Royal Navy YY_Temp Yan Yao Temple 
Thai_PA Thailand Port of Authority APFC_Ltd Aisa Plus Finance Co., Ltd. 
Tham_Univ Thammasat University Ban_Bank Bangkok Bank 
Tour_Th Tourism Authority of Thailand GMMM_Ltd GMM Media Ltd. 
TR_Emb Thai Royal Embassy, DC. GSC_Ltd Grand Sport Co., Ltd. 
Unit425 Unit 425 of Border Protection Police KKT_Bank Kasi Korn Thai Bank 
BMA Bangkok Metropolitan Authority KSAY_Bank Krung Sri Ayutha Ya Bank 
CERD Civil Emergency Relief Department, CERD NKLT_Bank 
Na Korn Luang Thai 
Bank 
CKUFCI Chomporn Ket Udonsak Fishery College Institution Pet_Ltd 
Petroleum (Thailand) 
Ltd.,Plc. 
Dept_For Department of Forest, Th Prax_Ltd PraxAir (Thailand) Co., Ltd. 
HY_Hosp Had Yai Hospital RAEC_Ltd Rome Apollo Electronics Co.,Ltd. 
ILTCC Immigration Labor Temporary Control Center, Ranong SC_Bank Siam Commercial Bank 
KK_Univ Kon Kaen University SCNKT_Bank Standard Charter-Na Korn Thon Bank 
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Kra_Hosp Krabi Hospital SET SET Thailand 
Krabi_Prov_FO Krabi Provincial Fiscal Office SLIC Southern Local Insurance Center 
Krabi_Prov_TCC Krabi Provincial Travel Coordination Center Thai_Bank Thai Bank 
Krabi_Prov_TWD Krabi Provincial Transportation Way Department TIAC_Ltd 
Thai International 
Airways Co., Ltd. 
LP_Phu Local Police, Phuket TNC_Bank Tha Na Chart Bank 
NST_Hosp Nakorn Sri Thammaraj Hospital TOT_Corp Telephone Organization of Thailand Corporation 
Ph_Prov_FO Phuket Provincial Fiscal Office TPI_Ltd TPI Cement Plc., Ltd. 
Ph_Prov_PHO Phuket Provincial Public Health Office  TRN_Ltd Thai Rath Newspaper Co., Ltd. 
Phu_Hosp Phuket Hospital UOB UOB Group 
PN_Hosp Phang Nga Hospital VR_Ltd Vergin Radio Ltd. 
PN_Prov_FO Phang Nga Provincial Fiacal Office VR1_Ltd V R 1 Radio Ltd. 
PN_Prov_PHO Phang Nga Provincial Public Health Office  CTC_Ltd Cement Thai Co., Ltd. 
PNNP Phang Nga National Park Krabi_FI Krabi Financial Institution 
PPHO Provincial Public Health Office, Phuket Naka_Hosp Nakarintara Hospital, Nakornsrithammaraj 
Prov_Gov_Ayu Ayuthaya Provincial Government PFI Phuket Financial Institution 
Prov_Gov_Krabi Krabi Provincial Government PN_FI Phang Nga Financial Institution 
Prov_Gov_Ph Phuket Provincial Government PPRC_Ltd PP Princess Resort Co., Ltd. 
Prov_Gov_PN Phang Nga Provincial Government PRC Private Rescue Center 
Prov_Gov_Ran Ranong Provincial Government Ran_FI Ranong Financial Institution 
Prov_Gov_Sat Satoon Provincial Government Sat_FI Satoon Financial Institution 
Prov_Gov_SB Supan Buri Provincial Government TFI Trang Financial Institution 
Prov_Gov_Trang Trang Provincial Government   
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COMBINED ORGANIZATIONS WITHIN THE THAILAND NETWORK 
 
Organizations Originally Coded As 
 
 
Organizations Originally Coded As 
 
 
Organization 
 
Acronym 
 
Jurisdiction 
 
Source of 
Funding 
 
 
Organization 
 
 
Acronym 
 
Jurisdiction 
 
Source of 
Funding 
Ban Koh PP 
School  BK_Sch Public Local Local Schools Loc_Schools Public Local 
Ban Tub La Mu 
School  BTLU_Sch Public Local Local Schools Loc_Schools Public Local 
Less Damaged 
School Center  LDSC Public Local Local Schools Loc_Schools Public Local 
Most Damaged 
School Center MDSC  Public Local Local Schools Loc_Schools Public Local 
Krabi District 
Office of 
Education 
Krabi_DO_Ed  Public Local Local Schools Loc_Schools Public Local 
Ingka Yut Army 
Camp IYAC Public Local 
Military of 
Thailand Mil_Thai Public National 
Local Army, Krabi  LA_Krabi Public Provincial Military of Thailand Mil_Thai Public National 
Local Army, 
Nakorn Sri 
Thammaraj 
 KA_NST Public Provincial Military of Thailand Mil_Thai Public National 
Local Army, Nara 
Thiwat  LA_NT Public Provincial 
Military of 
Thailand Mil_Thai Public National 
Local Army, 
Phang Nga  LA_PN Public Provincial 
Military of 
Thailand Mil_Thai Public National 
Local Army, 
Phuket  LA_Phu Public Provincial 
Military of 
Thailand Mil_Thai Public National 
Local Army, 
Songkla  LA_Song Public Provincial 
Military of 
Thailand Mil_Thai Public National 
Thai Development 
Military Unit  TDMU Public National 
Military of 
Thailand Mil_Thai Public National 
Thai Mechanical 
Military Unit  TMMU Public National 
Military of 
Thailand Mil_Thai Public National 
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Thai Supreme 
Commander of 
Military 
 TSCM Public National Military of Thailand Mil_Thai Public National 
Department of Air-
Medical Care, Air 
Force  
Dept_AMC Public National Military of Thailand Mil_Thai Public National 
Secretary Office of 
Princess Ploy Pilin  SO_PPP Public National 
Office of the 
Crown Off_Crown Public National 
Secretary Office of 
Princess Siripa 
Jutaporn 
 SO_PSJ Public National Office of the Crown Off_Crown Public National 
Secretary Office of 
the Crown 
Princess, Th 
 SO_CP Public National Office of the Crown Off_Crown Public National 
Secretary Office 
of the Queen, Th  SO_Queen Public National 
Office of the 
Crown Off_Crown Public National 
Secretary Office of 
the King, Th  SO_King Public National 
Office of the 
Crown Off_Crown Public National 
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CLIQUES IN THE THAILAND RESPONSE SYSTEM: 27 DECEMBER 2004 
THROUGH 17 JANUARY 2005. 
1: Dept_DPM; Gov_Thai; Min_Cul_Thai; Min_Int_Thai 
2: CVRF; Gov_Thai; Min_Int_Thai 
3: CND; Gov_Thai; Min_Int_Thai 
4: Gov_Thai; Min_Fin_Thai; Min_Int_Thai; Min_SDHS_Thai 
5: Gov_Thai; Min_Int_Thai; Prov_Gov_Krabi; Prov_Gov_Ph 
6: Dept_Fish; Gov_Thai; Prov_Gov_Krabi 
7: Dept_WT; Gov_Thai; Thai_Army 
8: FIO_Thai; Gov_Thai; Min_PubHth_Thai 
9: FSI; Gov_Thai; Min_FA_Thai; Min_PubHth_Thai; Nat_Pol 
10: FSI; Gov_Thai; Min_Jus_Thai; Nat_Pol 
11: FSI; Gov_Thai; Min_NRE_Thai 
12: FSI; Gov_Thai; LP_PN 
13: FSI; Gov_Thai; PPYY_Found 
14: Gov_Thai; KT_Bank; Min_Fin_Thai 
15: Gov_Thai; KT_Bank; RCPCNK_Found 
16: Gov_Thai; Min_Ag_Thai; Prov_Gov_Sat 
17: Gov_Thai; Min_Def_Thai; Thai_AirForce; Thai_Navy 
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18: Gov_Thai; Min_Def_Thai; Thai_Army; Thai_Navy 
19: Gov_Thai; Min_Def_Thai; Min_SDHS_Thai 
20: Gov_Thai; Min_Def_Thai; Min_PubHth_Thai 
21: Gov_Thai; Min_Ed_Thai; RK_Found 
22: Gov_Thai; Min_FA_Thai; Min_ICT_Thai; Nat_Pol 
23: Gov_Thai; Min_FA_Thai; TIAC_Ltd 
24: Gov_Thai; Min_ICT_Thai; Tham_Univ 
25: CND; Gov_Thai; Min_ICT_Thai 
26: CND; Gov_Thai; Min_NRE_Thai 
27: Gov_Thai; Min_NRE_Thai; TGP_Mun_DO 
28: CVRF; Gov_Thai; Min_PubHth_Thai 
29: Gov_Thai; Thai_AirForce; Prov_Gov_Ran 
30: Gov_Thai; Thai_Army; Thai_Navy; Prov_Gov_Krabi 
31: Gov_Thai; Thai_Army; Prov_Gov_Krabi; Prov_Gov_Ph 
32: Gov_Thai; Thai_Army; Prov_Gov_PN 
33: Gov_Thai; Thai_Army; Prov_Gov_Sat 
34: Dept_DPM; Gov_Thai; Thai_CoastGuard 
35: Gov_Thai; Thai_CoastGuard; Prov_Gov_Krabi 
36: CVRF; Gov_Thai; Thai_Navy 
37: Dept_DPM; Gov_Thai; Thai_Navy 
38: CVRF; Gov_Thai; Tour_Th 
39: Gov_Thai; Prov_Gov_PN; LP_PN 
40: Gov_Thai; Prov_Gov_PN; TGP_Mun_DO 
41: Dept_CE; Min_Int_Thai; Prov_Gov_Krabi 
42: Dept_GAO; Prov_Gov_Krabi; Prov_Gov_Ph 
43: Dept_UP; Min_Int_Thai; Prov_Gov_Krabi 
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44: Mil_Thai; Min_Def_Thai; Thai_Army; Thai_Navy 
45: Mil_Thai; Thai_Army; Thai_Navy; Prov_Gov_Krabi 
46: Mil_Thai; Off_Crown; Thai_Army; Prov_Gov_PN 
47: Mil_Thai; Min_Int_Thai; Off_Crown 
48: Mil_Thai; Min_Int_Thai; Prov_Gov_Krabi 
49: FSI; Mil_Thai; Nat_Pol 
50: Mil_Thai; Min_Def_Thai; Thai_AirForce; Thai_Navy 
51: FSI; Mil_Thai; LP_PN 
52: Mil_Thai; Off_Crown; Prov_Gov_PN; LP_PN 
53: Mil_Thai; LP_PN; PRC 
54: Mil_Thai; Prov_Gov_Krabi; PRC 
55: Min_Int_Thai; Off_Crown; Prov_Gov_Ph 
56: Off_Crown; Thai_Army; Prov_Gov_Ph 
57: Min_Ed_Thai; Off_Crown; Loc_Schools 
58: Min_Int_Thai; Prov_Gov_Krabi; Prov_Gov_Ph; TBNOP 
59: FSI; LP_PN; BMPG 
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APPENDIX F 
RESIDUAL PLOT OF DEPENDENT VARIABLES ORGANIZATIONAL 
PERFORMANCE & READINESS IN UNEXPECTED EVENTS 
Observed
Predicted
Std.  Residual
DV: Organization performance
Model: Intercept + ORGFLXSM
 
NOTE: ORGFLXSM: Organizational Flexibility, TCHSMM: Technical Infrastructure, CULTOPSM: 
Cultural Openness 
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Observed
Predicted
Std.  Residual
DV: Organization performance
Model: Intercept + TCHSMM
 
Observed
Predicted
Std.  Residual
DV: Organization performance
Model: Intercept + CULTOPSM
 
NOTE: ORGFLXSM: Organizational Flexibility, TCHSMM: Technical Infrastructure, CULTOPSM: 
Cultural Openness 
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Observed
Predicted
Std.  Residual
DV: Organization unexpected event
Model: Intercept + ORGFLXSM  
 
Observed
Predicted
Std.  Residual
DV: Organization unexpected event
Model: Intercept + TCHSMM
 
 
 
NOTE: ORGFLXSM: Organizational Flexibility, TCHSMM: Technical Infrastructure, CULTOPSM: 
Cultural Openness 
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Observed
Predicted
Std.  Residual
DV: Organization unexpected event
Model: Intercept + CULTOPSM
 
 
 
Source: Regression Analysis, Data from structural survey distributed to Thailand emergency personnel, 
dated July – August 2005 
NOTE: ORGFLXSM: Organizational Flexibility, TCHSMM: Technical Infrastructure, CULTOPSM: 
Cultural Openness 
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APPENDIX G 
CHARTS OF REGRESSION STANDARDIZED RESIDUAL OF DEPENDENT 
VARIABLES: ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE AND ORGANIZATIONAL IN 
UNEXPECTED EVENTS 
Normal P-P Plot of
Regression Standardized Residual
DV: Organization unexpected event
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Scatterplot
DV: Organization unexpected event
Regression Standardized Predicted Value
3210-1-2-3
R
eg
re
ss
io
n 
St
an
da
rd
iz
ed
 R
es
id
ua
l
4
3
2
1
0
-1
-2
-3
-4
 
 
Normal P-P Plot of 
Regression Standardized Residual
DV: Organization performance
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Scatterplot
DV: Organization performance
Regression Standardized Predicted Value
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APPENDIX H 
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION TABLE: THE EXTENT TO WHICH SOCIO-
TECHNICAL ELEMENT EXISTS IN EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
 
National emergency laws
13 3.7 4.0 4.0
69 19.6 21.2 25.2
182 51.7 55.8 81.0
62 17.6 19.0 100.0
326 92.6 100.0
11 3.1
15 4.3
26 7.4
352 100.0
None
Low
Medium
High
Total
Valid
0
Not Applicable
Total
Missing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
 
Special emergency regulations
5 1.4 1.5 1.5
81 23.0 24.2 25.7
203 57.7 60.6 86.3
46 13.1 13.7 100.0
335 95.2 100.0
6 1.7
11 3.1
17 4.8
352 100.0
None
Low
Medium
High
Total
Valid
0
Not Applicable
Total
Missing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
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Emergency integrated response plans
4 1.1 1.2 1.2
62 17.6 18.3 19.5
215 61.1 63.6 83.1
57 16.2 16.9 100.0
338 96.0 100.0
10 2.8
4 1.1
14 4.0
352 100.0
None
Low
Medium
High
Total
Valid
0
Not Applicable
Total
Missing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
 
Emergency commands and coordinations
6 1.7 1.8 1.8
67 19.0 19.6 21.3
216 61.4 63.2 84.5
53 15.1 15.5 100.0
342 97.2 100.0
9 2.6
1 .3
10 2.8
352 100.0
None
Low
Medium
High
Total
Valid
0
Not Applicable
Total
Missing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
 
Emergency interorganization for communities
11 3.1 3.3 3.3
71 20.2 21.1 24.4
198 56.3 58.9 83.3
56 15.9 16.7 100.0
336 95.5 100.0
9 2.6
7 2.0
16 4.5
352 100.0
None
Low
Medium
High
Total
Valid
0
Not Applicable
Total
Missing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
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Emergency interorganization for agencies
7 2.0 2.1 2.1
91 25.9 26.8 28.9
200 56.8 59.0 87.9
41 11.6 12.1 100.0
339 96.3 100.0
9 2.6
4 1.1
13 3.7
352 100.0
None
Low
Medium
High
Total
Valid
0
Not Applicable
Total
Missing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
 
Multi-ways of info exchange between agencies
12 3.4 3.6 3.6
102 29.0 30.2 33.7
191 54.3 56.5 90.2
33 9.4 9.8 100.0
338 96.0 100.0
12 3.4
2 .6
14 4.0
352 100.0
None
Low
Medium
High
Total
Valid
0
Not Applicable
Total
Missing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
 
Multi-ways of info exchange across sectors
13 3.7 3.9 3.9
107 30.4 32.1 36.0
184 52.3 55.3 91.3
29 8.2 8.7 100.0
333 94.6 100.0
10 2.8
9 2.6
19 5.4
352 100.0
None
Low
Medium
High
Total
Valid
0
Not Applicable
Total
Missing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
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Trained professional managers on duty
11 3.1 3.3 3.3
122 34.7 36.1 39.3
173 49.1 51.2 90.5
32 9.1 9.5 100.0
338 96.0 100.0
11 3.1
3 .9
14 4.0
352 100.0
None
Low
Medium
High
Total
Valid
0
Not Applicable
Total
Missing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
 
Trained reserved personnel on recall
10 2.8 2.9 2.9
94 26.7 27.6 30.6
183 52.0 53.8 84.4
53 15.1 15.6 100.0
340 96.6 100.0
9 2.6
3 .9
12 3.4
352 100.0
None
Low
Medium
High
Total
Valid
0
Not Applicable
Total
Missing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
 
Risk assessment
6 1.7 1.8 1.8
76 21.6 22.9 24.7
218 61.9 65.7 90.4
32 9.1 9.6 100.0
332 94.3 100.0
14 4.0
6 1.7
20 5.7
352 100.0
None
Low
Medium
High
Total
Valid
0
Not Applicable
Total
Missing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
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Building codes
34 9.7 10.6 10.6
107 30.4 33.2 43.8
165 46.9 51.2 95.0
16 4.5 5.0 100.0
322 91.5 100.0
15 4.3
15 4.3
30 8.5
352 100.0
None
Low
Medium
High
Total
Valid
0
Not Applicable
Total
Missing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
 
Structural inspection
54 15.3 17.1 17.1
105 29.8 33.3 50.5
130 36.9 41.3 91.7
26 7.4 8.3 100.0
315 89.5 100.0
16 4.5
21 6.0
37 10.5
352 100.0
None
Low
Medium
High
Total
Valid
0
Not Applicable
Total
Missing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
 
Alternative communication
19 5.4 5.9 5.9
92 26.1 28.4 34.3
182 51.7 56.2 90.4
31 8.8 9.6 100.0
324 92.0 100.0
17 4.8
11 3.1
28 8.0
352 100.0
None
Low
Medium
High
Total
Valid
0
Not Applicable
Total
Missing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
 
 
 
 271 
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Alternative electrical facilities
24 6.8 7.4 7.4
99 28.1 30.6 38.0
163 46.3 50.3 88.3
38 10.8 11.7 100.0
324 92.0 100.0
15 4.3
13 3.7
28 8.0
352 100.0
None
Low
Medium
High
Total
Valid
0
Not Applicable
Total
Missing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
 
Special emergency operation and equipment
13 3.7 4.1 4.1
96 27.3 30.1 34.2
171 48.6 53.6 87.8
39 11.1 12.2 100.0
319 90.6 100.0
23 6.5
10 2.8
33 9.4
352 100.0
None
Low
Medium
High
Total
Valid
0
Not Applicable
Total
Missing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
 
Identification of major facilities
13 3.7 4.0 4.0
78 22.2 23.7 27.7
197 56.0 59.9 87.5
41 11.6 12.5 100.0
329 93.5 100.0
16 4.5
7 2.0
23 6.5
352 100.0
None
Low
Medium
High
Total
Valid
0
Not Applicable
Total
Missing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
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Alternative rescue or emergency response
13 3.7 3.9 3.9
86 24.4 25.7 29.6
188 53.4 56.3 85.9
47 13.4 14.1 100.0
334 94.9 100.0
13 3.7
5 1.4
18 5.1
352 100.0
None
Low
Medium
High
Total
Valid
0
Not Applicable
Total
Missing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
 
Self technical mannual procedure
30 8.5 9.1 9.1
107 30.4 32.3 41.4
166 47.2 50.2 91.5
28 8.0 8.5 100.0
331 94.0 100.0
14 4.0
7 2.0
21 6.0
352 100.0
None
Low
Medium
High
Total
Valid
0
Not Applicable
Total
Missing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
 
Other technical support
9 2.6 10.0 10.0
33 9.4 36.7 46.7
46 13.1 51.1 97.8
2 .6 2.2 100.0
90 25.6 100.0
244 69.3
18 5.1
262 74.4
352 100.0
None
Low
Medium
High
Total
Valid
0
Not Applicable
Total
Missing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
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Shared value of humanitarian assistance
3 .9 .9 .9
19 5.4 5.6 6.5
158 44.9 46.9 53.4
157 44.6 46.6 100.0
337 95.7 100.0
14 4.0
1 .3
15 4.3
352 100.0
None
Low
Medium
High
Total
Valid
0
Not Applicable
Total
Missing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
 
Commitment to goal of protecting life
1 .3 .3 .3
24 6.8 7.1 7.4
194 55.1 57.7 65.2
117 33.2 34.8 100.0
336 95.5 100.0
15 4.3
1 .3
16 4.5
352 100.0
None
Low
Medium
High
Total
Valid
0
Not Applicable
Total
Missing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
 
Willingness to share information needed
1 .3 .3 .3
40 11.4 11.9 12.2
198 56.3 59.1 71.3
96 27.3 28.7 100.0
335 95.2 100.0
16 4.5
1 .3
17 4.8
352 100.0
None
Low
Medium
High
Total
Valid
0
Not Applicable
Total
Missing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
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Acceptance of new information
2 .6 .6 .6
28 8.0 8.4 9.0
210 59.7 62.9 71.9
94 26.7 28.1 100.0
334 94.9 100.0
18 5.1
352 100.0
None
Low
Medium
High
Total
Valid
0Missing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
 
Openness to new methods
5 1.4 1.5 1.5
51 14.5 15.1 16.6
182 51.7 54.0 70.6
99 28.1 29.4 100.0
337 95.7 100.0
15 4.3
352 100.0
None
Low
Medium
High
Total
Valid
0Missing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
 
Willingness to review actions taken
3 .9 .9 .9
47 13.4 13.9 14.7
190 54.0 56.0 70.8
99 28.1 29.2 100.0
339 96.3 100.0
13 3.7
352 100.0
None
Low
Medium
High
Total
Valid
0Missing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
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Willingness to correct mistakes
2 .6 .6 .6
46 13.1 13.8 14.4
182 51.7 54.7 69.1
103 29.3 30.9 100.0
333 94.6 100.0
15 4.3
4 1.1
19 5.4
352 100.0
None
Low
Medium
High
Total
Valid
0
Not Applicable
Total
Missing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
 
Willingness to accept responsibility, solve conflicts
3 .9 .9 .9
47 13.4 14.2 15.2
174 49.4 52.7 67.9
106 30.1 32.1 100.0
330 93.8 100.0
18 5.1
4 1.1
22 6.3
352 100.0
None
Low
Medium
High
Total
Valid
0
Not Applicable
Total
Missing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
 
Willingness to service public
1 .3 .3 .3
22 6.3 6.5 6.8
168 47.7 50.0 56.8
145 41.2 43.2 100.0
336 95.5 100.0
15 4.3
1 .3
16 4.5
352 100.0
None
Low
Medium
High
Total
Valid
0
Not Applicable
Total
Missing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
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Continual search for relevant, accurate info
3 .9 .9 .9
33 9.4 9.9 10.8
1 .3 .3 11.1
199 56.5 59.6 70.7
98 27.8 29.3 100.0
334 94.9 100.0
14 4.0
4 1.1
18 5.1
352 100.0
None
Low
4
Medium
High
Total
Valid
0
Not Applicable
Total
Missing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
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